November 9, 2024:
During the last hundred years the Russian military has gone through numerous upgrades and transformations in its weapons and equipment as well as how it operates. One aspect of military operations, logistics, has been left relatively untouched. All other industrialized nations have mechanized their military logistics, especially how they load and unload cargo. That means more forklifts and other commercial logistics equipment to speed things along.
Russia continues to use manpower to do the work of the machines every other armed force uses. Clinging to archaic logistical practices means that supplies reach Russian troops more slowly, and often not at all, because of the shortage of trucks to move supplies the last fifty or hundred kilometers from the railroad to the front lines.
When Ukraine became independent in 1991, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Ukrainians eagerly switched from Soviet methods of doing things to what NATO countries were using. Russia continued as before. Ukraine noted how much more efficient military operations were if the troops had an adequate and constant flow of supplies. That required trucks and automated equipment to load and unload the trucks. When Russia invaded in 2022, Ukrainian troops concentrated on destroying, disabling or capturing all Russian vehicles, especially trucks. Russian forces soon felt the impact of the Ukrainian methods when many Russian vehicles could no longer move because their fuel trucks had been blown up or captured by the Ukrainians. In many cases the Ukrainians would go after the trucks first and not attack some of the Russian combat vehicles, Ukraine expected to see the Russian combat vehicles run out of fuel and often be captured and used by the Ukrainians.
Many Russian soldiers and officers realized that logistics was far more important than the Russian high command realized. Russian troops began seizing Ukrainian and some Russian civilian vehicles to replace their lost trucks. Not many forklifts were captured and used. The importance of cargo handling machinery was still lost on most Russian officers. A significant portion of troops spent some time manhandling supplies in and out of trucks and rail cars before being sent to fight the Ukrainians. Russia would also impress Ukrainian civilians for this work, until they realized that the Ukrainian workers were increasingly sabotaging the supplies and equipment they handled. They did it in ways that were not obvious until the supplies or equipment were put to use and failed.
A growing number of Russian troops, including some senior commanders, are demanding changes in how things are done when it comes to handling supplies. The government replies that Russia does not have a lot of this equipment, while Russian firms that do have forklifts, etc., go to great lengths to hang on to them. Managers and workers also point out that work will get done much more slowly without these machines. Russian government seizure of private cargo-handling equipment slows down operations in firms and economic sectors that lose them.
Meanwhile not much has changed and many thousands of Russian troops are engaged in manually handling logistical tasks rather than fighting. The slow moving Russian logistical system means the troops who are fighting are often short of ammunition and other supplies. It doesn’t help that the Ukrainian UAVs have been very successful in destroying any Russian vehicles, even motorbikes, within 20 kilometers of the front lines. Russian front-line troops lack food, water, supplies and ammunition, and suffer badly from disease due to the lack of water. Wounded Russians must be able to crawl to safety or die. In winter they will die. The outnumbered Ukrainians depend on these Russian shortcomings to succeed at fighting outnumbered and still winning.