September 15, 2013:
Afghanistan has over 300,000 soldiers and police for a population of 30 million. That’s about the same as the United States, which has ten times as many military and police personnel for a population that is ten times as large. The big difference is that the U.S. forces are better trained, educated, and competent. They are also much less corrupt. The violence rates are also much different, with Afghanistan having a higher murder rate and many areas that are basically controlled by gangs, warlords, and the Taliban (usually in conjunction with a drug gang). The Afghan forces consider themselves successful because they have been able to keep the Taliban out of the cities and large towns and put the Islamic terrorists on the defensive in rural areas where the Taliban does its recruiting and maintains base camps and terrorist training and support facilities.
Western trainers and advisors report that the Afghan security forces are more effective than their opponents (gangsters and the Taliban) but still less effective than their foreign counterparts. Then there is the problem with corruption and bad attitudes by many Afghan leaders (civilian and military) who seem more interested in stealing foreign aid than in using such assistance to improve the security forces or Afghanistan in general. This is a constant source of disappointment for foreigners (military trainers and aid workers).
For all these reasons it’s no surprise that Afghan officials are getting a lot more military aid and cooperation from Russia. Despite the brutal Russian invasion (in 1979) and occupation (until 1989), Russians are no longer regarded so bitterly by many Afghans. That’s because the Russian occupation was but one part of a civil war that began in the late 1970s, when the Afghan Communist Party sought to upset the tribal alliances that had defined Afghan politics for centuries and replace it with a communist dictatorship. The tribes saw this as an assault on their religion (communists were openly anti-religion) as well as their tribal independence and power. The tribes promptly took control of the countryside and began marching on the cities (where the communists had most of their supporters). Russia, which backed the new communist government, sent in troops in 1979, rather than see the tribes regain control. The Russians entered Afghanistan for political, not economic, reasons and departed a decade later, leaving a communist government behind. Most previous conquerors of Afghanistan had come for economic reasons and had the means and incentive to stay for long periods. But the Soviet Union was in terrible economic shape in 1979, and dissolved in 1991, which was a major reason they left in 1989 because it was an expense they could no longer afford.
The 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union cut off subsidies for the pro-Russian Afghan government, and that government was soon overthrown. The usual ethnic and tribal factions then continued the civil war, mostly over control of the traditional capital of Afghanistan, Kabul. The Russian departure led to more than two decades of more violence and oppression (by Taliban, warlords, and wealthy drug gang leaders). The Russians have been neighbors since the 19th century and, despite losing their Central Asian provinces in 1991 (when the Soviet Union dissolved), the Russians maintained close relations with the new Central Asian states that are now Afghanistan’s northern border. The Russians are still there and over time have come to be seen as more of a potential friend than a former foe.
After September 11, 2001, Russia
initially
declined
to
provide
much
assistance
for
the
NATO
and
U.S.
effort
in
Afghanistan.
Part
of
this
was
jealousy.
The
U.S.
has
been
much
more
successful
against
the
Afghans
than
the
Russians
were
in
the
1980s.
Not
just
militarily but
also
in
terms
of
logistics.
One
of
the
big
limitations
on
the
Russian
military
effort
in
the
1980s
was
the
lack
of
roads
and
railroads
in
Afghanistan.
The
Soviet
General
Staff
calculated,
even
before
Russian
troops
went
in,
that
the
sparse
transportation
net
would
prevent
Russia
from
supporting
more
than
134,000
troops
there.
Actually,
the
Russians
generally
had
no
more
than
110,000
troops
in
Afghanistan
through
most
of
the
1980s.
But
NATO
and
the
U.S.
built
up
a
force
that
was
nearly
twice
that
size.
There
are
a
few
more
roads
in
Afghanistan
these
days,
and
railroad construction only recently got underway. Western troops
required
far
more
supplies
than
their
1980s
Russian
counterparts
ever
got.
The
U.S.
has
achieved
all
this
by
developing
ways
to
make
better
use
of
existing
roads and
flying
more
material
in.
Despite
their
silence
on
the
matter,
the
Russians
have
been
watching
this
logistical
effort
intently and
taking
notes. Russia also noted that Russian customs (more tolerant of bribes and shady behavior in general) was more in tune with Afghan culture. Russian businessmen and diplomats began to arrive in Afghanistan in 2002. Many Afghans were glad to see this happen and welcome more cooperation with their northern neighbor.
The
northern
Afghan
tribes
remember
that on
September
11,
2001,
they
were
still
fighting
the
Taliban
government
that
had
not
yet
gained
control
over
all
of
Afghanistan. The
"Northern
Alliance"
of
non-Pushtun
tribes
was
still
holding
out.
The
United
States
sent
in
a
few
hundred
Special
Forces
and
CIA
operators,
a
hundred
million
dollars
in
cash,
and
a
few
thousand
smart
bombs
to
help
the
Northern
Alliance
out and
the
Taliban
were
broken
and
fleeing
the
country
within
two
months.
The
northern
tribes
didn't
mind
Pushtuns
getting
the
top
jobs
in
the
new
government but
were
no
longer
willing
to
meekly
follow
the
Pushtun
lead
blindly.
The
Pushtun
see
it
differently,
claiming
(with
some
truth)
that
they
did
most
of
the
fighting
against
the
Russians
in
the
1980s,
and
that
many
of
the
northern
tribes
cut
deals
with
the
Russians
(as
did
some
Pushtun
tribes,
something
the
Pushtuns
don't
like
to
talk
about).
That
had
more
to
do
with
Afghan
politics (the
northern
and
southern
tribes
disagreed
on
how
to
deal
with
Russia
and
modernization)
than
with
anything
else.
Then
came
the
Taliban
(a
cynical
invention
of
the
Pakistanis,
created
from
Pushtun
refugees
convinced
that
a
Holy
War
would
bring
peace
to
Afghanistan).
Meanwhile,
the
heroin
trade
(growing
poppies
and
using
a
chemical
process
to
turn
the
sap
from
these
plants
into
opium
and
heroin)
moved
from
Pakistan
(where
the
government
saw
it
as
a
curse)
to
Afghanistan.
Many
of
the
same
tribes
that
produced
the
refugees
who
became
the
Taliban also
produced
the
most
successful
drug
lords.
The
Pushtun
are
many
things,
including
well
organized
and
ambitious, and Russia has always been a willing ally of the northern tribes.
The Taliban today are basically a faction of the Pushtun tribes and the drug trade is basically run by Pushtuns. For most Afghans, the Pushtuns (40 percent of the population) are the enemy and Russia is a neighbor that has more often than not been a useful friend. The Russians are also interested in stopping the Pushtun drug trade, and this gives the northern tribes and Russia a common goal to work towards. Expect to see more of Russia in Afghanistan after NATO forces depart next year.
As the Afghan security forces take over from foreign troops they are suffering more casualties (over a thousand a month, including about 300 dead). They are inflicting even more casualties on the enemy, as are the growing number of pro-government militias organized to keep the Taliban out of rural areas. This is making recruiting more difficult for the Taliban because most of their recruits may be illiterate but they notice that an increasing number of local guys who went off to work for the Taliban didn’t come back, or came back suffering from combat wounds or having spent a long time in a jail. So the Taliban have lowered their standards and increased pay and benefits. But this has led to less capable and reliable Taliban foot soldiers.
September 14, 2013: In the south (Kandahar) a suicide car bomber, attempting to attack a military convoy, detonated his explosives before he could reach his target and killed three civilians instead. The foreign troops were unharmed.
September 13, 2013: In the west (Herat) nine Taliban were killed when they attempted to get into the U.S. consulate. Two Afghan security guards and an Afghan contractor died defending the place.
September 8, 2013: The Taliban attempted to get into an intelligence facility outside the capital. The attack failed with six attackers and four Afghan soldiers killed.
September 7, 2013: In Pakistan seven Taliban leaders were released from prison in an effort to encourage the Afghan Taliban to negotiate a peace deal. Afghan officials doubt this will do any good and are more frequently claiming that Pakistan is doing this to win favor with the Taliban and don’t really want the Taliban to make peace.
September 5, 2013: In the east (Paktika province) an Indian woman was shot dead by the Taliban who claimed she was a spy for India. The woman, Sushmita Banerjee, was a foreign aid worker who had married an Afghan in 1988 and later escaped Afghanistan and the harsh rule of the Taliban. She wrote a book about her experiences which was made into a popular 2003 Indian movie. But the Taliban denounced the book and movie and threatened revenge. Sushmita Banerjee was well liked in Afghanistan for her work in bringing medical care to women.
September 4, 2013: A female member of parliament was released after being held prisoner by the Taliban for three weeks. This was negotiated, with the government releasing six prisoners the Taliban wanted.
September 3, 2013: In the northeast (Kunar province) local officials said a U.S. UAV missile strike killed eleven civilians and five Islamic terrorists. The federal government agreed with this but NATO officials said no civilians were killed, only ten Islamic terrorists and that this was double checked. It’s suspected that this is another of the “dead goat” scams. This occurs when
the
locals
lie about dead civilians in order to get
NATO compensation
money
(and
to
avoid
Taliban
retribution).
Anytime a missile or
smart
bomb
is used on an
isolated
location
(which
describes
most
of
Afghanistan),
and
there
is
any
chance
of
civilian
casualties,
the
locals
sometimes attempt this scam.
Typically local tribal elders
or government officials
insist
that
outsiders
stay
away
during
this
trying
time.
Even
the
foreign
soldiers
and
Afghan
police
are
put
off
(after
the
search
for
Taliban
bodies,
documents,
and
equipment
is
completed).
Being
good
Moslems,
the locals
bury
the
dead
before
sunset
of
the
same
day.
The
next
day,
the
elders
will
claim
as
many
civilian
dead,
killed
by
smart
bombs,
as
they
think
they
can
get
away
with.
Sometimes
additional
graves
get
a
dead
goat
or
other
animal,
so
the
proper
stench
permeates
the
mound
of
earth.
Digging
up
graves
is
also
against
Islamic
law,
so
the
elders
know
the
foreign
troops
have
to
take
their
word
for
it.
The
elders
also
know
that
the
foreign
troops,
depending
on
nationality,
will
pay
$1,000-$5,000
compensation
per
dead
civilian.
Not
only
is
there
a
big
payday but
the
Taliban
appreciate
the
bad
publicity
directed
at
the
foreigners and
usually
show
their
appreciation
by
cutting
this
village
or
valley
some
slack
in
the
future.
NATO has been running into this scam for years and has learned to be determined about documenting what went on during an air strike to make it impossible for a scam to succeed.
August 31, 2013: In the south (Helmand province) a suicide car bomber detonated his explosives when he found himself trapped in a line of vehicles in front of an army checkpoint. Six people died and twenty were wounded, almost all of them civilians.
August 30, 2013: In the south (Helmand province) a roadside bomb killed twelve civilians. In the north (Kunduz province) a Taliban death squad went after a district (subdivision of the province) leader and killed him using a suicide bomber. The victim was exiting a mosque and eight others were killed and eleven wounded, most of them innocent civilians. The Taliban calls such victims “involuntary martyrs.” Few Afghans agree with this description.
August 29, 2013: In the west (Farah province) the Taliban ambushed a police convoy and killed fifteen policemen.
India is sending seventy-nine more police commandos to increase security around its Afghan embassy and consulates throughout the country.