The failure of the Russian military in Ukraine during 2022 surprised many who accepted official (government intelligence agency) assessments of military power. This is not a new problem; it stems from the difficulty of determining military capabilities during peacetime.
In peacetime, it is difficult to determine whose armed forces are superior because realistic assessments often contradict government claims. There is demand for independent rankings, and the most popular measure counts manpower, weapons, economic and logistical capabilities, plus geography, natural resources, and economic strength. Left out are nuclear weapons, which have led nations with nuclear weapons to avoid conflict with other countries that also had nukes. This has led to what is known as the “nuclear peace,” which has produced a record number of years without a war between major (nuclear-armed) powers.
Some key factors often left out of peacetime analysis include critical qualities like training and leadership. One comprehensive conventional analysis is the annual Global Firepower Index (GFI). The rankings seem to be accurate until you consider the actual performance of different nations. For example, GFI ranks Israel 20th behind other Middle Eastern nations like Saudi Arabia (17th), Iran (14th), Egypt (13th), and Turkey (11th). Before the 2011 rebellion and continuing civil war, Syria was considered to rank somewhere between Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Before its quality flaws were exposed in the 1991 and 2003 wars, Iraq was also ranked higher than Syria. Yet military historians and senior officers in many nations note that you cannot ignore historical performance, often described as the quality factor or quality multiplier. Not just in weapons and other aspects of military power that could be counted and compared. The quality multiplier is often a percentage decrease to a more conventional analysis like GFI. The firm producing GFI admits this and stresses that its data and rankings depend on unclassified data of what each country possesses.
There are ways to obtain an accurate quality multiplier. Not a perfect quality multiplier, but one that provides more accurate rankings. One way to do this is to refight historical battles using wargame design-type force analysis that addresses concepts like total force quality in a testable way. Wargame designers use a “guess and test” approach, which applies a fraction to raw (theoretical) combat power that accounts for less capable leadership, equipment quality, support, training, and other "soft" factors. Think of it as an efficiency rating, with "100" being perfect and "55" being a more common 55 percent efficiency.
Wargames were a mid-19th-century development that used data on outcomes of Napoleonic Wars (1792-1815) battles to estimate the capabilities of contemporary forces and to get an idea of how future battles would be fought and who was more likely to win. Further historical analysis of earlier use of these concepts indicated that, for thousands of years, more successful commanders had a good sense of how total force quality worked and applied it as the “commander's estimate.” 19th-century wargames documented how this worked because the Napoleonic Wars were well documented, and the Industrial Revolution was also a scientific revolution that led to what we now call statistical and predictive analysis. By the 20th century, senior officers were familiar with these concepts and prepared to use them to measure combat power and accurately predict whose forces had the edge.
Peacetime politics often prevented open discussion of applying total force quality. This changed in the 1960s and 70s when accurate commercial wargames, mainly from Avalon Hill in the late 1950s and SPI (Simulations Publications Inc.) in the late 1960s, became available and most nations acknowledged the value of this kind of analysis, even though peacetime politics continued to hinder its widespread application in managing the peacetime military.
The commercial wargames were a catalyst because they accepted the concept of validation. This was not an alien concept. Engineers, especially those developing software or complex machinery, have long understood the need for validating their products. Without this double-checking and extensive testing, new software or equipment might not do what was intended and could get people killed or just limit sales.
Pre-1970s professional wargames were similar but different. Many were predictive or attempted to simulate unpredictable combat situations. However, in peacetime, no real war keeps wargames and generals honest. Instead, politicians, generals, and policymakers often want a specific outcome from wargames. Put bluntly, they often decide the results before the wargames even begin. Many professional wargames are quite accurate, as users occasionally validate them by comparing a recent battle to the wargame's outcomes and the historical event. But, in general, validation was not a high priority and was avoided as much as possible during peacetime.
Within the professional wargame community, this issue has sparked quiet debates for decades. Initially, validation gained little traction. But in the decades following the introduction of commercial wargames, more military leaders, especially in the West, rose in the ranks with their knowledge of commercial wargames and the crucial importance of validation. Without much publicity, American commanders increasingly applied validation to their training and tactics development. By the time the 1990-91 Gulf War came along, the world was shocked by the swift and devastating defeat inflicted on the Iraqi forces in a ground war that lasted, literally, only a hundred hours. This made the mass media curious about what was going on, and it was pointed out, in simple terms the media could use, that the military had learned to measure and apply what had made forces superior in the past. Other recent examples include the three Arab Israeli wars, where Israel, with a greatly inferior force according to the measure used by the Global Firepower Index, quickly and decisively defeated large Arab coalitions led by Egypt and Syria. On paper, the Israelis should have lost every time, but they didn’t, and after the 1973 war, the Arabs took it as a fact that the Israelis would probably keep defeating them. Gradually, the Arab states made peace with Israel, and by 2020 they were openly joining Israel in a coalition against a common enemy: Iran.
Historically, the Iranians were the local superpower, defeating all local opponents and sometimes major powers from outside the region, like the Romans, the Russians, and, for a while, the Ottoman Turks. The current Iranian government is a religious dictatorship that believes it is on a mission from God and that its success is inevitable. This is unusual for Iranian/Persian governments and diminishes the Iranian chances of success but not their ability to hurt their enemies, especially those that are neighbors.
Wargame designers determined what each side was worth in historical battles in a fairly simple way. One key aspect of wargame design was assigning combat values to the military units involved. This process is simple at first. You identify the worst unit as best you can from the historical record and assign it a value of "1." At this point, identify the best unit, as best you can, and ask yourself: how much better is the best unit than the worst unit? If you come up with a number no greater than, say, 9, you're probably in the ballpark, and at that point all you have to do is fit all the remaining units in the game in between the best and the worst by just asking yourself the question: how capable is this unit in comparison with the best and the worst? If it sounds simple, it is. There's no mystery involved. The system is further refined as you play, and any misjudgments quickly become evident when you try to recreate the historical event. You then adjust unit values and eventually arrive at a fairly accurate numerical appraisal of each unit's combat ability.
Some people in the Pentagon caught on to this in the 1970s and soon realized that the combat models they were using, with Global Firepower-type values, were clearly unrealistic if you tried to use them to refight a World War II or other post-1945 battle. The younger combat officers accepted this more quickly than their seniors because they were buying and using many of these historical wargames. At their urging, SPI, one of the early commercial wargame developers, took a chance and developed wargames based on contemporary forces and battles not yet fought. These contemporary wargames were very popular, in part because so many officers and their troops bought and played them. In doing so, these early adopters came to accept the value of the analysis behind creating an accurate wargame.
While the U.S. Navy and navies in general adopted these wargame techniques early in the 20th century, they saw them as unique to naval warfare and not adaptable to ground and air combat. The commercial wargames showed otherwise, and by the late 1970s the Army and Marines, followed by the Air Force in the 1980s, were creating and using wargames designed with the validation techniques of historical wargames. This produced the surprising, to people outside the military, “100-hour war” outcome in 1991 and similar events ever since.
These validation techniques made clear that highly trained, volunteer soldiers were the best option for post-World War II warfare. For ground troops, this meant training "ordinary" soldiers to standards that would have made them elite, command-type troops during World War II. At the same time, many new military gadgets and startling new tactics emerged, but they worked only when used by well-trained troops. This was demonstrated after 2001 in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Some post-World War II historians had noted and measured the qualitative differences, but their results were not widely recognized. One notable practitioner of this was military historian and World War II artillery officer Trevor Dupuy. He noted that while the Germans lost World War I, they developed training and tactics late in the war that nearly won it for them and played a major role in how World War II developed. These well-trained and equipped German World War I “Storm Troopers” simply used more effective training and tactics, and this approach worked. The Germans then trained half the army to Stormtrooper standards. Nothing magic was involved, just intense, well-thought-out training and excellent leadership. Officers and NCOs were carefully selected and given more training than those of any other nation. While most military experts dismissed German efforts after World War II ("after all, they've lost two world wars"), some noted that losing wars and losing battles were different.
For example, Trevor Dupuy closely examined combat records and found and documented that German troops generally outfought their opponents. Even after adjusting for variables like defenses and who was attacking, German troops inflicted more casualties than the soldiers they fought. Not every combat division had the same combat capability, and it was revealing to see how divisions matched up in effectiveness. Most generals were unaware of some of these differences in combat effectiveness. Without American historian Trevor Dupuy's research in the 1970s and 80s, these critical differences might still sit unnoticed in musty archives. Dupuy's calculations revealed why some Allied, German, Russian, and Japanese divisions outperformed others. Mainly, it was the quality of training and leadership. Division commanders had (and still have) discretion in how their troops are trained. During World War II, some divisions set up their own training operations and ensured troops and combat leaders received the training they needed. This made a major difference on the battlefield. Ironically, the Germans noticed it more than the Allies. They accurately identified the best-trained and best-led American and British divisions. After the war, they generally ignored such analyses. After all, the Germans had lost the war.
But in the early 1970s, with the Vietnam War out of the way, the American army began to concentrate on the future. They did this by studying the past more diligently. What began the reform activity was the 1973 Arab Israeli war. Israel won, but not in six days as it had in 1967. It took them 16 days and cost many more lives. Two aspects of this war caught American generals' attention. One was the speed and violence made possible by the modern weapons each side was using. But more importantly, the Israelis were using the same attitudes towards training as the Germans had in the two World Wars. While many pundits dismissed the Israeli victory as inevitable because they were fighting Arabs, a closer look at the battles revealed that Israeli troops were exceptionally well trained and led, much more so than their Arab opponents.
The American generals in the 1970s then looked at their current foe, the mighty Red Army (of the Soviet Union). This force stretched from East Germany to Moscow, ready to march to the English Channel in waves of tanks, infantry, and warplanes. The United States and its allies couldn't match the Red Army in quantity, so they had to win with quality.
Veterans of the Vietnam War remembered that about ten percent of the American infantry were commandos, Special Forces, or LRRPS (long-range reconnaissance patrol troops), and that they did very well against the North Vietnamese, and usually in the North Vietnamese backyard. After the war, the U.S. armed forces faced the end of conscription. All troops would be volunteers. Maybe the solution to all this was what the Germans discovered and applied late in World War I and into World War II.
While the media talked about the American "high tech armed forces" in Vietnam, the troops knew they would need a substantial increase in soldiers' skills before they could expect to "fight outnumbered and win." They also realized that press releases touting great new weapons would not add combat power immediately. This led to the phrase, "come as you are, war." It meant being realistic and training for combat, recognizing that future improvements in troop quality or equipment were not what you were going into combat with. This outbreak of pragmatism led to a largely unspoken but very real shift: every combat soldier should be a more effective fighter than their enemy counterpart, and that edge could be achieved now and, with enough effort, maintained.
After 1991, Russia tried to do this and failed. This wasn't a big news story, but it wasn't a secret either. Even people in the intelligence agencies knew this, but official policy preferred to believe in an alternate reality. The American CIA found a novel solution. When officials prepared reports, the main text said what the customer (the current government) wanted, while the reality was in the footnotes. In the Soviet Union, the correlation of forces analysis method accounted for both numbers and capabilities for both sides. The government preferred to see results that always proved the superiority of Soviet forces. Occasionally, a new analyst assigned to the STAVKA (senior military staff) was ordered to an updated correlation of forces on the Soviets versus NATO. Sometimes the new analyst delivered accurate reports showing NATO forces now had the edge. They officially ignored it, and the new analyst was transferred to one of the secret scientific cities in the Ural Mountains, where talented but undisciplined experts lived and worked in golden cages that were difficult to escape and that enemy spies or diplomats could not visit.
After the 1990s, China built its first modern military force, which, for the first time in history, was larger and better equipped than the Russians'. The Chinese also adopted Western training and wargaming techniques. The results of these validated wargames were considered state secrets. These wargames clearly showed that China still faces the reliability problems its peacetime forces have suffered for thousands of years. The government continues trying to fix those problems, but corruption and lax military leadership persist. China has adapted by changing its tactics against current rivals, such as India, South Korea, and nations with existing claims to islands in the South China Sea. China avoids armed combat with these foes and relies on economic and non-lethal force to wear the enemy down. This is expensive and doesn’t always work, but it is preferable to starting a shooting war that could escalate into something China cannot control.
James F Dunnigan