The "Silver Lining" in Britain's Loss of America

Britain’s strategic situation during the American War of Independence has often been limited to its military operations in the Thirteen Colonies.  While there are many books that analyze these operations to greater and lesser degree fewer tend to look at the overall situation Britain faced as the American War progressed. With the entry of France into the conflict in 1778 Britain was immediately faced with the prospect of a wider conflict. A worldwide conflict. How did Britain cope with this?

Boone attempts to address this issue and proposes that while losing its North American colonies was unfortunate, the silver lining for the British was securing a greater empire in the Caribbean, British North America(Canada) and India. The author provides a lengthy analysis of conflicts from the late 17th century all the way up to the Revolution attempting to show the strategic relationship Britain had with its colonies in North America. Facing its main French rival in the region, both sides tended to look at their North American holdings as a side show. This changed with the advent of the Seven Years War (1756-63) when Britain made the strategic decision to divert its rivals in Europe while placing greater emphasis on securing and enlarging their colonial empire.

With the events leading up to the American Revolution Britain had a brief opportunity to quell the rebellion in the first two years of the conflict in 1776-77. Through timidity and indecision this was not done and with the entry of France and later Span and Holland into the conflict Britain was forced to reappraise its position. The decision was quickly made that the Spice Islands in the Caribbean were of greater importance than the American colonies. This was reflected in the immediate withdrawal from Sir Henry Clinton’s army of 5,000 troops in New York to protect these assets. This drastically reduced Britain's position in the war and placed her on the strategic defense. Operations in the American colonies would be limited to campaigns in the Southern colonies which would help support the effort to retain the colonies in the Caribbean.

The author shows that by means of a delicate balancing act Britain was just able to retain her possessions in the Caribbean, and even expand them slightly, while holding on in America and maintaining a blockade in Europe against French and Spanish fleets. This blockade was by no means perfect, and its porous aspect allowed significant French armaments to slip over the Atlantic to aid the rebel cause. Still, what the author tries to show is that the British showed surprising flexibility in being able to more or less discard America in order to retain the greater empire. The defeat in America had some short term consequences in the loss of prestige and possessions, but by retaining the hold on the majority of the empire despite considerable pressure Britain would emerge as a greater global power as a result. This can not be overlooked when the challenges of Revolutionary and Napoleonic France would be faced not long after losing America in 1783.

While the book has some interesting information about the conflicts in India, and the Caribbean the text often suffers from poor editing and repetitive statements.. Quite often the same information is repeated in succeeding paragraphs and chapters in order to make certain emphasis on the strategic situation Britain faced. As it stands now this work must be a review copy as it would be hard to imagine this is the finished product. Still, this is a useful, quick and fairly detailed study of how Britain managed the loss of her North American colonies and would emerge as the premier global power until well into the 19th and early 20th centuries.

Note: Losing America, Securing an Empire is also available in e-editions.

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