January 28, 2008:
Because of Saddam's continued support
of terrorists, weapons of mass destruction and bad behavior in general, the
U.S. invaded Iraq. Using three divisions, the country was conquered in three
weeks. Britain had done the same thing in 1941 with three divisions, and also
took Baghdad in less than three weeks. But in 1941, the British went in because
Iraq had declared itself an ally of Nazi Germany. After deposing the pro-German
Sunni Arab politicians, the Brits simply installed a pro-British Sunni Arab strong man.
When the U.S. led coalition ousted
Iraqi troops from Kuwait in 1991, most observers, including media pundits,
missed a very important detail. The U.S. has gotten Arab nations to join the
operation only because of a promise not to invade Iraq itself. This was no
secret at the time, and was a reflection of Arab politics. That is, the Sunnis
must be in charge, especially in Iraq, which is considered the front line for
the defense of the Arab world from Iran.
In 2003, the U.S. removed the Sunni
Arabs from power, and declared that democracy, and majority rule, would
prevail. That was anathema to the Iraqi Sunni Arabs, who feared retribution
from the Kurds and Shia Arabs. In addition, there was the money angle. The
Sunni Arabs had been keeping a disproportionate share of the oil wealth for
themselves, and had been doing so for decades. In order to avoid poverty and
prison, the Sunni Arabs began a terror campaign against the coalition (mainly
U.S. and British) troops. In early 2004, they allied themselves with al Qaeda,
and Islamic terrorists in general. Al Qaeda saw the invasion of Iraq as an
attack on their heartland, and an opportunity to defeat the United States, and
the West in general.
The basic U.S. strategy in Iraq was,
historically, sound. You help the locals get organized so they can take care of
themselves. That means elections and help to rebuild local institutions. But
there's never a guarantee that will work. The U.S. Marines were in Haiti for
nearly 30 years (from 1914), and the country still reverted to dictatorship and
poverty when the marines left. This exposes a truth that many refuse to
acknowledge. Fixing countries isn't easy. The "civil society" that we
in the West take for granted, cannot just be conjured up. The harmonious
relationships that enable some democracies to work, are not a given. Those
relationships often require a lot of bad habits to be changed. This is not
easy. Just check a history book.
Iraq, and most of the countries in the
Middle East, are broken. They have been for a long time. We in the West have
generally ignored it, because there were no workable solutions that were easily
available. Then came the latest wave of Islamic terrorism. This got worse,
until September 11, 2001, and then the
prospect of mass murder in our own backyard became a reality. But at
that point, the West became divided over the solution. Do we keep treating the
terrorists as a police problem, and wait them out? That is known to work. But
the threat of even deadlier terrorist attacks made more dramatic moves
attractive to many, especially in the United States. That resulted in Iraq,
confronting the Arab problems up close and personal. It ain't pretty. But
unless the Arab problems are solved, the ugly aftereffects will still be there,
and so will the threat of mass murder on the street where you live. The war on
terror, and the war in Iraq, are all part of a struggle within Islam. Do we
keep on with the same pattern of rebellion and repression, or do we try
developing a civil society. Until the Iraqis decided what kind of country they
wanted to live in, the war went on.
The anarchy that followed the American
conquest of Baghdad was quickly accepted for what it was, spontaneous revenge
against the Sunni Arab dictatorship and the thieves that ran it. Things settled
down for a while, until the Sunni Arabs began the terror campaign to drive the
Americans out, intimidate the Shia Arabs, and regain control of the country.
These were all high-risk undertakings, and all failed. But not until after four
years of terror, and over 100,000 dead Iraqis, did the Sunni Arabs admit
defeat.
After the coalition took over, there
was no more Iraqi police force or army. That's because the Saddam era security
forces were recruited mainly for loyalty to Saddam, and the Sunni Arab
minority. Before Saddam was ousted , the active duty army consisted of about
250,000 troops. Some 40 percent of these were the elite Republican Guard.
Nearly all the army officers, and most of the NCOs, were Sunni Arabs. In the
Republican Guard, everyone was Sunni Arab, as this outfit was, in effect,
Saddam's "royal guard" and his main defense against a revolt by the army. The
other 150,000 troops were mainly Sunni
and Shia draftees, although there were Kurd and other minorities (Turks, and
several Christian groups). At the time of the invasion, about 100,000
reservists (men who had done their conscript service recently) had been
recalled to active duty. There were another 600,000 or so reservists who could
have been called up. But many of these were Shia Arabs, and Saddam didn't want
to see lots of armed Shia, in uniform or not.
Unless you wanted an Iraqi security
force led by Sunni Arabs, many of dubious loyalty to a democratic Iraq, you had
to disband the security forces. The army and police force had to be rebuilt.
After two years of enormous effort, a new force was created. This was not easy,
for the old Iraqi army was widely considered (based on performance alone) to be
one of the most inept in the world. Despite spending over a hundred billion
dollars on it, Saddam was never able to build a force that could fight
effectively. Without the widespread use of chemical weapons in the 1980s, Iraq
would have been overrun by an army of poorly equipped Iranian amateurs. The
main problem was that the old Iraqi army was designed more for political, than
combat, reliability. That's the main reason it was disbanded shortly after Iraq
was conquered in 2003.
Saddam's army did have some troops who
could fight effectively. That was the Republican Guard, a force of about
100,000 troops selected mainly for loyalty, but also given lots of training to
make them effective fighters. Saddam wanted effective troops, but only wanted
them if they would be loyal to him. That meant there were very few Iraqis he
could find for such a force. But the Republican Guard experience did prove that
with the right training and equipment, you could turn Iraqis into effective
soldiers.
Equipping the new Iraqi army was the
easy part. Just provide 700,000 uniforms, 210,000 sets of body armor, over
300,000 small arms, half a billion rounds of ammunition, 20,000 vehicles
(mostly trucks), and twenty new bases (including five large enough to house a
division.) By 2005, three divisions were activated (1st, 3rd and 7th), although
these troops mainly operated as infantry battalions attached to American units.
Some Iraqi brigades were being formed to conduct larger scale operations. The
U.S. (and Germany) have also been training Iraqi staff officers, but no one
could be sure when these divisions would be able to operate by themselves.
Battalion and brigade officers were now getting there first combat experience
in 2005.
Over 500,000 Iraqis joined the new army
and security forces (many of whom are paramilitary SWAT teams), and over half
of them were dismissed (as untrainable) or deserted. Those that remained served
in 115 battalions. The most important thing about these battalions was that each
of them have a ten man American training team. These guys continue teaching,
often by demonstrating how things are done. For example, the old Iraqi army
never stressed marksmanship, or small unit leadership and combat drills. The
American style has the troops shooting lots of bullets at targets, with
repeated instruction on how to hold and aim the rifle properly so that you
could hit what you were aiming at. The infantry drills are demonstrated by
American trainers, and U.S. troops. Iraqi troops constantly saw American
soldiers and marines in action, and the American training teams in each Iraqi
battalion were always ready to show the Iraqis exactly how it has done. The
Iraqis were told they can be as effective as the Americans, but they had to
train hard to get there.
The hardest job was getting Iraqis who
can, and will, serve as effective NCOs and officers. In Saddams army, being an
officer or NCO was seen as a form of patronage, not a responsibility. It's hard
to change that attitude, as it was alive in Iraq for generations. Again, the
Iraqis were reminded that if they wanted to be super-troopers like the
Americans, someone had to take on the leadership responsibilities. After two
years of looking, several thousand capable candidates were found. But the training
took time, and the American training teams spent a lot of time showing the
officers and NCOs the many little things that go into making a capable combat
leader.
All this has been a difficult story to
report, leaving Americans with a vague idea of what was happening with the
Iraqi armed forces. Most journalists have no idea what the old Iraqi army was
like, and what kind of changes had to be made to create a new one. But the
changes were being made, and every week, more Iraqi troops became capable of
fighting. They didn't have to be as good as American troops, just being better
than the terrorists and irregulars they face gave them a decisive edge. And
each week, more of them achieved the edge.
Nearly all of the violence was in
central Iraq, where there were many mixed (Sunni Arabs living in close
proximity to Kurds and Shia Arabs). In the far north, the Kurds had been free
of Sunni Arabs for a decade before 2003. There were very few terrorist attacks
in the Kurdish controlled area, and by 2005, Iraqis were going to the Kurdish
north for vacations. The Kurds had very strict border controls, especially for
Sunni Arabs. In the south, where most areas were completely, or overwhelmingly,
Shia Arab. The only violence was between Shia militias.
The U.S. tactic from the beginning was
to minimize American casualties, creating Iraqi security forces, collecting as
much information on the Sunni Arab terrorist groups as possible, and
maintaining supply routes from Kuwait. This was still a lot of activity, usually
amounting to over 2,000 convoys and patrols a day.
The enemy included al Qaeda, which
imported thousands of Sunni Arabs for suicide attacks. Nearly half of these
were from Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Most of the rest were from North Africa,
which, next to Saudi Arabia, has long been a major source of Islamic radicals.
But most of the attacks were by Iraqi Sunni Arabs, who tried to coordinate
operations with al Qaeda. By 2005, this merger began to fray, as Iraqi Sunni
Arabs grew tired of the indiscriminate suicide bomb attacks. But more worrisome
was the growing number of Shia Arab death squads. Saddam's secret police and
militias used terror to keep the Shia Arabs in line, and these terrorists did
their work openly. No masks, just bad behavior, done for maximum impact on the
greatest number of people. The Shia Arabs wanted revenge, and in 2004, the Shia
Arab death squads began to operate. They went out at night and killed Sunni
Arabs. Some they would take prisoner, and torture them before killing them. The
Sunni Arabs had death squads as well, but there were far more Shia Arabs than
Sunni Arabs.
By 2005, many Sunni Arabs were fleeing
the country. Jordan and Syria accepted these refugees. Both countries also
allowed these refugees, many of them wealthy members of the defunct Saddam
government. Jordan insisted these terrorist organizers and paymasters be
discreet. But Syria allowed them to organize a smuggling operation that got
foreign Sunni Arabs, recruited from all over the world, to fly in and be moved
across the border. This did not get shut down until 2007. At that point, even
the Syrians could see they were backing the losing side, and it was time to
play nice with the Americans, and the new Iraqi government.
Elections were held in 2005, and the
new government was dominated by Shia Arabs. By 2006, about half the Sunni Arabs
were gone. The country was now about ten percent Sunni Arab, 65 percent Shia
Arab, and most of the remainder were Kurds. The Sunni Arabs were faced with
extermination and that led to one last terror offensive in late 2007 and early
2007. This killed 3,500 in September, and in February, they killed 3,000. The
dead were civilians and security
personnel (mostly civilians). The Spring Offensive was quickly brought to halt
by a U.S. "Surge Offensive." This was done with five more American brigades
being brought in, to join the fifteen
already there, and the 250,000 Iraqi security forces (half soldiers and half
police). By the Summer, most Sunni Arabs had had it with the terrorism, and the
Americans were able to cut deals with most of the Sunni Arab tribes, and
recruited another 70,000 Sunni Arabs for local defense forces. These turned on
the Sunni Arab terrorists in their midst. By January, only about 300 Iraqis
died from the violence. The Sunni Arab rebellion was broken.
There remained some major problems,
mainly massive corruption, and incompetence in the government. Except for Israel and Turkey, there are no
working democracies in the region. It's all bullies and police state politics.
Many Iraqis realize that the old ways have not served them well. But building
an effective government is not easy, even with everyone saying corruption is a
bad thing and must be eliminated. There's no guarantee that this "war on
corruption" will work, but things will remain bad if you do nothing. The
Arab world is a mess because of the corruption. Not just all the dictatorships,
but an economy that under-performs the rest of the world (including many areas
without natural resources, like oil). There's an "Arab Reform
Movement" operating throughout the region, but so far all they have been
able to do is bring the problems out into the open. That's progress, but not a
solution.
Despite the need for solutions, too many American politicians were more
concerned with political correctness. That isn't always bad. For example, there
has been enormous emphasis, in Iraq, on keeping American casualties down. This
has been a success, with the casualty rate being about half what it was in
Vietnam, and at a record low level historically. This has amazed military
experts the world over, but was accomplished by adopting tactics that limited
what American troops could do. The civilian deaths, as a result of U.S. combat
operations, declined even more. That got little media attention either. But it
was a big deal with the Iraqis.
Iraq can either be a turning point in
Middle Eastern history, or the democracy can be corrupted, as it was in 1958
when the constitutional monarchy was overthrown by the Sunni Arab dominated
military. To that end, the Iraqis are trying to negotiate a long term treaty
with the United States that would include an American promise to "coup-proof"
elected Iraqi governments. That's novel, but depends on the election process
remaining uncorrupted. Nothing is simple in the Middle East.