July 25, 2006: While the roadside bombs (IED, Improvised Explosive Device) in Iraq have proved to be the biggest danger to U.S. troops, it has also provided the means to stimulate and pay for some major military innovations. Billions of dollars has been thrown at attempts to find solutions to what is currently causing about 60 percent of American casualties in Iraq. Out of that has come major developments in electronic warfare, UAVs, intelligence operations, medicine, training, convoy operations, and protection for non-combat vehicles.
There were, however, two unexpected developments. First, it was found that the best defense against IEDs was the vigilance of the troops as they rode through areas where they were likely to encounter IEDs. This was, at the same time, reassuring, and disappointing. Reassuring because alertness in the combat zone has always been a major asset. Disappointing because Americans have come to expect, even rely on, technological solutions to problems.
The new technology helped, but it was not decisive, at least not compared to the ability of the troops to know what to look for, and consistently spot the IEDs before getting close enough to get hurt. This worked because information on how IEDs were set up was quickly collected and passed on to all the troops. This was done with some high tech tools (digital cameras and email), but it was a fairly low tech concept. Keep in mind that casualty rates are at an all time historic low. Less than half the rate in Vietnam, for example, and much lower than in World War II.
The gadgets and new tech do help. Portable electronic jammers prevented many IEDs from being detonated, which was useful when the troops did not spot one. UAVs could also seek out bombs ahead of time, or, more importantly, spot them being planted. This often led to the planting crew getting killed. Intelligence troops developed new pattern analysis tools to predict where IEDs were likely to be planted, and how. The new intel tools also made it easier to identify and catch the people building the bombs. The blast injuries from IEDs led to new medical tools, treatments and procedures.
Because the IEDs exposed combat-support troops to more action than they were accustomed to, new training for these "non-combat" personnel was developed. This led to innovations going right back to basic training, and revolutionized the way convoy operations were run. This included the armoring of trucks and other non-combat vehicles. The next generation of U.S. support vehicles will come ready to have "armor kits" quickly installed, and uninstalled.
The other unexpected development was the realization that IEDs were nothing new. They had been used before, especially in Vietnam and World War II (by the Japanese in the Philippines), but with much less success. That's because Iraq was unique in ways that made the IED a widely used weapon. The primary reason for that was the inability of the Iraqi terrorist to deal with American troops head-to-head. When they tried that, Iraqi casualties were lopsided and very bad for terrorist morale. IEDs eliminated most of the risk to the attackers. The Iraqi terrorists, backed by ample supplies of Baath Party cash (stolen oil money), lots of technically adept, but unemployed (they had worked for Saddam) Sunni Arabs, and ample supplies of explosives (Saddam had bought huge amounts of munitions), it was possible to make lots of IEDs. So what if the Americans avoided 90 percent of them, the remaining ten percent still produced plenty of casualties. Attempts to repeat this use of IEDs elsewhere, like in Afghanistan, have failed. The same conditions were not present, as was the case in previous wars where IEDs showed up.
IEDs are not a new weapon, nor are they unique. But they did, in Iraq, prove useful to user and victims alike.