July 22,
2008: The Afghan government believes
that key leaders in the Pakistani army and intelligence service (the ISI) are
still making deals, some of them secret, with the Taliban and Islamic radical
groups, to make it easier for Afghanistan to be attacked, while providing
Pakistan some immunity from terrorism. This kind of cynical arrangement is a
staple of politics, especially in the Moslem world. Islamic radical groups will
grant such immunity from attack in return for favors, then later resume
attacks. So while the Afghan accusations may sound bizarre to Western ears,
they make a lot of sense along the Afghan-Pakistan border. Behind the scenes,
the U.S. is trying to get the Pakistani army and ISI to change their strategy,
but that is not easy. The generals leading both organizations (and the current
head of the Pakistani military used to head ISI) are more concerned with
self-preservation in the long term, than in eliminating Taliban activity inside
Afghanistan. To the Pakistani generals, the Taliban are just another in a long
line of tribal troublemakers. And it's traditional to deal with these fellows
using bluff and bluster, rather than anything more expensive (like bullets and
soldiers lives). Ideally, you'd like to get the tribes fighting each other,
which is exactly what is happening when the Taliban go to Afghanistan. This
year, however, there is an additional complication. Several thousand al Qaeda
terrorists (or recruits) have showed up, the aftereffect of the al Qaeda defeat
in Iraq. It's not yet clear how many of the al Qaeda men will cross the border,
or stay and try to take control of Pakistan. The ISI is negotiating, hoping to
get most of these new thugs into Afghanistan. But al Qaeda needs Pakistan as a
base, and NATO is leaning on Pakistan hard to not allow that.
The
Taliban have developed more effective tactics this year. After a disastrous
outing last year, the Taliban were under a lot of pressure to reduce their
casualties this year, and they have. The Afghans have always been adaptable,
especially when it is a matter of life and death, and there have been many
small changes in Taliban tactics to counter the greater lethality of NATO
forces (who use UAVs, smart bombs and better trained troops). Taliban forces now
operate in smaller groups, keeping
weapons (which can be identified from the air by UAV or aircraft cameras)
hidden, and concentrate forces just before an attack. Cell phones and
walkie-talkies make this easier. Taliban will also break off an attack quickly,
knowing that the smart bombs are on the way. The Taliban will stay near the
Pakistani border, because the Americans and NATO rarely pursue, although smart
bombs are more frequently dropped on the Pakistani side. But once a group of
armed Taliban have made it into Pakistan, they can melt into the civilian
population. Which leads to another popular Taliban tactic, using civilians as
human shields. It doesn't always work, and when it doesn't the Taliban are
quick to claim another NATO atrocity. The Taliban have also been using a
growing number of deceptions to try and get NATO smart bombs or artillery to
hit friendly targets. A favorite one on the border is to fire mortar shells at
NATO troops on one side of the border, and at nearby Pakistani border guards
just across the frontier, to try and deceive NATO and Pakistani troops into
believing they are firing at each other. NATO counter-fire radars have spotted
the shells, and traced them all back to the same location. But such radars are
not always available, and sometimes this trick works. Another deception is feed
bad intel to the followers, and try and trigger a missile or smart bomb attack
on civilians.
This year's
Taliban tactics, however, are more disruptive and less concerned with taking
permanent control of territory. The Taliban is trying to disrupt the Afghan
government control (which was never very great to begin with), and wear down
the foreign troops (and cause popular discontent back home that will lead to
NATO forces being recalled). The Taliban are playing the long game, which is
how things are done up in these hills, when you are dealing with a more
powerful opponent. The Taliban have no doubt that their foe (the Afghan government
and their foreign allies) are more powerful. The foreign troops in particular,
are very deadly. The older Taliban, who fought the Russians in the 1980s, note
that the NATO and U.S. troops are all equal to the small number of commandos
the Russians used. Back then, the only Russians the Afghans feared were the few
thousand paratroopers and Spetsnaz commandos they sometimes encountered. When
that happened, the Afghans knew it was time to retreat, quickly. But now, even
the Afghan Army troops are more lethal. They have been trained by the Westerners,
and that has made a difference. But most of the opponents the Taliban face are
anti-Taliban (or pro-government, there is a difference) tribal fighters. The "Taliban
War" is basically a tribal conflict, just as it was back in the 1980s, against
the Russians, and in the 1990s, when the Taliban captured Kabul, and almost
took over the entire country (cut short by the U.S. invasion of late 2001.)
The
Taliban are paying more attention to extortion and taking over business
operations, on both sides of the border. The Taliban may be on a Mission From
God, but God's children have expenses and must get paid. The more the better.
The tribal areas are poor, and the Taliban attracts a better grade of roughneck
if they can pay better. The Taliban leaders, in particular, want more reliable
gunmen, if only to provide themselves with better personal security. NATO has stepped
up efforts to track down and kill the Taliban and al Qaeda leadership. This is
happening more often, and is disrupting Taliban operations in areas where key
leaders are taken out. The American get more cooperation from Afghans in this,
because the Taliban have increased their attacks on reconstruction projects.
This year, more efforts are being made to kidnap foreign aid workers, and hold
them for ransom. The Taliban could kill these guys, but the ransom routine has
the same demoralizing effect on the aid workers, and raises badly needed cash
as well. In the last week, two French aid workers were grabbed, and two Turkish
ones were released, after ransom was paid, after being held a week.
The U.S. is
doubling the number of MRAPs (armored trucks designed to deflect mine and
roadside bomb explosions) in Afghanistan (to 1,600). These must be driven in
from Pakistani ports. That will come in handy, because the Taliban are trying
to take down the road based NATO supply line, that stretches from the Pakistani
coast into Afghanistan. These trucks are protected by lucrative security
arrangements made with tribes that "own" the roads. These guys don't like
seeing this income threatened by a bunch of religious fanatics. Most of this
fighting is taking place on the Pakistani side of the border, and NATO has
quietly told the Pakistanis that if these supply lines cannot be protected,
NATO would have to come in and do it. This, more than anything else, motivates
the Pakistanis to tone down Taliban violence, at least on the Pakistani side of
the border.
July 16,
2008: Despite new tactics, the Taliban
still get chewed up pretty badly. A Taliban war band, of about 300 men, was
spotted as it crossed over from Pakistan, and quickly jumped on by NATO troops
and smart bombs. About half the Taliban were killed, and the rest wounded,
captured, or scattered. It's catastrophes like this that force the Taliban to
pay better, and to encourage their commanders to keep their fighters dispersed.
But many of the Taliban big shots are traditionalists, and just love the
feeling of leading a column of several armed men through the mountains. It's a tradition
that's become an expensive luxury, one that often costs you your life.