December 18,2008:
A lot of the fighting in Afghanistan isn't about religion or
"expelling the foreigners." No, it's usually about money, power and
tribal politics. The current Afghan government is having the same problems
"running the country" that the Taliban did. These were the same
problems the loose coalition that defeated the communist government in the
early 1990s had. These were the same problems that the monarchy had for over a
century, even though the kings were usually well aware of what they were
dealing with (a loose coalition of tribes and ethnic groups that don't really
get along, but really can't afford to be at war for a long time.) Afghanistan has
always been a poor country. Banditry can be sustained indefinitely, especially now
that the foreign troops and NGOs are here, with all manner of things to steal.
Afghans don't consider it theft if you take something you need (or, let's face
it, just want) from someone outside your tribe. That's just taking care of your
own. And therein lies the problem. There is no Afghanistan, just a patchwork of
tribes and tribal alliances. Within the larger tribes there are often nasty
rivalries between large clans. Then there are the newly rich drug gangs, which
are tribe based, and have changed the power relationships among some of the
tribes.
The
"Taliban" (religiously conservative, and violent, factions) are on a
mission from God to impose strict lifestyle rules, and turn the country into a
religious dictatorship. The Taliban were unable to do that by the end of 2001,
and are less likely to do it in the future. But fueled by a share of the drug
profits and the proceeds of other criminal enterprises (especially extortion
and kidnapping) they can still entice poor, but adventurous, country boys to
come along and raise some hell. And usually get killed by smart bombs the star
struck kids cannot comprehend. Meanwhile, more and more of the tribes are
getting a clue and making peace with the central government. While the national
rulers tend to be thieves, they are also willing to share the loot. That's
another ancient Afghan custom, and U.S. and NATO commanders are willing to play
along in order to prevent the country from slipping back into anarchy (real
anarchy, not the Taliban terrorism that passes for it these days) and once more
becomes a terrorist haven. The foreign generals believe it will take another
year or two of smart bomb magic to kill enough thrill seeking tribesmen, to get
all the tribes on board. The math is simple; the foreign troops can kill
Afghans much better than the other way around. Even the most pro-Taliban tribes
eventually come to realize that, and live with it. The country will not be
peaceful at that point. There will still be the drug gangs and bandits (groups
of armed tribesmen out of steal or settle some feud). But that's been going on
for thousands of years, and won't change until the national police get
themselves pulled together. That will take another generation or two. For most
Afghans, "police" is an alien concept, and the corruption of most of
the cops in service has been really bad public relations.
U.S. and
NATO commanders are fed up with the "protection" scam being run them
on the supply route from Peshawar, in the Pakistani tribal territories, to
Kabul. The road runs through the 50 kilometer long Khyber pass, and that is but one part of a 500
kilometers trip over generally bad roads. The tribes that live along the road
expect to be paid, as do the criminal gangs near the dozen truck staging areas
(where shipping container are loaded). Some 50,000 of those containers a year
carry U.S. and NATO military supplies. That's about half the traffic, which has
increased greatly since the Taliban were tossed out of power in late 2001. Getting
each container from the Pakistani port of Karachi to Kabul costs several
thousands of dollars in fees, bribes and wages to Pakistanis, Afghans and
assorted greedy officials and tribesmen along the way. Some tribal leaders say
they are only interested in keeping the trucks from bringing alcohol and
pornography into Afghanistan, but the bottom line is how much cash gets into
the pockets of some of the gunmen living along the route.
The Taliban
continue to get slaughtered whenever they mass, and get spotted by foreign
troops. It's the damn smart bombs, and the UAVs that always seem to show up at
the wrong time for the tribal gunmen. In response, the Taliban have tried to
use more suicide and roadside bombs. There were 264 of these encountered in
October, and 315 in November. Most of these bombs are poorly constructed and
deployed. They are spotted, or don't go off. It takes 40-50 roadside bombs to
kill one foreign soldier. A dozen or more local civilians are killed instead,
which makes the Taliban roadside bombing program very unpopular. Civilians
often tip off police when they see bombs being planted. Recruiting suicide
bombers is difficult. One recent suicide bomber was a thirteen year old boy,
whose explosives killed himself and three British troops.
December 10,
2008: During a night operation to capture a Taliban leader in the southern
province of Zabul, U.S. Army Special Forces operators chased their suspect to a
compound. When the Taliban inside would not surrender, the Special Forces began
moving in to capture or kill the enemy gunmen. Several hundred meters away
there was an Afghan police unit manning a roadblock. The Afghan police knew
that U.S. troops were after some Taliban that night, but did not know exactly
where the action was. Then they saw some men firing at a compound, and decided
the attackers were Taliban. So the police opened fire. The Special Forces troops,
not knowing it was police firing at them, fired back, and soon called in a
smart bomb, which killed six of the police and wounded 13. The Taliban got away
while the Special Forces troops were discovering that their
"attackers" were actually police, and tending to the wounded.