November 27, 2024:
The American military, industrial and political leadership are slow to adapt to the unexpected and revolutionary drone warfare that emerged since Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022. This is not unusual in the United States, and most other nations, threatened with being drawn into a war. One reason to fear involvement is that nations at war rapidly develop new weapons and tactics. For nations not at war, as the United States is in 2024, adapting to operations in a new war should be simple. Just implement all that has been learned from the Ukrainian war, especially the widespread use of drones and the need for tanks to move cautiously, if at all and stay hidden. A few thousand dollars’ worth of drones can destroy a $4.5 million M1 tank. The U.S. has over 5,000 M1s available for use. The Americans are not trying to develop and build cheap air-defense drones, which are already being used in Ukraine. The United States could buy them from Ukraine or build them under license in the United States. This would require some Ukrainian drone production engineers to come to the U.S. to oversee the construction and operation of a drone production facility. There are some other problems. In wartime drone designs evolve rapidly. Stockpiling thousands of drones produced in 2024 and 2025 would create a problem when using them a year or more after 2025. The enemy may have built more advanced drones in anticipation of offing them in a surprise attack. The American stockpiled drones would then be less useful because they are older designs. This is especially true with anti-drone drones, a recent development that is still evolving.
Meanwhile American defense manufacturers will resist converting to drone production. There is less profit in cheap drones compared to multi-million dollar aircraft, tanks and air defense systems. It would take a wartime situation to force the defense firms to adapt to producing a lot of cheap drones.
Meanwhile American attempts to adopt the new drone tactics and technology developed, and still developing, in Ukraine have encountered problems. First, the U.S. is not at war and the military bureaucracy has a peacetime attitude towards any new technology. This includes the use of drones in Ukraine and the flood of practical experience and solutions passed by Ukraine. Current U.S. Army drones, when used in Ukraine, often encounter problems the Ukrainian drones don’t. In a wartime situation, Ukrainians have been quick to make changes until they get the results they need.
The American military may want to implement the lessons of drone use in Ukraine, but American defense contractors and manufacturers feel compelled to modify and improve what the Ukrainians have done while they adapt Ukrainian drone tech to something new which United States forces can use and Congress will pay for. This process tends to lower the effectiveness of what the Ukrainians have created, while delaying the product and enriching the contractors and manufacturers. The lesser effectiveness is usually revealed the first time American troops use the U.S. version of Ukrainian drone tech. Something is lost in the tech translation. This is nothing new. It’s been happening for over a century.
The U.S. is currently adapting and adopting Ukrainian drone technology. There will be modifications and upgrades for as long as the fighting in Ukraine lasts. These changes come quickly in wartime, and always have. In Ukraine, drone designs can be changed in less than a week. This is usually because the Russians have gained an edge with one of their recent tweaks. While Ukraine has been in the forefront of developing and upgrading drone technology, the Russians have kept up. In war time you either keep up or become an inept underdog that falls farther and farther behind. The Russians have kept most of the time and when they fail to keep up, they suffer heavy losses.
The peacetime American military has no such wartime feedback loop. If someone in the defense procurement establishment says the current American drone tech is good, it is officially adequate. Sending U.S. drone adaptations to Ukraine for testing is done, but often over the objections of some U.S. manufacturers. When tested in combat, some of the U.S. drones fail to deliver. When the Ukraine war ends, there will be no way to adequately test American drones. There may be other wars where American troops are involved and able to test the new drones. But it won’t be in the intensely competitive atmosphere the Ukrainians and Russians have created.
Ukraine has been writing the book on drone technology since 2023, with Russia contributing edits in real time. When that atmosphere is not present, the speed of developing new tech or maintaining current drones slows down a lot. This process is at work now as the U.S. Army orders drones based on Ukrainian designs. The American military procurement bureaucracy is infamously slow in adopting and manufacturing new weapons. It is feared that the Ukrainian drone revolution will be equally slow in actually reaching Americans soldiers and marines. Many military and Defense Department civilians are aware of this problem and see the drone development and procurement program as an opportunity to show that the United States can do it right and quickly.
In early 2024 Ukraine created a new branch of their military, the USF/Unmanned Systems Force. This is in addition to the Ukrainian Air Force that consists of manned aircraft. The USF does not control the drones which Ukrainian forces use regularly, but instead contributes to developing new drone models and organizing mass production for those new models that are successful. The U.S. military took note of this but acting on it takes a lot longer for a peacetime military.
Drones were an unexpected development that had a huge impact on how battles in Ukraine's current war are fought. Drones were successful because they were cheap, easily modified, and expendable. Modifications and upgrades could be implemented quickly and cheaply. Both Russian and Ukrainian forces were soon using cheap, under a thousand dollars, quadcopter drones controlled by soldiers a few kilometers distant using FPV/First Person Viewing goggles to see what the day/night video camera on the drone can see. Adding night vision is available when needed, at a higher cost per drone. Most of these drones carry half a kilogram of explosives, so it can instantly turn the drone into a flying bomb that can fly into a target and detonate. Some drones carry more explosives depending on what is needed to deal with a target.
These drones are awesome and debilitating weapons when used in large numbers. If a target isn’t moving or requires more explosive power that the drones can supply, one of the drone operators can call in artillery, rocket, or missile fire, or even an airstrike. Larger, fixed wing drones are used for long range, often over a thousand kilometers, operations against targets deep inside Russia.
A major limitation to the expansion of drone operations is the need for trained drone operators. These operators need over a hundred hours of training before they are able to operate these drones at peak effectiveness. As operators spend more hours operating drones in combat, the number of new lessons learned and applied increases.
The small drones are difficult to shoot down until they get close to the ground and the shooter is close enough, as in less than a few hundred meters, away to successfully target a drone with a bullet or two and bring it down. Troops are rarely in position to do this, so most of these drones are able to complete their mission, whether it is a one-way attack or a reconnaissance and surveillance mission. The recon missions are usually survivable and enable the drone to be reused. All these drones are constantly performing surveillance, which means that both sides commit enough drones to maintain constant surveillance over a portion of the front line, to a depth, into enemy territory, of at least a few kilometers.
This massive use of FPV-armed drones has revolutionized warfare in Ukraine and both sides are producing as many as they can. Russia initially produced its own drones now after briefly using imported Iranian Shahed-136 drones that cost over $100,000 each. Ukraine demonstrated that you could design and build drones with similar capabilities at less than a tenth of that. The Iranian drone was more complex than it needed to be and even the Russians soon realized this and turned from the Shahed-136 for more capable drones they copied from Ukrainian designs or ones Russians designed.
Ukrainian drone proliferation began when many individual Ukrainians or small teams designed and built drones. The drones served as potential candidates for widespread use and mass production. This proliferation of designers and manufacturers led to rapid evolution of drone capabilities and uses. Those who could not keep up were less successful in combat and suffered higher losses.
Military leaders in other nations have noted this and are scrambling to equip their own forces with the most effective drones. Not having enough of these to match the number the enemy has in a portion of the front means you are at a serious disadvantage in that area. These drones are still evolving in terms of design and use and are becoming more effective and essential.
One countermeasure that can work for a while is electronic jamming of the drones’ control signal. Drone guidance systems are constantly modified or upgraded to cope with this. Most drones have flight control software that sends drones with jammed control signals back to where they took off from to land for later use. The jammers are on the ground and can be attacked by drones programmed to home in on the jamming signal. Countermeasures can be overcome and the side that can do this more quickly and completely has an advantage. That advantage is usually temporary because both sides are putting a lot of effort into keeping their combat drones effective on the battlefield.
The emergence of drones as a new, novel, and decisive form of air power is the most recent of similar events that took place during the last century. During the last century the U.S. Air Force has advocated military victory achieved mainly with air power. This attitude took root after the 1914-18 World War I when the Army Air Corps, predecessor of the USAF, got rid of most of its numerous reconnaissance aircraft and concentrated on bombers and fighters. Then came the popular belief that larger bomber aircraft would dominate future wars. This never came to pass and, every time there was a war, the air force had to scramble to expand its meager peacetime reconnaissance force to meet the realities of war.
This was not so bad during World War II because the air force was still part of the army but, after World War II, the Army Air Force became the independent U.S. Air Force and sought to control everything that flew over land. That meant army attempts to retain small reconnaissance aircraft and cargo aircraft were constantly opposed by the air force. The army valued prolific and prompt aerial reconnaissance more than the air force and this led to a dispute that was not settled until quite recently.
Since the late 1990s, when the army re-started flying its own armed aircraft in the form of large armed drones, in addition to the armed helicopters it has always had, the air force began to notice. The army argument was that these larger drones work better for them if they are under the direct control of army combat brigades. The air force saw that as inefficient and preferred to have one large pool of larger drones which are deployed as needed. This difference of opinion reflects basic differences in how the army and air force deploy and use their combat forces. The army has found that a critical factor in battlefield success is teamwork among members of a unit, and subordinate units in a brigade. While the air force accepts this as a critical performance issue for their aircraft squadrons, they deem it irrelevant for army use of drones.
One thing the army acquisition of thousands of reconnaissance drones did not change was the air force loss of interest in aerial reconnaissance and surveillance after each war. Air force reluctance to develop, build and maintain a large strategic reconnaissance force led the CIA to use its considerable clout and budget developing strategic reconnaissance aircraft like the U-2 and SR-71 manned aircraft and surveillance satellites. The CIA also pioneered the use of larger drones like the 1.1-ton Predator and armed them. This helped the army win permission from the Department of Defense to expand its force of armed aircraft beyond helicopter gunships.
Air force attitudes have hurt the army in several ways. When it comes to influencing the war on the ground the air force is much less dominant. This is despite air force efforts to maintain its ability to bomb targets in direct support of ground operations. The air force blind spot when it comes to air reconnaissance has hurt its overall effectiveness. Blame this on a bad attitude towards BDA/Bomb Damage Assessment. This is the business of figuring out what to bomb, and what the impact on the enemy is after you bomb. The problem of the air force leaders being deceived by the people on the ground being bombed began during World War II. This was when air forces used large scale aerial bombing for the first time. Right after that conflict, the U.S. did a thorough survey of the impact of strategic bombing on Germany and Japan. It was discovered that the impact was far different from what air force BDA during the war had indicated. The air force vowed to do better next time. But as experience in Korea/1950-3, Vietnam/1965-72, Kuwait/1991, Kosovo/1999, and Iraq/2003, the war on terror and in Ukraine demonstrated, the enemy on the ground continued to have an edge when it came to deceiving the most energetic BDA efforts.
The only proven technique for beating the BDA problem was to have people on the ground, up close, checking on targets, while the fighting was going on. Those with powerful air forces do not want to do this because of the risk of some of their commandos getting killed or captured, and because the intel and air force people were sure that they knew what enemy was up to down there.
The people on the ground have consistently demonstrated an ability to deceive aerial surveillance. Even during the early 21st century, when the U.S. developed persistent drone surveillance, the irregular forces they were facing proved capable of reducing the effectiveness of the drone effort. This spotlights another useful fact; airpower can be useful on the ground but that happens over time and not quickly.
The army and air force have a different outlook on planning and risk. The air force sees warfare as a much tidier, and predictable, affair than the army experiences regularly. In this respect, the air force and navy are closely aligned. Both are technical services, who are used to exercising more control over their forces than do army generals. The army sees warfare as more unpredictable and has adapted to that unpredictability. The army generals are usually skeptical of the air force's ability to take down foes from the air and the army was usually right.
Despite being a successful high-tech operation, American air forces, especially the Navy and USAF, frequently have trouble adjusting to changes they do not agree with. When the Cold War ended in 1991 the air force was still largely thinking about continuing to operate as they had done in the Cold War, but the technology and tactics of warfare were changing. The post-Cold War enemy no longer consisted of large, organized forces spread over huge areas. The enemy was increasingly irregulars who were harder to spot from the air. The air force reluctantly adapted, in part because the army and CIA adopted new reconnaissance and surveillance techniques like drones and persistent surveillance. This pattern is returning as the air force reorganizes after the decade of heavy combat and big budgets the war on terror produced.
Now the air force is turning its attention to a near-peer opponent in the form of a rapidly expanding and modernizing China's military. Unexpectedly the Ukraine War emerged first with Russia and Ukraine fighting each other. Ukrainians had the advantage of material and intellectual support from NATO countries. In the end the winner of any stage of the war was the side that was the most resourceful and innovative. This process has been present in warfare for centuries but during the last century the changes and innovations came so quickly that the process was visible. This disrupted the long-established missions each of the military services had established.
For example, as successful as these new air reconnaissance tools were, they did not seem like a suitable long-term job for the air force. The other services disagreed, and it took the better part of a decade after 2001 to get the air force to come around. In 2005 the air force deployed its first Predator drone unit and in 2009 it put its first Reapers to work. They were following the CIA in this area, which caused some misgivings among senior air force leadership. But the army and Congress were calling for more of what the CIA was doing with armed drones for surveillance and attack and the air force joined in.
What the CIA pioneered was persistent surveillance with armed drones. The 24/7 observation by the drones enabled CIA and air force intel analysts to compile information about the target and order one or more missiles fired as soon as a suitable target was identified and located. This led to an ever-growing list of terrorist leaders and their key subordinates killed in this way. At the same time, this use of surveillance and precision weapons led to lower collateral, as in nearby civilian casualties, which plummeted to historical, and remarkable, lows.
Air force traditionalists warned that in a conventional war this sort of thing would not work. Where the enemy had modern air defense systems and jet fighters the Predator and Reaper drones would be impractical because they would be quickly shot down. But that was not the type of war being waged thirty years ago and it was pointed out to the air force that the military has to deal with what they are faced with, not just with what they prefer. Moreover, even in a conventional war there is still work for these new tactics and the tech that makes it possible. The air force still disagreed but did not have a persuasive alternative. The air force still wanted more money for their stealthy F-35 fighter and a new stealth bomber. This is despite the fact that other nations were developing more and more sensors that could nullify stealth.
The air force has been in this position before. This was seen during the 1960s when the air force and navy aviation suffered unexpectedly high aircraft losses over Vietnam because their aircraft and pilots were not prepared for the lower-tech Russian aircraft used against them by the Vietnamese. This led aircraft to be again equipped with cannon because the new air-to-air missiles were not yet reliable enough to replace the old fashioned cannon.
Then came the concept of using your own aircraft for aggressor, or dissimilar tactics, training. This began in 1969 when the U.S. Navy established the original Top Gun fighter pilot school. This was done in response to the poor performance of its pilots against North Vietnamese pilots flying Russian fighters. What made the Top Gun operation different was that the training emphasized how the enemy aircraft and pilots operated. This was called dissimilar training. In the past, American pilots practiced against American pilots, with everyone flying American aircraft and using American tactics. It worked in World War II because the enemy pilots were not getting a lot of practice and were using similar aircraft and tactics anyway. Most importantly, there was a lot of aerial combat going on, providing ample opportunity for on-the-job training. Not so in Vietnam, where the quite different Russian-trained North Vietnamese were giving U.S. aviators a difficult time. The four week Top Gun program solved the problem. The air force followed shortly with its similar Red Flag school. In the early 1980s, the Russians established a dissimilar air combat school, and the Chinese followed in 1987.
There will be a need for a drone-based Top Gun when the Ukraine war is over. Drone developers and operators are always eager to test their tech and skills against similar opponents. Yet, after a century of trying, the ground forces and non-aviation naval forces still cannot get the people up there to come down and get a much needed reality check on what is happening down below where battles and wars are still decided.
That changed in Ukraine when the proliferation of surveillance and armed drones often replaced conventional air and artillery forces, at least for operations close to the ground and requiring more urgency to find and attack targets. This was the ultimate solution to obtaining constant close surveillance of the combat zone. With drones you not only know what goes on in the combat zone, but can quickly, often within minutes, bring in an armed drone to attack the newly discovered target. Combat drones operated by an FPV controller have offered many new opportunities on the battlefield. This includes dealing with individual enemy soldiers and persuading them to surrender to nearby Ukrainian soldiers or else. How one of these events played out was captured on video and the video was released to the media.