Command and Organization in the West

Too often, accounts of Civil War battles and campaigns concentrate on the qualities of the opposing commanders as the determinant of victory or defeat. Those qualities are indeed important, but there are related factors that also play an important part. Some, such as luck, are not measurable, but author Zimmermann examines six of them that are.

The six are:

1. The existence and achievement of an attainable objective,

2. Success in seizing the initiative at the end of the action.

3. The commander being sustained by his lieutenants.

4. The commander being reinforced by a competent staff that effectively supervises logistical support.

5. Skill at committing all resources in a timely fashion.

6. Achieving true strategic success by the end of the campaign.

In the West in 1862, Zimmermann examines nine consequential engagements. Union forces were victorious in seven of them. This was not the result of bringing superior forces to bear—that is outnumbering the Confederates, having superior weapons, and so forth; these factors did not come into play until 1863.

In a prologue, Zimmermann looks at the performance of the two top U.S. commanders in the Mexican war, Zachary Taylor and Winfield Scott, and how their methods rubbed off on the young officers under their command who would later become generals in the Civil War. Taylor, who had performed well during the Seminole War, advanced south from Texas, initiating battles with the Mexicans that he won. However, Mexico City was 700 miles away, and he had no clear, attainable objective that would end the war in favor of the U.S. And once his logistical support was disrupted, he was effectively out of the war. Scott, by contrast planned his attack on Mexico City meticulously, working closely with the navy, ensuring adequate logistical support, making careful reconnaissance, throwing maximum force at the enemy each time they engaged, and ultimately capturing the capital—an action that brought the Mexicans to the negotiating table and an end to the war. In Mexico, Scott achieved all six elements of victory, Taylor only one.

The author also draws attention to the fact that staff positions during the Mexican war, including those concerning logistics, were largely filled by West Point graduates. In the Civil War, by contrast, its much larger armies meant that many staff positions had to be filled by civilians with little or no military experience, especially as most West Pointers wanted combat positions. Confederate logistical arrangements were often inferior to those of the Union, because the increasingly industrial North had many civilians who were grounded in directing large organizations such as railroads. The still largely agricultural South had plantation managers aplenty, but their organizational experience was not on the same scale.

As an example of this imbalance, Zimmermann examines the Union victory at Mill Springs. He notes that Zollicoffer crossed over the unfordable Cumberland River with no achievable goal in sight—thus placing his army in a vulnerable position, wandered too near the enemy lines, and got killed. While his successor – Major General George B. Crittenden—did little, Confederate movements were uncoordinated, ammunition and food supply was inadequate, and the result was a debacle for the South. Other engagements examined include Fort Donelson, Pea Ridge, Shiloh, Richmond (Kentucky), Perryville, Corinth, Prairie Grove, and Stones River.

A final chapter draws conclusions from the analysis of these actions, the author noting that there may be other factors involved. (This reviewer wonders to what extent troop morale, for instance, might be added to the list, though it would be difficult to measure). The book wraps up with Appendices on the distribution of food and ammunition and on artillery improvements during the period covered. This is an extremely readable, outstanding study which belongs in every Civil War buff ’s library.

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Note: More Than Just Grit is also available in e-editions.

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