October 29,2008:
The U.S. Department of Defense
continues to buy new generations of IED (roadside bomb) jammers. The latest
model is CREW (Counter- Radio Controlled Improvised Explosive Device Electronic
Warfare) 2.1. CREW 3.0 is already being developed. These devices, for use in
vehicles, cost about $77,000 each and are now reprogrammable. There is some
debate over how effective they are. Two things are known. The devices have been
in use for five years, with frequent new models and upgrades. Also, the many
terrorists in Iraq put out nearly 40 roadside bombs for every American they
kill. Something was defeating the bombs, and the U.S. military will not discuss
details of what the terrorists were saying among themselves, or exactly how
many bombs were defeated solely by the jammers. It appears that the jammers are
useful enough to justify the several billion dollars invested on them. The
classified details of the jammer's impact on the war has been discussed with
some members of Congress, and no one has come out demanding an investigation of
all the money "wasted" on jammers. That says a lot.
In most
parts of the world, the cell phone or remote control toy is still the favored
method of setting off these bombs. Where possible, just running a wire is
preferred, as it is cheap, and cannot be jammed. The jammers available to
American and NATO armed forces can also be obtained by most police departments.
There have not been many takers, mainly because the American Warlock and CREW
jammers interfere with so many frequencies. Hardly any wireless device works as
long as one of these jammers is nearby. That makes the security forces very
unpopular, at least if there are very few roadside bombs going off.
Terrorists
are coming with more ways to get around the jammers used by security forces, to
defeat roadside bombs. Some bombs have been detonated by light sensors set off
by camera flash. This proved to be tricky, as you had to get the light just
right. Another resourceful method was the use of a radar Speed Trap detector
set off by a radar gun. This is actually
an old one, originally used by Irish terrorists over two decades ago. It's
believed, however, that the Iraqi terrorists reinvented it. Another popular
improvisation is the use of the keyless Entry systems for automobiles. In this
case, modified systems, that had a longer range (over a hundred meters) have
been used to set off some bombs. CREW was apparently modified to deal with this
one.
Iraq is
where some 90 percent of the roadside bombs have been used in the past five
years, although Afghanistan is now becoming the primary are for this type of
weapon. Until the end of 2007, the roadside bomb was a major industry in Sunni
Arab areas of Iraq. The building, placing and detonating of these bombs is
subcontracted to one of hundreds of teams that specialize in those tasks. The
chief proponent of the roadside bomb are the Sunni Arab security officials who
used to work for Saddam. These guys are still well financed, and that's what
has made the roadside bomb such a major part of the Iraq war.
IEDs, or
improvised explosive devices, became the primary terrorist weapon in Iraq
because they limited attacker casualties. By the end of 2007, about 81,000 of
them were used, mostly against U.S. troops. During that period, IEDs killed
about 2,100 U.S. troops. That's about one American killed for every 38 IEDs
used. Not particularly impressive, but as the only effective weapon the Iraqi
terrorists had, they got behind the
tactic in a big way.
IED use started off slow, with only about
3,000 used in the first year after Saddam was overthrown. Of total of 81,000
IEDs used, about 30 percent were used in 2007, the year that al Qaeda and its
Sunni allies were defeated. Because of the surge offensive, and the declining
effectiveness of terror groups, the number used in 2007 was less than the
previous year. Another factor in the decline is the growing cost of building
and placing these bombs. The 600,000 tons of Saddams munitions that were
scattered all over the country in early 2003, were largely been found and
destroyed by 2007. By then, terrorists often had to make their own explosives,
or pay big bucks to the black market dealers or smugglers. The people who place
and detonate IEDs were demanding more money, because their job had gotten more
dangerous.
During 2004,
about a third of U.S. casualties in Iraq were from roadside bombs. There are
also a lot of ambushes with AK-47s and RPGs, but these cause fewer casualties.
The most exposed U.S. troops are those moving supplies, and other stuff, around
the country. There are 300-400 convoy operations a day in Iraq, most of them
being supply runs. This involves over 3,000 vehicles, and some 6,000 troops.
Casualties from attacks on convoys are relatively low, although soldiers who
drive dangerous routes regularly have about a five percent chance of getting
killed or wounded during a 12 month tour. That's a very high casualty rate for
non-combat troops.
The use of
IEDs gave Saddams experienced and well trained military and security personnel
a chance to show off their skills. But the most effective countermeasures were
equally clever American troops using whatever high, and low, tech solutions
they could come up with. Again, new technology got the most media attention,
but when you went into the details of why over 90 percent of IEDs are spotted
and disabled, you found that it was brains, not gadgets, that was mainly
responsible.
IEDs have
been around for several generations. The only reason they are getting so much
ink in Iraq is because the terrorists are unable to inflict many casualties on
American troops any other way. The Sunni Arab fighters in Iraq are,
historically, a pretty inept and pathetic bunch. This can be seen in the
amazingly low casualty rate of American troops. By comparison, an American
soldier serving in Vietnam was about three times more likely to be killed or
wounded.
IEDs were
used in Vietnam, but caused (with mines and booby traps in general) only 13
percent of the casualties, compared to over 60 percent in Iraq. The reason for
this is one that few journalists want to discuss openly. But historians can
tell you; Arabs are lousy fighters. Hasn't always been this way, but for the
last century or so, it has. This has more to do with poor leadership, and a
culture that simply does not encourage those traits that are needed to produce
a superior soldier. In a word, the North Vietnamese soldiers and Viet Cong
guerillas were better, and more deadly, fighters. They got better results
without having to fall back on IEDs.
IEDs are mainly a matter of technology, planning
and careful preparation for the attack. These are all things Iraqis are good
at. You also suffer a lot fewer casualties by using IEDs, so the weapon is good
for the morale of the users. Over the last four years, the IED has been used
more and more. While only 5,607 IEDs were placed in 2004, there were 10,953
encountered in 2005 and over 40,000 in 2006. But American troops responded to
the threat. In 2004, about a quarter of IEDs actually went off and hurt
someone. In 2005, that rate declined to ten percent, and kept falling. This has
been very frustrating for the terrorists and nerve wracking for the American troops
on the receiving end. While billions of dollars has been put into developing
new devices to counter IEDs, the best defensive tool is still alert troops, who
have been briefed on the latest intel about what kind of IEDs are being
planted.
The basic target
areas for IEDs remain intersections and roundabouts, on and under bridges and
overpasses, on verges and breaks in the median strips, defiles, and any place
where the IED planner believes the bomb will not be noticed by approaching
Americans. In addition, IEDs are often planted in a daisy-chain fashion.
Another tactic is using some gunmen to draw U.S. troops towards an IED. These
"kill zones" often employ secondary IEDs, that are detonated after
the initial devices have exploded.
IEDs were
big business in Iraq for several years. Most of the Iraqis making and planning
these bombs were not doing it for free. They got paid, and the bomb building
industry generated over ten million dollars a year in revenues for Iraqi
individuals and contractors. For a Sunni Arab who once worked for Saddam, this
was one of the few good employment opportunities available. Moreover, the low
risk aspect has brought out the "Geeks-for-Saddam," crowd and
resulted in many snazzy instructional DVDs and videos for wannabe bomb makers.
Excellent graphics, and everything is in Arabic. Many of these items have been
captured, along with a few of the geeks. The educational effort was supported
by the terrorist leaders because it was obvious that, without constantly
improving the bomb designs and planting tactics, the failure rate would soon
get to 99 percent, or worse.
The
organizations that provided the money for bomb building, and helped with
obtaining materials (there's a black market for everything in Iraq,
everything), evolved. They had to, as
the management of the IED campaign quickly became prime suspects, and much
sought after by U.S. troops and Iraqi police. But you don't hear much about
this in the media, for the simple reason that American intelligence did not
want to let on how much it knew and how close it was getting to the remaining
IED kingpins. That was very much a war in the shadows, and one that extended
into neighboring countries. By early 2008, most of the IED gangs were
destroyed, severely damaged, or disbanded (by lack of work, or fear).
The biggest
victims of IEDs were Iraqis, especially civilians. The terrorists went to great
lengths to place IEDs in populated areas, where all the structures and clutter
along the roads provided more hiding places. But the local Iraqis were not keen
on having a large bomb go off in their neighborhood. The terrorists often don't
give the locals much choice. After all, terrorists know how to terrorize, and
they usually start with uncooperative Iraqis living around them. IEDs place in
rural areas are much easier to spot by the Americans, and all their UAVs,
electronic gadgets and sharp eyed soldiers.
The Iraqi
Sunni Arab terrorists believed that if they kept it up long enough, causing a
dozen or so American casualties a day, they would eventually cause the
Americans to get discouraged and go home. This worked in Vietnam, although it
didn't work for the Japanese during World War II. It didn't work in Iraq,
because the terrorists lost the support of the population, while the Americans
gained it.