Special Operations: Stealthy Support For Afghans


September 13, 2016: The U.S. recently revealed that American SOCOM (Special Operations Command) troops in Afghanistan accompany their Afghan counterparts on about ten percent of combat missions and also help plan most of the other 90 percent. American special operations troops now in Afghanistan are supposed to be concentrating on training Afghan commandos while also helping with planning and preparation for missions. It was also revealed that commandos from other NATO nations also get actively involved in some Afghan special operations missions. However it was noted that on 80 percent of their missions the Afghan special operations troops go out by themselves. U.S. and NATO special operations troops generally are not involved in combat but often provide armed backup and battlefield advice and assistance (calling in air strikes or receiving intel from American and NATO UAVs and intel troops back at a base).

Although most American combat troops left Afghanistan at the end of 2014 there are still several thousand SOCOM troops there and even more regular army personnel (mainly for support). There were still enough warplanes and helicopter gunships available in 2015 to carry out about 30 percent of the ground attack missions undertaken in 2014 and that has been increasing in 2016. American air support now takes longer to arrive as each one requires approval by more lawyers and politicians back in the United States. Occasionally the American SOCOM teams carry out a combat missions alone but these are kept quiet and need even more permissions from lawyers and politicians back in the United States.

Despite all this the Afghan security forces have survived, for the moment, the loss of all those foreign troops in 2014. The most serious problem is that the foreign troops and contractors who helped keep complex equipment going for the Afghan military have largely left. Without this support Afghan troops found that things soon began breaking down. There was often no one available to fix these problems until deals could be made to hire new contractors to replace the departed American and NATO specialists.

The Afghan police and army are not missing the Western combat troops as much as they are the Western tech support. By the end of 2014 all combat operations against the Taliban were being handled by Afghan police and soldiers. But most of the support functions long handled by the Western forces were not being taken care because nearly all those foreign logistical, medical, communications and intelligence troops and civilian contractors had gone. This hurts the Afghans especially hard because they have not got enough Afghans with technical skills to replace all those Western specialists. Medical support is particularly missed, as is the once abundant and timely air support (using smart bombs).

All this missing support is already hurting the morale of Afghan security forces, many of them veterans who had gotten used to the availability of Western levels of medical care for those wounded in combat and smart bombs to get them out of hopeless situations. The missing Western air support resulted in more Afghan casualties but the Afghans adapted. One or two smart bombs is often decisive when fighting the Taliban, warlords or bandits. Without much fanfare in late 2015 the United States quietly moved some more warplanes back to Afghanistan to increase the air support. The air surveillance capabilities of the Westerners was also a great help in defeating the enemy and limiting friendly casualties. This was also quietly increased in 2015. All the other Western support services had a similar impact and most are now gone. There is still some air and medical support but much less than before and intended mainly to support the 20,000 foreign troops and contractors who remain as military advisors and trainers. In practice more of these resources have been allocated to the Afghans, rather than have them stand idle.

The remaining foreigners were well aware of these shortage and advised their bosses to see about keeping some more of those services in Afghanistan or helping the Afghans to replace them using Afghan or foreign contractors. Afghan leaders also asked for this, as they get reports of the growing problems created by the withdrawal of all those foreign technicians. Many of those appeals are being quietly answered. After all, these needs are being provided by civilian contractors who are never deliberately sent into combat.

The Afghan security forces, despite corruption and occasional poor leadership, have outfought the Taliban since they began taking control of all security functions in 2012. Considering the internal problems the Taliban have, the Afghan security forces might actually win this war.

One critical function the remaining American SOCOM operators provide is an up close and personal assessment of the performance of Afghan combat forces. The American SOCOM forces are doing more advising than teaching and those evaluations are constantly passed back to the Pentagon, the White House and Congress. So far the Afghan special operations troops are doing well, the army is OK and the police in many areas need some work.


Article Archive

Special Operations: Current 2019 2018 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 



Help Keep Us Soaring

We need your help! Our subscription base has slowly been dwindling. We need your help in reversing that trend. We would like to add 20 new subscribers this month.

Each month we count on your subscriptions or contributions. You can support us in the following ways:

  1. Make sure you spread the word about us. Two ways to do that are to like us on Facebook and follow us on Twitter.
  2. Subscribe to our daily newsletter. We’ll send the news to your email box, and you don’t have to come to the site unless you want to read columns or see photos.
  3. You can contribute to the health of StrategyPage. A contribution is not a donation that you can deduct at tax time, but a form of crowdfunding. We store none of your information when you contribute..
Subscribe   Contribute   Close