Critical Confederate Failure before Atlanta

In his new work, Robert D. Jenkin, author of The Battle of Peach Tree Creek and To the Gates of Atlanta, looks at the controversial action at Cassville on May 19, 1864, which saw an unsuccessful Confederate attack in the morning, and then an ineffective Confederate defense that afternoon. Years of research having convinced him that “the pieces that we previously knew did not fit together, and the story told was incomplete, inaccurate, and inconclusive.” (p. 2), and that the actions of both Joe Johnston and John Bell Hook have been erroneously depicted for some 150 years.

Jenkins addresses the events of that day in two parts. Part I “The Morning Affair: The Failed Confederate Offensive,” examines the Confederates' attempts at a surprise attack during the morning of May 19th. Hood, who led the attack, was forced to give it up, and take a defensive position north of the village when an unknown Federal force appeared on his right flank and rear.

Part II, “The Evening Affair: The Failed Confederate Defensive,” deals with the debate among the generals over whether to stand and fight or withdraw, with Hood and Leonidas Polk urging a withdrawal, while Johnston desired to remain and fight the next morning. In the end, Jenkins argues that Johnston grudgingly agreed to withdraw during the night.

Even before the war ended, and well after it, both Johnston and Hood began writing accounts of the events blaming each other for the outcome.

Having uncovered a good many hitherto unexamined documents and maps, Jenkins discovered troubling discrepancies in Johnston’s accounts of the events, including his wartime report and subsequent writings. In addition, Jenkins found that Johnston tampered with an account by staff officer, T. B. Mackall, which appears in the Official Records.

Jenkins also found critical errors in the Confederate intelligence, reconnaissance, cavalry screening, and mapping of the contested area, including misinterpretation of several roads and road names.

Jenkins also points out that earlier historians addressing the Cassville affair concentrated on the “debate” between Hood and Johnston, while mostly neglecting Sherman's movements and the other reports by officers on both sides.

Jenkins has some interesting things to say about Sherman as well, suggesting that he may not have been as brilliant a tactician as usually thought, but had at least two talents that served him well during the campaign. Firstly, he understood logistics and he kept his army supplied, second, he understood momentum and he kept his army moving, whether he won or lost a fight, because by keeping the initiative, he prevented the Confederates from seizing it.

Jenkins has written the definitive account of the Cassville Affair. Primarily of value for the serious student of the Atlanta Campaign with a strong background in the minute aspects of it, the more casual reader is apt to get lost.

Highly recommended.

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