April16, 2006:
Making democracy work is proving to be a difficult for Iraqis. Before
2003, pundits (and most Arab governments) insisted that Arabs could not handle
democracy. Arabs were too fractious and could not form the coalitions, and
negotiate the compromises, that make democracy work. Arabs needed a strong
leader, a monarch or dictator, to rule them. This was all said with a straight
face.
The
pundits were not entirely wrong. When given the opportunity. Iraqis formed over
a hundred political parties. That has since shrunk to a few dozen, but
the friction these parties create has continued to prevent the formation of a
government. Compromise, the Iraqis are finding, is hard, especially when it
comes to sorting out who gets what ministry. Unlike in the West, there are
fewer price tags on items in stores, leading to haggling over what an item is
worth. Arabs see this as sport, but in politics it can stretch things out for a
long time. In Iraq these days, that time is also measured in lives lost. One of
the key decisions the government-that-doesn't-exist-yet has to make, is what to
do with the Shia and Kurd militias. There are two each, and the two Shia
militias, those of the Badr and Sadr organizations, both backed by Iranian
factions, are the most dangerous. The Shia militias represent Shia political
parties that want to run the government. Not a democratic government, but a
religious dictatorship
The
two Shia militias are basically religious gangs, whose crimes are now seen as
more of a problem than the declining violence of the Sunni Arab terrorists. For
nearly three years, these Shia religious radicals were considered an asset.
While the Shia radicals in southern Iraq are protected by the 10,000 armed men
of the Badr Brigade (a part of (SCIRI, or the Supreme Council for the Islamic
Revolution in Iraq), a smaller, but similar organization exists in central
Iraq. This is the Mahdi Army, led by Muqtada al Sadr. This group tried to fight
the U.S. forces, and lost big time. The Mahdi Army only has a few
thousand armed men, and they have made themselves very popular in the Shia
community by fighting the Sunni Arab gangs and terrorists that went after
the millions of Shia Arabs living central Iraq. There are several other small
Shia paramilitary organizations in central Iraq, most of which could be
described as local self-defense forces. There is one exception, and these are
police battalions recruited from Shia Arab areas and usually led by Islamic
conservatives. The most notable of these is the Wolf Brigade, a force of some
2,000 well trained and disciplined police. These have been used in operations
in Sunni Arab areas, to find and arrest or kill terrorists.
While
there are several hundred Sunni Arab officers in the new army, the force is
dominated by Kurds and Shia Arabs. Iraqis are worried about who controls the
army and, more to the point, whether the army will try to control the country.
For all of Iraq's short (80 year) history, and for thousands of years before
that, the region has been ruled by generals. Democracy is the new kid on the
block, and many Iraqis are uncertain if democracy can control the generals. The
elected politicians aren't sure either. But as long as the Americans are
around, Iraqi generals won't be running things. So the main concern of Iraqi
politicians is how best to divide up the booty. That's another ancient custom
in this part of the world. Saddam wasn't the first strongman to take over, and
steal as much as he could for himself and his henchmen.
Electing
people is easy, getting those elected officials and legislators to run the
country effectively is hard. This is complicated by the fact that the Shia
Arabs and Kurds have never been allowed to participate in the running of the
country. All these newly elected politicians are inexperienced at doing what they
are supposed to do. From afar, what the democracies of the West do looks easy.
But it isn't. Moreover, the Iraqi politicians are being influenced by family
and tribal loyalties. The idea of "serving a higher power" has not
fully established itself in Iraq. We take "civic duty" for granted.
To Iraqis, this concept is new, and unproven. Better to trust your family,
tribe, and bodyguards. This was how Saddam survived for so long. Iraqis know
and remember that.
It's
corruption that Iraqi politicians understand as well as their Western
counterparts. Get elected, get access to public money, and steal as much as you
can without getting punished. This is where the real war for Iraq's future is
being fought. There will be some corruption, that is understood. No government
on the planet is completely free of it. But too much, and the government does
not work. The voters become unhappy, unrest grows, and you end up with another
dictator. Right now, the politicians are so corrupt that they could drive the
country back to a dictator in less than a decade. Many Iraqis are aware of
this. The question is, will enough honest Iraqis step up, at great risk to
themselves, to establish and maintain a viable (relatively honest and
efficient) government? No one knows, and the politicians are still arguing over
who will have what ministry so that we can start ruling, and dealing with some
very pressing problems.
The
government has to deal with corruption, in the long run, and the militias, in
the short run. The Sunni Arab terrorists and Saddam loyalists are still
fighting, but they have lost. Most Sunni Arab leaders are now more concerned
about protecting their people from the Iraqi army and police. These security
forces are not only dominated by Kurds and Shia Arabs, but are strong, and
growing stronger. Iraq's Sunni Arab neighbors have given up any ideas of
actively supporting putting the Iraqi Sunni Arabs back in power. Instead, the
neighbors are hoping the Shia Arabs and Kurds running the new Iraqi government
will help containing Iran. That is the major goal of the Arab nations of the
region. That sometimes gets forgotten in the West. They never forget it in the
Persian Gulf.