November 24, 2007:
Winter has
hit southeastern Turkey and northern Iraq.
Snow already covers the slopes of the mountains in southeastern Turkey
and is evident in some of the valleys along the Iraq-Turkey border in the
Khandil Mountain region (where the PKK has its base areas). This means that
large scale combat operations are increasingly less likely. Turkish special
operations forces will continue to conduct missions in the region, but
conventional forces attacking high altitude base camps and attempting to hold
territory in cold, wet weather are taking additional risks the kinds of risks
commanders don't relish. Mobility is obviously an issue, but supply may be an
even bigger concern. Bad weather usually grounds transport helicopters and
limits the availability of attack helicopters (special ops and medevac will
still fly). Bad weather also limits the effectiveness of fixed-wing air
support. This does not favor the rebels. Moving on foot in snow and wet weather
conditions in mountainous terrain is very difficult. If rebels are detected in
transit they can "curl up" for only so long. Freezing temperatures become a
threat to life. Light a fire and the rebel column gives away its position.
November 23, 2007: Turkish
officers claim the U.S. promised Turkey that the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party)
will be "eliminated" from Iraq by early next summer. "Eliminated" is a very
strong word, more likely are Turkish media reports that May 2008 is the date
promised for getting rid of PKK bases in Iraq. That makes a lot more sense
because the bases can be destroyed. The PKK fighters, however, will scatter.
The Turkish military is also acknowledging that intelligence sharing with the
US has improved. The US had promised to provide Turkey with better (more
detailed) intelligence on PKK operations in northern Iraq. Turkey has been
interested in receiving more "real-time" intelligence, which usually means
videos from Predator UAVs, but can also mean signals and electronic
intelligence data. However, it's worth remembering that the Turks aren't
novices at using SIGINT and ELINT. The Turks operate their own electronic
warfare aircraft.
November 21, 2007: An Iraqi
Army unit surrounded a refugee camp in northern Iraq and begun inspecting all
vehicles and people who enter and leave the camp. The camp houses Kurdish refugees who fled Turkey in
the 1990s. The Turks claimed the camp serves as a supply point for the PKK.
This is an indication that the Iraqi
government is trying to follow-through on its promise to Turkey to stop PKK
fighters from moving freely in Northern Iraq. Turkey wants more that movement
restrictions, however - Turkey wants PKK leaders arrested.
November 20, 2007: What is the
best way to end the Turkey's Kurd war? Two years ago the Turkish government
decided the time was increasingly ripe for ending the war. It began a
three-pronged plan. The military prong has received the most attention. Turkey
beefed up military forces in southeastern Iraq and established a security zone
that could easily become a "forward deployment area" for launching a major
ground attack into northern Iraq. Turkey also began a diplomatic offensive with
the Iraqi government as the target. The Turks do not want the Iraqi government
to fall. It doesn't want the chaos on its border, nor does it want an
independent Kurdistan to emerge. However, the Turks concluded they could put a
lot of pressure on the Iraqis (both the national government and on Iraqi Kurds)
to give up the PKK camps in northern Iraq. Turkey also pressured the US, which
relies on Turkish land and air routes for supplies. Turkey had to be measured
in the way it took on the U.S., because the U.S. and Turkey have a lot of
common interests that go way beyond Iraq. So what was the third prong? That
third prong actually began in the 1990s, when several Turkish leaders (some of
them Turkish Kurds) said that legitimate Kurdish economic and political
complaints had to be addressed or the war would never end. The Justice and
Development Party (AKP) decided to reach
out to Turkish Kurds as part of its domestic election strategy. Thus, in July 2007 Prime Minister Erdogan's AKP got
a substantial majority of votes in southeastern Turkey (which is a
predominantly ethnic Kurdish region). Kurds also placed 20 independent Kurdish
candidates in Turkey's parliament. For years the majority of Turkish Kurds said
that the "PKK problem" was not the real "Kurdish problem" in Turkey. The real
Kurdish problem was lack of economic opportunity and political
disenfranchisement. Remember, the PKK came to life during the Cold War as a
Marxist rebel organization that wanted to create Communist Kurdistan. Frankly,
most Kurds weren't interested in Communism at all. Many have tired of the
trouble the PKK creates. The AKP decided that these Kurds were potential AKP
voters. So the third prong is democratic enfranchisement in Turkey. Are Turkish
Kurds happy? No, not yet, but there is improvement. Economic and political
improvement in Turkey's Kurdish provinces is a direct attack on the PKK's
political appeal. (Austin Bay)
November 18, 2007: The Iraqi
government announced that it had begun supplying the Kurdish regional
government (in Iraqi Kurdistan) with "more modern security equipment." The
equipment includes computers, security detection equipment, fingerprint
(biometric) analysis equipment, and security cameras. This is the kind of
equipment Iraqi Kurds can use at security checkpoints in Kurdistan to try and
stop PKK rebels.