December 22, 2011: Lessons have been learned in Iraq and Afghanistan and over the last decade the U.S. Army has been revamping its training and operating manuals to reflect what was learned (or, often, relearned). The army has dozens of manuals, pamphlets, and other documents detailing how the troops should be trained and how they should fight. All these are being brought up to date with what has been learned recently. Most of what is being lost is speculative stuff added in the 1990s, after the Cold War ended, and the army foresaw a future in which technology would change everything. Tech did bring many changes but not always as anticipated. Combat and a live (not imaginary) enemy impose a reality that often cannot be predicted.

For example, five years ago the army completed a revision of its counterinsurgency (COIN) manual for the first time in twenty years. The new manual, FM 3-24, was accurate but caused controversy. It had become a matter of faith for many Americans that no matter what happened in Iraq or Afghanistan it was a defeat for America and the United States was doomed to lose. Yet the U.S. found ways to deal with everything the Islamic and sectarian terrorists could come up with. Iraq and Afghanistan were very different situations but American troops adapted and prevailed in both. The biggest problem turned out to be agreeing on exactly what "victory" was.

The army and marines have a long history of success fighting guerillas. Even Vietnam, which conventional wisdom counts as a defeat, wasn't. The conventional wisdom, as is often the case, is wrong. By the time the last U.S. combat units pulled out of South Vietnam in 1972 the local guerilla movement, the Viet Cong, was destroyed. North Vietnam came south three years later with a conventional invasion, sending tank and infantry divisions charging across the border and conquering their neighbor the old fashioned way.

When the United States got involved with South Vietnam in the late 1950s there was good reason to believe American assistance would lead to the defeat of the communist guerilla movement there. In the previous two decades there had been twelve communist insurgencies and 75 percent of them had been defeated. These included Greek Civil War (1944-1949), Spanish Republican Insurgency (1944-1952), Iranian Communist Uprising (1945-1946), Philippine Huk War (1946-1954), Madagascan Nationalist Revolt (1947-1949), Korean Partisan War (1948-1953), Sarawak/Sabah "Confrontation" (1960-1966), Malayan Emergency (1948-1960), Kenyan Mau-Mau Rebellion (1952-1955). The communists won in the Cuban Revolution (1956-1958), the First Indochina War (1945-1954), and the Chinese Civil War (1945-1949). The communists went on to lose the guerilla phase of the Second Indochina War (1959-1970).

The main problem with COIN is that the American armed forces take it for granted. U.S. troops have been defeating guerilla movements for centuries. Through all that time COIN has been the most frequent form of warfare American troops encountered. But COIN has always been viewed as a minor, secondary, military role. It never got any respect. Even the U.S. Marine Corps, after half a century of COIN operations, were glad to put that behind them in the late 1930s. All that remained of that experience was a classic book "The Small Wars Manual" written by some marine officers on the eve of World War II. That book, which is still in print, contained timeless wisdom and techniques on how to deal with COIN operations and "small wars" in general. Much of the work the army has done in the last five years to revise their manuals could have been done just by consulting the Small Wars Manual. In some cases that's exactly what was done.

The basic truth is that COIN tactics and techniques have not changed for thousands of years. What has also not changed is the professional soldiers disdain for COIN operations. This sort of thing has never been considered "real soldiering". But the U.S. Army and Marines have finally come to accept that COIN is a major part of their job, something that U.S. troops have always been good at, and something that you have to pay attention to. So when you see more news stories about the COIN keep in mind the history of that kind of warfare and how long, and successfully, Americans have been dealing with it.

Recent combat experience has also changed the way American commanders look at warfare in general. Three years ago the army released a new edition of its “how to fight” manual (Field Manual, or FM, used to be 100-5, now 3-0). The 2008 edition puts nation building (as in Iraq and Afghanistan) on an equal level with conventional warfare. That was a major change. For nearly a century, FM 100-5 was revised every 5-10 years to reflect changes in technology, experience, and perceived threats. Until the Cold War ended in 1991, 100-5 reflected an emphasis on traditional war. This was prompted by the need to deal with the mighty Red Army of the Soviet Union. But in the 1990s the hundreds of Soviet combat divisions disappeared. The 1993 edition put more emphasis on peacekeeping, counter-insurgency, and nation building. That has grown steadily over the last few editions. A trend, so to speak, that has reduced the emphasis on conventional warfare to parity with “operations other than war”.

FM 100-5 provides guidelines for commanders and planners. The new 100-5 implies a need for more infantry, military police, civil affairs, engineer, and intelligence units. This reflects the experience of the last decade. What the new FM 100-5 does is make it possible to establish many temporary changes as permanent modifications to army organization, tactics, training, and equipment.

Throughout most of its history the U.S. Army did what the new 100-5 describes. Only during major wars did the army gear up for conventional war. Thus the army has an institutional history of dealing with operations other than war. But there is still a cultural divide between the “conventional war” generals and those who are more into peacekeeping and nation building. Part of this is cultural, as soldiering is traditionally seen, worldwide, as preparing for big battles and fighting other soldiers. But the U.S. is unique in having a military tradition heavy on what the army did in Iraq and Afghanistan. You can see this in the creation of the Special Forces half a century ago and the presence of so many civil affairs units. With the new 100-5 the army is going back to its roots.

The new 100-5 also gives army reformers an opportunity to continue with their efforts to introduce more technology. It was new tech that made the army so successful in Iraq and Afghanistan. GPS guided bombs, missiles, and shells greatly reduced civilian casualties and made it easier to maintain and build the loyalty of civilians. Computers and data mining software made it possible to sort out the bad guys from the innocents. The battlefield Internet and satellite communications enabled troops to react more quickly than their terrorist opponents. The proliferation of inexpensive and powerful night vision gear took away one of the enemies most powerful assets - the ability to operate under cover of darkness. Computer game technology enabled the army to quickly develop useful simulations for showing troops how to handle new situations. This meant everything from handling local civilians to avoiding roadside bombs. New protective vests and tactics lowered casualties to less than half the rate suffered in Vietnam.

Most army troops currently spend the bulk of their training time getting ready for peacekeeping and nation building operations. This will no longer be seen as a temporary situation. When U.S. troops are out of Iraq and Afghanistan some units will again train for conventional war, but the career officers and NCOs won’t forget what they learned from their other training and combat experiences.

The army has already disbanded many of its artillery units. First, this was done because many of these guns were no longer needed to fight a Red Army that no longer existed. But this change also reflected the introduction of GPS guided shells and missiles that meant less ammunition would be needed in the future and that meant fewer artillery units to fire the shells and missiles. Iraq also saw many artillerymen retrained for infantry duties. That will probably remain. Tank units proved to be useful in fighting terrorists but had to use different tactics. And tank crews also had to improve their infantry skills. Military police became more proficient at guarding convoys, handling more dangerous prisoners (terrorists), and dealing with civilians. Military intelligence units became more like police analysts, looking for the few bad guys among a large population of innocents.

The new 100-5 will generate a lot of new ideas, equipment, tactics, and training methods. It’s not a revolutionary document but an evolutionary one. And the evolution continues. With more emphasis on troops getting to know the locals, using police techniques to hunt down the bad guys, and adapting new technology (computers, UAVs and robots) to old needs. Officially, the army sees these new manuals remaining viable for another 10-20 years. By then, China may have completely updated its armed forces and become the new Big Bad.