Why Paris Fell

The Franco-Prussian War has, to one degree or another, been overshadowed in the English-speaking world by the U.S. Civil War that preceded it and the subsequent World Wars. By comparison, the clash between France and a coalition of German States was limited in both scope and duration. Of course, this conflict is significant, as most readers will already be aware, for establishing the primary long-term causes for the First World War: the unification of Germany and the French loss of Alsace-Lorraine to the same. But as Nash demonstrates, the Franco-Prussian War deserves to be better known, not only for the consequences of its outcome, but for its own sake as a terrible, hard-fought cataclysm.

‘Tank’ Nash’s book is, despite its title, a narrative history of what can arguably be seen as two and, if, as in the case of this volume, one includes the events of the Commune, three different wars. It began as a cabinet war between Emperor Napoleon III and King Wilhelm I, developed into something approaching total war, and ended as a civil war among the French. The author is neither a specialist on the subject of the Franco-Prussian War nor nineteenth century warfare in general. But his background as a veteran of the British Army with an MA in military history and his considerable experience as a published author are reflected in his assured grasp of his subject. Although Nash limits himself to relying on published works, he makes extensive use of primary and secondary French and German language sources. The story Nash tells is one of horrific tragedies born of hubris.

It’s easy to dismiss Napoleon III’s Second Empire as a cynical façade. The truth is more nuanced. Nevertheless, as Nash demonstrates, the war cruelly highlighted its many defects, particularly fatal failures in leadership, organization, and social policy. But it should be noted that, like Napoleon III, Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, the architect of this sea of misfortune, also got more than he bargained for. What Bismarck assumed would be a swift, victorious affair turned into a grueling, bloody struggle that generated a degree of bitterness between the two nations that would have catastrophic consequences in the following century for both his new Germany and the world as a whole.

From the very outset, the contrast between Gen. von Moltke’s clockwork like mobilization and the French Army’s shambolic assembly foreshadowed the balance of the military contest. As to be expected from an author whose previous book was a study of logistics in the Vietnam Wars, Nash rightly emphasizes the debilitating impact of an inadequate supply system on the French field armies. Yet, in spite of being repeatedly let down by their generals, The Emperor’s soldiers proved the equal of their German foes in courage and tenacity. Undeservedly, the bravery of the French troops was rewarded with disaster. At the end of a period of less than two months, a large majority of the regular French Army was encircled at Metz and Sedan, and the latter entered Prussian captivity along with Napoleon III himself.

But Bismarck was quickly disabused of his illusions of easy victory. The populace of Paris abandoned the monarchy for a republican Government of National Defense (G.N.D.) that, true to its title, immediately set about raising new field armies. Meanwhile, the southern German kingdoms stubbornly resisted pressure to join in a new Prussian dominated Reich, which had been Bismarck’s primary goal for launching the war with France. As related by Nash, the second phase of the war saw the G.N.D. suffer a nearly unbroken string of costly setbacks. Patchwork field armies and the Paris garrison were simply incapable of overcoming German professionalism and superior artillery. Poorly armed, inadequately disciplined and trained, short of food, and suffering, along with their German counterparts, from a bitterly cold winter, the forces of the G.N.D. were quite naturally plagued by low morale and desertion. What is remarkable is that, despite all of these handicaps, French troops fought a number of ferocious battles in below freezing temperatures with the Prussian, Bavarian, and Württemberg armies that lasted multiple days.

After months of incalculable misery for the peoples of both nations, Bismarck finally got his way. King William I of Prussia was proclaimed Emperor of a united Germany in Versailles and, despite opposition from Gen. von Moltke, the bombardment of Paris commenced. It was, however, a combination of factors in early January, 1871, that ultimately forced representatives of the G.N.D. to sign an armistice. These included the virtual destruction of the army that held out the best hope for the relief of Paris, the utter failure of a major break out attempt by the Paris garrison, and the approaching exhaustion of the capital’s food supply. But, as Nash explains, instead of heralding a merciful end to this tragedy, the armistice was only a prelude to its most appalling chapter.

Essentially, the Parisian working class, which had suffered the most during the siege and made up the bulk of the city’s defenders, felt betrayed by the government that had replaced the G.N.D. for its acceptance of Germany’s harsh terms of surrender. A rebellion broke out that was harnessed by left wing radicals who proclaimed the establishment of an ill-defined socialist state, the Commune. To the author’s credit, he provides an even-handed assessment of the Commune, which is in stark contrast to the unequivocal condemnation by the new French government under Adolphe Thiers. Relying on the troops of Napoleon III which the Germans had begun to release from captivity, the Commune was exterminated without mercy, with French soldiers slaughtering fellow French men, women, and children, as Paris burned around them.

One can only imagine the feelings of those who survived the events of these ten crowded months, whether they be a Parisian mother, a Bavarian leutnanat, a peasant from Alsace, or a Prussian Uhlan. Leaving aside the considerable loss of life by French civilians, the figures for the total number of officers and soldiers from both sides killed in battle, not including the events of the Commune, comes to roughly 105,000, with an additional 57,000 who died from illness while on campaign. It’s interesting to note that, in terms of the average death toll per month, the Franco-Prussian War far exceeds the U.S. Civil War, with roughly 27,000 compared with, depending on the figures for total fatalities, between 13,000 and 17,000. An obvious contributing factor, which is covered by Nash, was the significant improvements in firearms and artillery. Despite the passage of only five years, the majority of rifles employed by the opposing sides had far more in common with those used in World War I than the rifled muskets of the U.S. Civil War. The impact of the rapid changes in technology is only one among many reasons justifying the study of the Franco-Prussian, and this well illustrated introduction by ‘Tank’ Nash is definitely a good place to start.

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Note: The Siege that Changed the World is also available in e-editions.

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