by Christopher Kyle Hemler
Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2023. Pp. xvii, 228+.
Illus., maps, notes, biblio., index. $34.95. ISBN:1682471349
Firepower in Amphibious Operations
Surely all readers of this newsletter are familiar with Joe Rosenthal’s famous photograph of the US Marines raising the Stars and Stripes on the tiny Pacific Island of Iwo Jima in February 1945. And surely, too, many know that the successful capture of that island from its Japanese occupants took a long and ferociously fought campaign. Few, however, also know that it had taken the Marines two years of amphibious assaults on Japanese-defended islands in the Pacific to hone the skills necessary for success there. This success depended in large measure on the painfully learned lessons of what author Chris Hemler calls triphibious warfare. That is, waterborne assaults on targets ashore that to be effective required three elements of fire support: from naval gunfire, from air bombing and strafing, and from landed artillery.
In his detailed study, Hemler shows how the Marine Corps came to spearhead amphibious warfare for the US military and how it developed the techniques that enabled success. In the interwar period financial constraints kept the Marine Corps small, but it was also specifically assigned the role of carrying out amphibious warfare for the US military. Until World War II amphibious operations against defended areas generally failed, so the Marine Corps was tasked to grapple with the notion of seaborne landings. As a result, between the wars they developed theories behind how to improve performance. The first practical test of these theories was in the assault on the island of Tarawa in November 1943. Here the failure of timing and coordination of supporting firepower for the US forces proved costly, causing the US naval service – of which the Marine Corps was an element - to finally take seriously the problems inherent in amphibious warfare.
In succeeding chapters Hemler discusses the assaults following Tarawa, in the Marshalls, the Marianas and finally the attack on Iwo Jima. He methodically reviews how Navy and Marine Corps officers examined the problems experienced in each attack, resulting in detailed “comments, judgements and recommendations” (p.48) for improvement. The central role of fire support in amphibious operations became clear, as did the need for mutual understanding, respect and above all trust from each of the three critical elements of ground, naval, and air forces. Communications among these three structures were greatly improved over the course of the war, as were the vital issues of timing and synchronization, assisted by the creation of joint assault signal companies (JASCOs) and naval gunfire liaison officers (NGLOs). So too, improved training was emphasized by the creation of a facility on Kahoolawe Island in Hawaii where triphibious fire support was assiduously taught and practiced.
As each new island campaign from the Marshalls to the Marianas to the Bonins brought new problems to light, Hemler does an excellent job of explaining how these were recognized, and solutions were gradually added to what finally became well-tuned though always very challenging operations. The success of the Navy and Marine Corps in these refined triphibious operations was demonstrated dramatically in the campaign for Okinawa when the Japanese military, giving up on trying to oppose the landings on the beaches, chose instead to try to hold defensive perimeters inland.
Among the critiques of Hemler’s book are the fact that he does not give much space to the Army forces involved, nor does he discuss other campaigns such as that on Peleliu. Indeed, his focus is very firmly on the V Amphibious Corps, which is understandable given that this is framed as a major case study. Indeed, the strength of this book is that it is the first close look at how a small group of Navy and Marine Corps officers, whom he identifies and discusses, recognized the critical significance of naval gunfire and close air support to successful amphibious operations. They created the doctrine and techniques that largely enabled the United States to fight successfully against Japanese held islands in the Pacific. Through thorough research, clear writing and a focused, methodical structure, Chris Hemler has produced an important and illuminating study of a much-neglected topic.
Our Reviewer: Prof Williams, former visiting professor at Annapolis, and Executive Director Emerita of The New York Military Affairs Symposium, is the author of several books on naval history and technology, including Secret Weapon: U.S. High-Frequency Direction Finding in the Battle of the Atlantic, Grace Hopper: Admiral of the Cyber Sea, The Measure of a Man: My Father, the Marine Corps, and Saipan, and most recently Painting War: George Plante's Combat Art in World War II. Prof Williams’ previous reviews include The Trident Deception, Battleship Commander: The Life of Vice Admiral Willis A. Lee Jr., Churchill, Master and Commander, Admiral Hyman Rickover, Allied Air Operations, 1939-1940, Nimitz at War, Global Military Transformations, Great Naval Battles of the Pacific War, Fighting in the Dark: Naval Combat at Night, 1904-1939, Leyte Gulf: A New History of the World's Largest Sea Battle, and Road to Surrender: Three Men and the Countdown to the End of World War II.
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