The Intelligence Muddle that Led to Munich

The image of Neville Chamberlain, and the policy of “Appeasement” that attaches to him, is one of a naïve bumbler humbugged by Hitler at Munich, helping plunge Europe into the abyss of W. W. II. But recent scholarship has been kinder to the British PM, and this new work by Norman Ridley, author of several works on the road to war, furthers that trend.

We get looks at the complex interplay of intelligence confusion, political complacency, the belief that Hitler was a reasonable actor, the legitimacy of some German claims (e.g., “self-determination of peoples”), a desperate desire to avoid war, fear of the “Red menace”, diplomatic bungling, and skillful German deception and misinformation which inflated the size of their growing army and air forces, which influenced the Allies’ failure to realize the danger posed by Hitler’s Germany.

By the time Chamberlain became Prime Minister in May of 1937, Britain and France were actually less able to act to curb Hitler’s ambitions than a year or two earlier. So when he waved the infamous “piece of paper” in 1939, Chamberlain already knew war was coming.

While Ridley might have strengthened his case by spending more time on military developments in the period, British rearmament, and the efforts by, of all people, Benito Mussolini and Pierre Laval to form a broad anti-Hitler coalition, Reading Hitler’s Mind is a valuable work for anyone interested in the origins of the Second World War.

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Note: Reading Hitler’s Mind is also available in e-editions.

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