January23, 2007:
Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki has been recognized as a capable
politician. But there was always doubts about his ability to stand up to the
more aggressive Shia factions. Last Fall, for example, he "exercised Iraqi
sovereignty" by ordering U.S. troops to halt operations against al Sadr
militias in Baghdad. Maliki needed Sadrs support because Sadrs political party
controlled about 30 percent of the Shia members in parliament. Noting that the
Americans actually obeyed Malikis orders, the Sadr militiamen stepped up their
attacks on Sunnis. In the last two months, this has led to Sadrs men moving
into Sunni neighborhoods of Baghdad, and going door-to-door, ordering Sunni
families to flee the city, or die. This was too much even for some of the Shia
political parties, and was anathema to Sunnis inside, and outside Iraq. Saudi
Arabia made noises about sending troops to Iraq. Baghdad has been a Sunni Arab
city for over a thousand years. It was the capital of the first Islamic empire
("caliphate.") In the face of all this, and the realization
that Sadr was losing control of some of his more enthusiastic subordinates,
Maliki told the Americans that he would no longer interfere in their operations
against Shia militias. Sadr got the message, and made nice, but it was too
late. Sadrs subordinates tried to hide, and the militiamen were ordered to be
discreet (no marching around in their black uniforms, carrying guns). The
Americans still had their extensive data files on the Sadr organization, and
dozens of militia officers have been arrested, along with 600 of the more
notorious militiamen. Sadrs crew has been the source of the most notorious
death squads. In the past year or so, every Shia killed by a Sunni terrorist
bomb, was avenged by one or more Sunni Arabs being grabbed and murdered. It was
no longer a matter of hunting down known Sunni Arab killers. There are still
over 100,000 of those out there, former Saddam henchmen with blood on their
hands and fear in their hearts. Most have fled the country, because working for
Saddam paid well and made exile possible. Left behind are Sunni Arabs who never
got a lot from Saddam, and are now paying for it with their lives.
American
commanders are planning on getting the 22,000 troops "surge" out of
Iraq after about six months of operations. That, however, depends on how
effective Iraqi troops can be. As it has been for centuries, the Iraqi army is
very corrupt. Finding officers who are both able and honest is difficult.
American efforts to introduce financial controls, that would reduce the
corruption, have not been popular. Just as it was under the British and the
Turks, being an army officer is seen as a way to get rich. The most ancient
ploy is to claim you have more troops than you actually do, then pocket the pay
for these "phantoms." Another angle is selling weapons, fuel and
equipment, as well as renting out your troops to businesses, or, in some cases,
Shia militias. Some of the worst officers demand kickbacks from their troops.
The
additional U.S. troops will establish about three dozen small bases throughout
Baghdad, and then work with Iraqi soldiers, local police and local officials to
clear out death squads, terrorist cells, and those that support them. There are
already many neighborhoods where this has been done, so there is a model to
follow. What is unknown is whether a "little extra muscle" will bring
lasting peace to many other neighborhoods. The basic problem in Iraq is, and
always has been, a shortage of public minded citizens. In the West, we take for
granted that, in most neighborhoods, there are enough people who care, are
reasonably honest, and "public spirited" to keep the area safe and
livable. In Saddam's time, the peace was kept via terror. Even pro-Saddam
neighborhoods had clan or political gangs to discipline anyone who got out of
line. When, in the West, such gangs are found controlling a neighborhood, it's
considered a great scandal. But in Iraq, it's been the norm for so long, that
many Iraqis have a hard time imaging an alternative. But there are
alternatives, and there are living examples in Iraq. It's an alternative many
Iraqis are not sure is worth the cost. But few Iraqis want another Saddam, so
there is little choice but to clean up their neighborhoods and learn new ways
of running their country.
The
Sunni terrorists are using fewer suicide bombers in their attacks, a result of
many of the suicide bomber organizations being destroyed or, because they were
composed largely of foreign Arabs, forced to flee the country. The anti-al
Qaeda alliance in western Iraq doesn't get much media attention, but they have
managed to clear out al Qaeda, which now operates from those few towns and
villages still containing a lot of terror supporters.
Meanwhile,
the Sunni Arabs in southern Iraq got real quiet after British and American
troops arrived in 2003. Sunni Arabs working for the government quickly fled.
Those who moved too slowly were caught by furious Shia and killed. But over a
million Sunni Arabs lived in southern Iraq, including the largest Sunni Arab
tribe, and several tribes that contained Sunni and Shia clans. While there was
some violence against the Sunni Arab population by Shia militias, there was
nothing like the terrorist violence Sunni groups were committing in Baghdad and
northern Iraq. Unlike western Iraq, the Sunni Arabs of the south did not try to
establish control of towns. They went quietly along with the Shia majority.
While many southern Sunni Arabs fled their homes, or the country, because of
past associations with, or enthusiastic support of, Saddam, the majority have
managed to ride out the war. Currently, an organization of 500 Sunni Arab
clerics works with each other, Shia clerics, and Sunni clerics in other parts
of the country to reduce the violence. It may be too late for that in central
Iraq, where the Sunni terrorism has ignited a mutual blood bath with the Shia
majority. But in the north, the Sunni Arab clergy have helped calm down
terrorist tendencies up there.