by Austin Bay
March 2, 2011
Libyan rebels on the outskirts of Tripoli foreshadow the
demise of Col. Moammar Gadhafi's four decades of dictatorship.
But Gadhafi's not gone -- yet -- and the Libyan Civil War of
2011 may or may not end even if he goes in a coffin or on a jet into Venezuelan
In comparison, Tunisia's and Egypt's revolts were quite
restrained. Popular protests broke Zine el Abidine Ben Ali's Tunisian regime.
Ben Ali essentially ran a family mob operation. Skimming billions was his
objective. Can't spend it dead. When the Tunisian Army refused to back him, he
fled to Saudi Arabia.
Egypt's Hosni Mubarak raked in several billion, but he also
saw himself as a soldier ensuring national stability. When his fellow generals
convinced him he was triggering national instability, he left for a villa in
In Libya, however, anti-government demonstrations quickly
spiraled into bloody combat and atrocity.
Libya's dictatorship differs from those that ruled Tunisia
and Egypt. The difference begins with Gadhafi himself. Unlike Ben Ali and
Mubarak, Gadhafi is a megalomaniacal crank absolutely sold on his own
history-altering significance. After he overthrew Libya's monarchy in 1969, he
announced that he was a great leader but lacked a great nation. So he decided
to expand his power to a size more compatible with his ego by invading
neighbors and sowing chaos.
He invaded Chad. He supported terrorists and assassins who
launched attacks in Africa and Europe. He sought chemical and nuclear weapons.
Truly great leaders are also philosophical visionaries, so the colonel created
his own ideology, a mad amalgam of pan-Arabism and socialism with a dash of
He has suffered numerous defeats, but damaging his ego takes
American power. The 1986 U.S. air raid, following a Libyan terror bombing in
Germany, scared him. When the U.S. toppled Saddam in 2003, he ended his nuclear
weapons quest. Violent megalomaniacs who have successfully terrorized their
domestic opposition for decades, however, don't go without a bloodbath. Saddam
didn't -- nor will Gadhafi.
Gadhafi's military reflects Gadhafi's commitment to himself.
The core of his army is a 5,000-man regime-maintenance brigade that is loyal to
him, not Libya. In contrast, Tunisia's and Egypt's armed forces are
fundamentally nationalist institutions led by military professionals. Many of
their best officers work closely with civilian-controlled Western militaries.
Even if they argue that their circumstances differ from France or the U.S.,
they know democracy works. They have witnessed Spain's transition from Franco's
dictatorship to full-fledged membership in NATO and the European Union. They
also see Turkey as a model.
Nationalism, professionalism, Western military contacts and
developmental insight do not prevent corruption in the Tunisian and Egyptian
armed forces, but they do help explain why these organizations refused to fire
on mass demonstrations by their own people.
In November 1979, Commentary Magazine published Jeane
Kirkpatrick's controversial essay, "Dictatorships and Double
Standards." Kirkpatrick (who later served as U.S. ambassador to the United
Nations) contrasted autocracies (e.g., shah of Iran) with totalitarian regimes
(e.g., Fidel Castro).
Totalitarians sought to destroy social institutions and
replace them with ideological instruments; autocrats might seek to control
traditional institutions but not destroy them. Kirkpatrick wrote in a Cold War
context, where the Soviet Union was poised to replace a U.S.-friendly autocrat
with a communist. That threat no longer exists, but in the Middle East,
militant Islamists attempt to exploit institutional vacuums.
Kirkpatrick's essay still sparks debate. One of her core
arguments, however, is pertinent to 2011's dramatic rebellions. People shape
events, not vague historical forces or deterministic theories, and people who
seek to successfully transition their society from a dictatorship to a
democracy need reliable institutions that promote consensus, compromise and the
pursuit of power by legal means.
So far, the Tunisian and Egyptian militaries have fulfilled
that role, by supporting negotiations and a stable transition process leading
to national elections. Gadhafi's cult of megalomaniacal personality regime has
nothing immediately comparable.
With Egyptian, Tunisian and NATO assistance, defecting
Libyan military commanders and their units may provide the skeleton of a stabilizing
institution, especially if coast and desert tribal leaders will support it.
Hope that NATO spies and special forces in contact with the rebels are
forwarding this goal.