by Gregory Fontenot
Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2023. Pp. xxii, 571+.
Illus., maps, appends., ,notes, biblio., index. $39.95. ISBN: 0826222846
The Big Red One in W. W. II
Gregory Fontenot, an experienced historian, has written a number of quality books on American Army organizations and their achievements in conflicts from World War II through the War on Terror. His most recent offering, No Sacrifice Too Great, is similar to his earlier efforts, a straight-forward, clear, detailed, and engaging history of the Big Red One during the Second World War. While the narrative is, as noted, a relatively straightforward chronological history of the division during the war, there are a few subthemes that Fontenot highlights throughout the text. Specifically, he emphasizes the ways in which that the 1st Infantry Division (ID) “adapted to dynamic battlefield conditions throughout the course of its employment during World War II by innovating and altering behavior including tactics, techniques, and procedures” (p. 3).
The first two chapters address the interwar doctrinal foundations that set the conditions for how the 1st ID would train and prepare for combat. Chapters Three through Six consider the division’s actions in North Africa and Sicily, where the division first experienced combat, in very particular conditions, conducting unique operations for the era (e.g. amphibious landings, naval coordination, and international cooperation). The following two chapters provide a transitional section, though one that is important to Fontenot’s ultimate discussion, a consideration of the transition from the Mediterranean to Britain and the changes in senior leadership of the division, from the team of MG Terry Allen (Division Commander) and BG Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. (Assistant Division Commander), to MG Clarence Huebner and BG Willard G. Wyman. A central feature of this section is the tension that existed between LTG George Patton and LTG Omar Bradley and the division’s leadership prior to Huebner’s arrival, with the senior officers frequently expressing displeasure with Allen’s direction of the unit.
Chapters Nine through Fourteen focus on the division’s experiences in Northern and Central Europe, from D-Day through the end of the war in Czechoslovakia. This period between June, 1944, and May, 1945, saw the height of the 1st ID’s combat proficiency, as well as a new command team at the beginning of the calendar year, with MG Clift Andrus assuming command of the division. It was during this time, according to Fontenot, that additional adaptation facilitated the Big Red One’s success, to include the development of small unit tactics in urban and wooded terrain, undertaking operational pursuits, conducting river crossing operations, and acquiring and applying intelligence.
The final chapter, Fontenot’s conclusion, contains a thorough summary of the trajectory of the division’s experiences in the war, with particular emphasis on the key points of adaptation that were emphasized during the body of the work. Many of the conclusions he highlights in this section are focused on tactical lessons learned throughout the war, many of which were learned by other units independently, as well. Some of those lessons include: the avoidance of frontal attacks; advance by bounding/leapfrogging; undertaking night/predawn attacks; close coordination with support elements, particularly artillery and armor; and the prolific expenditure of artillery rounds in a number of different missions to support divisional operations. If there was one common factor that helped explain the successes achieved by the division, to Fontenot, it was that the division was blessed with exceptional leadership, and commanders who were willing to learn and adapt as needed to achieve success.
One of the challenges Fontenot notes in creating his work is the fact that much of the research was done while Covid was at its height, and many archives were closed and unavailable for research. The author, though, does a commendable job of utilizing the archival material that was available, mostly online, as a foundation for his study. Fontenot also relies heavily on personal biographies and accounts of the events depicted, and utilizes a wide range of veteran experiences to shape his work, from all levels of service. Another element that Fontenot brings in, which is useful and not commonly applied, is a close application of contemporary doctrine to the narrative. By utilizing American wartime doctrine, he is able to better shape the significance of the developments, improvements and experiences of the division in line with his thesis of adaptation and learning.
Writing a single-volume account of any division in World War II is a challenging endeavor, and given the range of operations for the 1st Infantry Division, such an attempt is even more challenging. Gregory Fontenot does an admirable job of putting together a consistent account of the division’s experiences in that conflict. A volume in the UMP series “American Military Experience),” No Sacrifice too Great is an excellent source for those wishing to understand the division’s experiences in World War II.
Our Reviewer: Dr. Michael Boden teaches global and Civil War history at Dutchess Community College in Poughkeepsie, NY. A retired Army veteran, he is a former Assistant Professor of History at West Point, and is on the Board of Trustees of the Dutchess County Historical Society, where he is currently researching the history of the county's Soldiers in the Civil War. He previously reviewed Such a Clash of Arms: The Maryland Campaign, September 1862.
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Note: No Sacrifice too Great is also available in e-editions.
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