The Life and Wars of Albert Sidney Johnston

Timothy Smith, an award-winning author of the Civil War in the West, offers us this look at the life and wars of Albert Sidney Johnston, the first Confederate commander in the theater, whom he characterizes as a gambler, a chess player, cerebral, and humble, whom many readers will likely root for. He argues Johnston could have been the Robert E. Lee of the West had he not died during the battle of Shiloh on April 6, 1862. He also argues, however, that Johnston was methodical or slow in reacting during battles, was too lenient with subordinates such as Leonidas Polk, a matter complicated by the fact that the two men were friends, and both also were friends with Confederate president Jefferson Davis.

This is the first significant biography of Johnston since Charles Roland’s Albert Sidney Johnston: Soldier of Three Republics, appeared in 1964. In contrast to Roland, Smith devotes much more space to Johnston’s Civil War service.

Smith draws his title from Johnston’s comment at the start of the Battle Shiloh, that he must “roll the iron dice of battle,” and tries to look at the general with an eye for the “flexible ways he commanded, with passive moderation.”

Smith addresses Johnston’s service during the Civil War in six chapters.

The first two chapters provides a look at the general’s early life and military service, during which almost everything went well, from when he soldiered for Texas before returning to the U.S Army, gaining a brevet as a brigadier general for effectively coping with several challenging situations, notably the so-called “Mormon War.”

Chapter 3 addresses Johnston’s service for the Confederacy in 1861, during which he commanded with success, showing a talent for taking risks and making bluffs, leading to supreme command in the West.

Chapters 4 and 5 detail the Union’s early victories in the West, at Forts Henry and Donelson, and demonstrates that Johnston made some mistakes in not taking firm control of preparations to deal with U.S Grant’s offensive. The result was the Confederacy’s loss of Nashville, as Johnston’s retreat into northern Mississippi. Smith covers the decision to fight at Shiloh, and the preparations for the battle, which he argues Johnston failed to oversee properly.

Smith’s final chapter covers the events at Shiloh on April 6, 1862, and how the poor planning for the battle led ultimately to Johnston’s death, personally leading a relatively small number troops at the front while neglecting the greater battle.

In the end, Smith argues that Johnston took excessive gambles in his attempt to win back all the territory that the South lost in the West. He makes excellent points in noting that, despite his reputation, Johnston was not a great commander. He had problems understanding strategic issues, thinking that one battle could reverse the course of the war, and did not grow through experience, as Robert E. Lee did. To be sure, he had to cope with a difficult president, who ordered that Confederate territory had to be secured while supplying insufficient manpower and equipment for the task.

Despite his failures, Smith stresses that that Johnston became a martyr for the Confederacy, attaining a stature that did not match his achievements.

Overall, Smith concludes that Johnston‘s performance as a commander did not match either the expectations of the day nor his postwar reputation. But Smith notes that after the general’s death, as the war dragged on, finding an effective commander for the Western Theater proved very difficult, a command where relationships were frequently characterized by infighting and back stabbing.

The Iron Dice of Battle is a valuable read for any student of the Civil War, and particularly for those with an interest in the Western Theatre.

Note: The Iron Dice of Battle is also available in e-editions.

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