Counter-Terrorism: Why The Pakistani Military Cannot Be Trusted


April 2, 2012:  Pakistan recently demanded, again, that the United States halt the use of CIA UAVs to attack Islamic terrorists in the Pakistani tribal territories along the Afghan border. Pakistan, however, offered a compromise this time. If the Americans would tell Pakistan where U.S. intelligence had located terrorists, Pakistan would send one of its F-16s and use a smart bomb to do the deed. The U.S. turned this down for several reasons, the main one being that the Pakistanis would "miss" (or simply not be able to find) terrorists who were working for the Pakistani Army. The Pakistanis could also sell protection (from air attacks) to Islamic terrorists. Some terrorists would still die because Pakistan has always been content to see the Americans kill Islamic terrorists who were carrying out attacks inside Pakistan. Terrorists who confined their attacks to targets in Afghanistan or India were another matter. From over a decade of experience the Americans know the Pakistani military cannot be trusted, but the Pakistanis deny this and demand more of whatever they can get.

In any event, there were only 11 U.S. UAV attacks for the first three months of the year. In 2011, there were 21 attacks in those three months and 28 in 2010. This decline is largely because there are fewer targets. In part this is because the U.S. has cut back on attacks against low level terrorists and are just going after leaders and specialists. The terrorists have also adapted, using better concealment and simply not moving as much. The damage has been done, with hundreds of terrorist leaders killed and their organizations now torn apart by squabbles over who should be in charge.

So despite the Pakistani anger at the United States for flying into Pakistan to raid Osama bin Laden's hideout (in a military town) and the subsequent expulsion of many American military trainers and intel specialists, the CIA decapitation (kill the leaders) campaign continues. The attacks were halted for a short time after a friendly fire incident last November killed 26 Pakistani troops on the Afghan border (where American and Afghan troops are often fired on from the Pakistani side of the border, sometimes by Pakistani troops or border guards working for terror groups).

There were 70 of these CIA UAV attacks in 2011, compared to 118 in 2010 (and 53 in 2009, 33 in 2008, 4 in 2007, 2 in 2006 and 2005, and one in 2004). Attacked by Predator and Reaper UAVs armed with missiles, the terrorists (al Qaeda, Taliban, and the Haqqani Network) have lost about 50 senior leaders in the last six years, most of them in the last three years. These losses are not only bad for morale at the top but are seriously disrupting terrorist activities. The terrorist losses have been severe and include heads of operations, finance, and intelligence. Many of the mid-level commanders were bomb making and terror attack experts. These losses caused additional casualties as less skilled bomb makers died when their imperfect devices blew up while under construction. New bomb makers have been less skilled because of poor instruction. The loss of operations commanders meant operatives were less effectively deployed and more easily caught or killed. The damage to their intelligence operations meant there was less success in general, especially against the growing American informant network on the ground. The financial leadership losses have meant less income and more reliance on stealing from locals, which makes the terror groups even more unpopular.

While there are more UAV attacks in the last few years, fewer civilians have been killed. It's difficult to tell who is an innocent civilian in these circumstances but since the Taliban have rarely claimed and identified civilian deaths from these attacks, there are apparently very few civilians killed. Overall deaths from these UAV attacks vary from 1,300 to 2,500, and it's generally agreed that most of the victims have been terrorists or their immediate families.

There are several reasons for this. One is better intel but there's a new weapon in use. The CIA controlled UAVs are sometimes using a smaller missile: the Griffin. This enables targets to be destroyed with less risk to nearby civilians. The Griffin is an alternative to the Hellfire II, which weighs 48.2 kg (106 pounds), carries a 9 kg (20 pound) warhead, and has a range of 8,000 meters. In contrast, the Griffin weighs only 16 kg (35 pounds), with a 5.9 kg (13 pound) warhead which is larger, in proportion to its size, than the one carried by the larger Hellfire missile. Griffin has a pop-out wings, allowing it to glide and thus has a longer range (15 kilometers) than Hellfire. UAVs can carry more of the smaller missiles, typically two of them in place of one Hellfire. Note that if the Pakistanis were allowed to make these attacks they would be using 227 kg (500 pound) smart bombs, each with over 120 kg of explosives. This would kill a lot of nearby civilians, which apparently does not bother the Pakistanis, as long as it's Pakistanis doing the killing.

The fact that there are civilians among the dead at all is largely because the terrorists use human shields and try to surround themselves with women and children whenever possible. Many of these civilians are wives and children of the Islamic radicals. As the CIA intelligence got better, and the locals more insistent on not being human shields, more and more of the civilians were close kin of the terrorists and at least aware of the danger they were in because of their husband's line of work.

The Taliban and al Qaeda don't like to discuss these attacks, even to score some media points by complaining of civilian casualties. Civilian deaths are minimized by trying to catch the terrorists while traveling or otherwise away from civilians. Journalists visiting the sites of these attacks later find few locals claiming lots of civilian casualties. Unlike Afghanistan, the Pakistani Pushtuns tend to avoid criticizing their government, for fear of retribution from tribal leaders or the government itself.




Help Keep Us From Drying Up

We need your help! Our subscription base has slowly been dwindling.

Each month we count on your contributions. You can support us in the following ways:

  1. Make sure you spread the word about us. Two ways to do that are to like us on Facebook and follow us on Twitter.
  2. Subscribe to our daily newsletter. We’ll send the news to your email box, and you don’t have to come to the site unless you want to read columns or see photos.
  3. You can contribute to the health of StrategyPage.
Subscribe   Contribute   Close