The Second Bull Run Campaign

In this new volume in the Savas Beatie “Emerging Civil War” series, authors Welch and Pawlak offer some interesting insights into the Second Manassas Campaign, one in which, under Robert E. Lee’s leadership, the Army of Northern Virginia demonstrated superb flexibility and coordination to inflict a devastating defeat on the Union.

The authors open with some background on the campaign. The failure of George McClellan’s Peninsular Campaign during the “Seven Days’ Battles,” and his withdrawal from Richmond, coupled with Lincoln’s loss of confidence in the man, who ignored the President’s counsel and his unwillingness to fight a “hard war,” a seeming desire to wage war without suffering, caused Lincoln to create a new “Army of Virginia.” Rather hastily assembled under John Pope, who had gained some success in the Mississippi Valley, the army lacked cohesion. In addition, when over-confident Pope advanced south from Washington, he expected that McClellan’s forces would be acting in support. That support was not forthcoming.

Lee brilliantly outmaneuvers Pope. As “Stonewall” Jackson’s corps faked a retreat, as the authors put it, Pope, believing that Jackson was retreating and . . . that he was close to defeating Jackson’s forces, “made command mistakes in ordering McDowell to pursue Jackson.” As he did so, his army was hit in the flank with a devastating blow by James Longstreet’s corps on August 30^th.

Then, in the aftermath of this victory “Jackson’s 24,000 men marched fifty miles, to cut Pope’s supply lines in two places, and stood in Pope’s rear between him and Washington,” leading to the recovery of much of northeastern Virginia from the Union's control.

The authors are very critical of Pope, who clearly was ill-prepared to command so large an army, and certainly not in a fight against Lee’s army. In addition to his failure to realize that Jackson’s retreat was a ruse, Pope believed FitzJohn Porter's corps would be arriving to support him, which did not prove to be the case, through no fault on Porter’s part, though he had to fight for decades to clear his name of misconduct. The author’s also assert that Pope was nothing more than a political pawn of the Lincoln administration, which may perhaps be questioned.

Never Such a Campaign is a readable, thought-provoking account based on primary sources and building on the work of earlier scholars, is highly recommended.

Note: Never Such a Campaign is also available in e-editions.

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