An Analysis of Military Movements After Gettysburg

In recent years several excellent books have dealt with Robert E. Lee’s retreat and George G. Meade’s pursuit following the Battle of Gettysburg in considerable detail, such as Kent Masterson Brown’s Retreat from Gettysburg, John Schildt’s Roads from Gettysburg, One Continuous Fight, by Eric Wittenberg, J. David Petruzzi, and Michael Nugent, and Lee is Trapped and Must be Taken, by Thomas Ryan and Richard Schau. The Gottfried’s Race to the Potomac, a volume in the “Emerging Civil War Series,” offers a briefer, but revealing introductory treatment, one that provides the reader with a basic understanding of the events, and one which “lead the reader to other, more in-depth treatments.”

The Gottfrieds note that the actions by both commanders were hampered by the number of troops killed, wounded, or missing, particularly given the significant loss of seasoned officers. They argue further that Meade had two other major problems, he was required maintain his army between Lee’s army and Baltimore and Washington at all times, and he had only taken command of the army June 28, 1863, almost literally on the eve of the greatest battle of the war, and was still trying to adapt to high command.

The authors also explain Lincoln’s displeasure with Meade’s message to his troops on July 4^th that concluded with the phrase “Drive the invaders from our soil,” the president noting that it was all “our soil,” and his belief that the general could have pursued Lee’s army more aggressively. They also explain why it was perhaps prudent for Meade to have conducted the pursuit deliberately and slowly, as he believed he did not have enough information on the state of Lee’s army to conduct a more vigorous pursuit, given that his ammunition and other supplies needed replenishing, he was short of horses, and needed more troops. Concluding that “Meade probably did as well as any general in following Lee without inflicting serious losses on his already wounded army.” They bolster their case with references to accounts by Union soldiers comparing Meade’s pursuit of Lee with George McClellan’s actions following Antietam.

As for Lee’s actions during this period, the Gottfrieds argue that the general knew that his army had suffered heavily, but he believed it could conduct an effective defense if necessary. They are particularly impressed by John Imboden’s performance, after Lee assigned him to escort thousands of wagons loaded with wounded troops and accompanied by more than 5,000 cattle, sheep, and hogs foraged from Pennsylvania, a column stretching some 50 miles, to the safety of Virginia.

During the retreat and pursuit there were numerous small-scale fights, mostly cavalry actions covering the retreat, at Smithsburg, Boonsboro, Funkstown, and Falling Waters, which allowed Lee ‘s army to reach Virginia with minimal additional casualties and without fighting a major battle.

Race to the Potomac is well written, hard to put down, and an excellent read, offering an account of the events that is to the point, accessible, informative, and well-researched, with some excellent maps by Hal Jespersen, greatly helping the reader’s understanding of the roads, terrain, and the positions of the forces involved.

There are also five recommended driving tours, which that will be useful for those interested in exploring the ground.

An outstanding addition to the literature on the aftermath of Gettysburg, Race to the Potomac is a worthwhile read for anyone with an interest in the Civil War.

Note: Race to the Potomac is also available in e-editions.

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