February 5, 2012:
The
Afghan
government
and
non-Pushtuns
in
general are
upset
with
a
recent
American
announcement
that
they,
along
with
most
NATO
troops,
plan
to
halt
major
military
operations
a
year
ahead
of
schedule
(by
2013).
The
U.S.,
and
some
other
NATO
allies,
would
shift
to
commando
and
training
operations.
The
Special
Forces
and
commandos
would
continue
to
hunt
down
Taliban
and
drug
gang
leaders,
while
foreign
trainers
continued
to
upgrade
the
skills
of
Afghan
soldiers
and
police.
The largest foreign force in Afghanistan is American (90,000 troops) but a quarter of those will be gone within a year. What many (Afghans and foreigners) fear is that Afghan soldiers and police will not be able to effectively replace the foreign troops. There is also a lot of trepidation about the Afghan police, who continue to be poorly trained and led, and generally unwelcome. Afghans have no tradition of rural police and the tribal leaders resent the loss of policing authority. Most Afghans believe the police are ineffective in dealing with crime or tribal leaders who oppose "outsiders" (the police) imposing on traditional powers. Yet each year more and more rural Afghans report encountering honest and effective police. But the rate of improvement is slow and most Afghan cops are still inept and corrupt.
Another problem is money. The Afghan security forces will reach their planned strength of 350,000 (soldiers and police) by 2014. This force will cost $6 billion a year to run and the Afghan government cannot afford it. Some 90 percent of the money must come from foreign donors. But most donor countries (especially American and European) are having cash-flow problems and France has suggested that the Afghan security forces be reduced 35 percent (to 230,000) to ease the burden on donor states. After all, the Taliban only have about 20,000 gunmen. Throw in another 10,000 bandits and hired guns working for drug gangs and other criminal organizations and that appears reasonable. But no one will know for sure until the foreign troops back off or leave and the Afghans take over. That is already happening in some parts of the country and the results are mixed. Some NATO nations believe Afghan forces will be less likely to succeed if American and NATO forces leave earlier than 2014. Everyone agrees that there is a risk of civil war when foreign troops cease combat operations. The Taliban and some pro-Taliban Pushtun tribes have made no secret of their desire to run the country again. Afghans fear a resumption of the civil war, which was interrupted in late 2001, when the Americans intervened on the side of the Northern Alliance (a coalition of non-Pushtun groups from the non-Pushtun north).
The civil war began in the late 1970s, when the Afghan Communist Party sought to upset the tribal alliances that had defined Afghan politics for centuries and replace it with a communist dictatorship. The tribes saw this as an assault on their religion (communists were openly anti-religion) as well as their tribal independence and power. The tribes promptly took control of the countryside and began marching on the cities (where the communists had most of their supporters). Russia, which backed the new communist government, sent in troops in 1979 rather than see the tribes regain control. The Russians entered Afghanistan for political, not economic, reasons and left ten years later, leaving a communist government behind. Most previous conquerors of Afghanistan had come for economic reasons and had the means and incentive to stay for long periods. But the Soviet Union was in terrible economic shape in 1979 and dissolved in 1991, which was a major reason they left in 1989. The 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union cut off subsidies for the pro-Russian Afghan government and that government was soon overthrown. The usual ethnic and tribal factions then continued the civil war, mostly over control of the traditional capital of Afghanistan, Kabul.
Meanwhile, some of the Pushtun factions had been radicalized by Saudi Arabian missionaries in Pakistan during the 1980s and were subsequently always the most numerous radicals.
Millions of Pushtuns had fled to Pakistan in the 1980s to escape the violence.
The Pushtuns live mostly in the south, are 40 percent of the population, and are part of a Pushtun region that has two-thirds of the Pushtuns in Pakistan (where they are only 15 percent of the population). Many of the Pushtuns had always been more traditional and socially conservative
than the non-Pushtun tribes. The Saudi missionaries brought with them the ultra-conservative Wahhabi form of Islam, and the most enthusiastic Afghan converts became the Taliban. It was the ISI that formally recruited (from Pushtun refugees attending Pakistan Islamic religious schools) and armed the Taliban and sent them into Afghanistan to end the civil war and take control of the country. The Taliban recruited like-minded Pushtuns in Afghanistan and proceeded to fight the other ethnic factions for control. By 1996, the Taliban had control of southern Afghanistan
and Kabul. This war was still going on when September 11, 2001 came along.
The Taliban never conquered the entire country and most current Taliban terrorism is still in the Pushtun south. But from the beginning the Taliban were supported, and heavily influenced, by the Pakistani ISI
(their main intelligence agency). Since September 11, 2001, Pakistani support for American anti-terror efforts has turned most of the Taliban (at least the Pakistani branch) and al Qaeda against Pakistan. Yet the ISI stays in touch with the Taliban and al Qaeda, even though they are officially at war with all of these terrorists.
Pakistan sees Afghanistan as its buffer against Russia and Iran and a nation that Pakistan should have a lot of influence over. Most Afghans are not happy with this attitude, which has led to a permanent state of tension between the two states. Most Afghans are particularly unhappy with the fact that Pakistan created the Taliban and still actively supports it, meaning that
a Taliban takeover of the country means a Pakistani takeover. A majority of Afghans, including most Pushtuns, oppose this.
In favor of the Taliban takeover are pro-Taliban Pushtuns (about a quarter of the Pushtuns, or about ten percent of all Afghans). The Taliban believe they can take over the country because they are on a mission from God, are Pushtuns (who always believe they should be in charge), and because the many tribes of Afghanistan could not effectively unite against the Taliban coalition. Finally, the Taliban believe they will get a lot of support (mostly in secret) from Pakistan. The Taliban would also have the financial support of the drug gangs, who established themselves in the 1990s, and paid the Taliban “taxes” for the privilege of turning southern Pakistan into the source of nearly all the world's supply of illegal heroin and opium. The drugs, and their producers, are hated by most Afghans but provide the Taliban with cash to hire gunmen and bribe officials. As a practical matter there is no way the Taliban could take over again, if only because so many Afghans have bitter memories of what happened the last time (the late 1990s) when the Taliban were in charge. But a Taliban attempt would cause another round of civil war, which would do a lot of damage.
The
Taliban
called
the
UN
a
liar
after
the
recent
release
of
a
UN
casualty
report
for
2011.
The
UN
counted
3,021
civilians
killed
by
combat
last
year,
an
eight
percent
increase
over
last
year,
and
77
percent
were
the
victims
of
Taliban
action.
The
number
of
civilian
dead
has
doubled
since
2007.
Last
year
the
biggest
increase
was
from
suicide
bombings,
where
civilian victims
were
up
80
percent,
to
450.
But
biggest
killer
remained
roadside
bombs
and
locally
made
landmines,
which
killed
967
civilians.
Military
action
(foreign
or
Afghan)
caused
14
percent
of
civilian
deaths
and
nine
percent
were
from
situations
where
the
source
could
not
be
determined.
Foreign
troops
and
Afghan
security
forces
pushed
the
Taliban
out
of
many
areas but
the
Islamic
terrorists
simply
continued
to
make
their
attacks
wherever
they
could.
This
meant
an
increase
in
violence
in
areas
along
the
Pakistani
border,
as
well
as
contested
areas
in
Kandahar
and
Helmand
provinces
(where
most
of
the
world's
heroin
comes
from).
The
Taliban
doubled
their
use of roadside
bombs
and
mines to
nearly
a
thousand
a
month.
But
the
number
of
these
devices
that
exploded
only
went
up
six
percent
over
last
year.
That's
because
the
American
anti-IED
(Improvised
Explosive
Device)
technology
and
specialists
had
arrived
(from
Iraq)
in
force
and
acclimated
to
Afghan
conditions.
Most
bombs
and
mines
were
detected
and
destroyed.
The
Taliban
had
banned
the
use
of
landmines
in
1998 but
that,
like
most
Taliban
promises
and
proclamations,
was
a
ploy,
not
a
promise.
The
Taliban
always
claim
they
are
fighting
for
the
people but
civilian
deaths
to
Taliban
activity
were
up
14
percent
last
year,
while
deaths
due
to
the
security
forces
(local
and
foreign)
were
down
four
percent.
Deaths
among
foreign
troops
were
566
last
year,
a
drop
of
20
percent
from
2010. Taliban deaths are not reported, but they are counted, but all NATO would admit to was capturing or killing over a thousand Taliban leaders last year. It’s believed over 10,000 other Taliban were killed or (less frequently) captured last year.
The
Taliban
has
been
shifting
its
tactics and
in
the
last
two
years
has
put
more
emphasis
on
assassination
of
government
and
tribal
leaders
who
refuse
to
cooperate.
Last
year,
Taliban
death
squads
murdered
495
people
this
way,
a
160
percent
increase
over
2009.
The Taliban are offering to enter into peace talks. But first they want five Taliban leaders released from American custody. The five are men captured in late 2001 and early 2002. All could stand trial for war crimes as all five killed many Afghans for religious, political, or ethnic reasons during the 1990s. Because of this, the U.S. is opposing Afghan government pressure to make nice and let these five guys go. The only reason the Taliban want peace talks are to help placate some of the dissident Taliban groups. For the last few years, there has been growing factional fighting within the Taliban (both the Afghan and Pakistani branches). This is the result of continued lack of success by the Taliban and the constant loss of leaders to American UAVs and Special Forces. Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia has agreed to host negotiations between the Taliban and the Afghan government.