Senior Leadership in the Italian Campaign

Andrew Sangster and Pier Paolo Battistelli’s Flawed Commanders and Strategy in the Battles for Italy, 1943-45 explores five generals who fought in Italy, all but one of them on the Allied side. It attempts to address their relative failures which deserve a sharper light of inquiry, leveraged against the period context.

The authors are both established writes, Sangster more as a biographer and Battistelli more as a general World War II historian. Their relative skills intersect in this project which features both biography and historical context.

The book is composed of eleven chapters, which alternate with historical context and/or events, and then cover a general chronology, in the following order: Patton, Montgomery, Clark, Alexander, and Kesselring. The text is supported by images, maps, bibliography, endnotes, and an index.

The authors central thesis is concerned with how “these generals affected the (Italian0 campaign with their differing and often conflicting personalities, sometimes creating major blunders and unnecessary loss of life.” (p. viii0

Since the authors focus on the generals, a brief overview of them follows. First, they consider Patton, who was active in North Africa and the invasion of Sicily. As one of the most complicated of wartime leaders, Patton exudes the enfant terrible stereotype and perhaps this 1928 quote suffices, he “would be invaluable in time of war but a disturbing element in time of peace.” (p. 630 Between a host of issues such as shooting POWs, slapping incidents, Anglophobia (especially hostility towards Montgomery), racism, and anti-Semitism; it is easy to see Patton as a something of his own worst enemy, yet as Eisenhower realized, he was a good combat leader and got things done when others did not. He did his penance for a time and then generally excelled in France from 1944 until the end of the war. He competed with Montgomery endlessly as a living paradox: equal parts warrior king and prima donna. The real problem with Patton’s legacy is the difficulty in distinguishing myth from reality, which continues even today.

Second, they consider Montgomery, active in North Africa since 1942 and eventually elevated much higher than his rival Patton. Montgomery is no less polarizing than Patton, with the usual treatment of him as better than Patton per British authors and the opposite from American authors. Montgomery enjoyed success at El Alamein, yet his later experiences never rose to the same level usually due to his difficult personality, know-it-all tendencies, self-importance, and egotism which, especially later at Arnhem, proved disastrous.

Third, they consider Clark, an interesting figure purely for his skillful maneuvering through the ranks so quickly which the authors see as driven by opportunity, self-publicizing, and powerful connections. Apparently, he knew the right people (like Marshall and Eisenhower) and advanced, even when it came with little or no real field experience although, clearly, he seemed an effective diplomat and administrator at times. Clark best embodies the sort of young Turk who makes his way through the paths of power until he lands command of Fifth Army, which on paper was meant for training. Of course, he tries to avoid being sidelined so he schemes to get into the action with deleterious results (see Salerno, Anzio, Rapido River and Cassino). Yet, he still managed to unfold his grand performance when he entered Rome brazenly and, according to a period German report, “saved the German Tenth Army” instead of encircling them as Alexander wanted. (p. 1510 Somehow, he survived all of these miscues and even a postwar Rapido River congressional inquiry, which says something about the way things are done when you manage to win one war and needing ‘heroes’ for the next war outweighs other concerns.

Fourth, they consider Alexander, an experienced British leader who may have been too gentlemanly for the role. Alexander seems to have a polarizing effect, seen as too mild or given to retreat early in the war, Churchill supported him because he was confident in his abilities, so he remained. Alexander’s orders tended to be too vague and when you have subordinates like Clark, were bound to be ignored or otherwise not correctly implemented. Alexander, to his credit, was about keeping the Anglo-Allied coalition together and drew wide approval as a man. He let his commanders work instead of reigning them in, which works both towards success and failure.

Lastly, they consider “Smiling Albert” Kesselring, the only Axis leader to be profiled. Kesselring is no less polarizing on paper, yet he seems to be one of the better military minds profiled which is saying something when you consider he is a Luftwaffe and not Heer (Army) leader. Admittedly, he greatly benefitted from the defender’s paradise that is Italy, with all the rivers, ravines and mountainous terrain that often buffaloed the Allies trying to force their way northwards. Overall, he benefitted from the timely escape of critical units from Sicily, lacked anything like the air and sea control of the Allies and fought his defensive war with considerable aplomb.

Each general’s relative foibles are explored which gives a deeper understanding of their efforts during the war and helps to provide interesting backstory and other content which is likely missed or ignored. Unfortunately, the book will likely only feed existing arguments as readers inevitably fall back on their relative bias as to who was the most successful or not due to some outside or otherwise uncontrollable reasons, which is much easier than actually changing your mind on a historical figure’s achievements.

Note: Flawed Commanders and Strategy in the Battles for Italy is also available in e-editions.

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