Information Warfare: Russia Reports All The News That Fits


January 4, 2023: Until early 2022, Russian Information War operations were aimed mainly at other countries. Russian leader Vladimir Putin had, in the previous two decades, successfully turned Russia back into something resembling the Soviet Union he was nostalgic for. Putin was now president-for-life and controlled the mass media and nearly all the independent media. Putin has revived many of his favorite Soviet era institutions, including a large, modern dezinformatsiya (disinformation) organization. This new dezinformatsiya capability took advantage of the Internet to become even more effective than its Cold War version. In 2022 Putin’s political fortunes took a turn for the worse when his invasion of Ukraine quickly failed with the loss of thousands of armored vehicles, most of the combat unit officers and such high troop losses that he found a growing number of Russians turning against him. If not stabilized or reversed, that shift in public opinion could prove fatal for his continued ability to rule Russia.

Putin’s solution was to order the dezinformatsiya operation to cooperate with the VGTRK (All-Russia State Television and Radio Company) to convince Russians that the Ukraine operation was not a failure but had succeeded in stalling and exposing a secret NATO plan to weaken Russia and render it unable to rebuild the Russian empire and make Russia great again. Or at least keep Putin in power. The VGTRK was full of Putin loyalists who enthusiastically used the dezinformatsiya operation to feed Russians an illusion that proved Putin’s version of what NATO was doing to Russia and the success of Putin in disrupting the NATO efforts to hurt Russia. While the old War era disinformation depended on bribing foreign journalists to get articles published that supported Soviet goals without being too traceable back to Russia.

Most of what we now know of Russian Cold War disinformation methods and their success was documented after the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 and for several year it was possible for Western journalists, and intelligence officials to document what the Soviets did and how successful it was. This provided lots of surprises, many of the unpleasant kind, for Western journalists and intelligence professionals. The Soviets were very successful, and managed to weaken Western efforts to thwart Soviet schemes.

Using the updated (to take full advantage of Internet capabilities) Putin has, so far, contained but not eliminated the growing popular opposition inside Russia. This new disinformation campaign is pretty convincing to the average Russian that knows little of the West and gets most of their news from VGTRK. It starts with the enormous quantity of information broadcast by Western media and captured on the Internet or databases maintained by Russia and China. VGTRK news editors have access to all these soundbites and video moments that can be edited and presented to show the Putin interpretation in a convincing manner, at least to Russians getting most of their news from VGTRK.

There are a large number of Russians who know what Western media publish and see through the VGTRK disinformation and see it for what it is. Unfortunately, many (nearly eight million) of these Russians have left the country since Putin took power in 1999. About a million left in the last year.

Western Internet media are not blameless and have, over the past few years, been accused, and often exposed for using disinformation for their own economic or, more frequently, political goals. For Western social media sites like Facebook, 2019 is now seen as the year their unpleasant changes began. This was all about the resurgence of Cold War era media campaigns that Russia used to wage internationally using pre-Internet media. In the last few months alone, Facebook has announced the discovery and banishment of hundreds of accounts owned and operated by Russian firms that specialize in this sort of thing. The largest Russian disinformation operation is the IRA (Internet Research Agency). During the Cold War something like the IRA would be a top-secret subsidiary of the KGB (secret police). In post-communist Russia, a lot of KGB operations have gone commercial and many other nations have adopted those techniques. Facebook has found dozens of nations using, or backing the use of Internet-based propaganda or disinformation campaigns. That is something new because in pre-Internet days only major nations could organize and run an effective international disinformation effort.

Facebook went public in part to alert the public to how these scams work and what to look for. Facebook finds most of these scams via software that looks for certain kinds of CIB (Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior). This automated approach sometimes leads to false positives and a hapless user finds themselves banned for appearing to be part of a Russian disinformation operation. With over a billion users this is bound to happen on Facebook, so the press releases about CIB efforts are partly an effort to let users know that Facebook is constantly refining its software tools to reduce the number of false positives. For Facebook that is necessary to limit the bad publicity some of these false positives create when the victim proves their case and makes Facebook look like some evil media corporation. Yet much of the “inauthentic behavior”, like copying and pasting a lot without using much commentary, is popular with a lot of legitimate users.

Facebook isn’t the only social media site trying to block government disinformation campaigns. Twitter, as well as Facebook earlier, announced they had shut down hundreds of accounts that were being used by China to spread false and disparaging news about the millions of pro-democracy demonstrators in Hong Kong. Twitter revealed that their analysis software had discovered over 20,000 suspect accounts but that most of these appeared to be legitimate accounts of people who sided with the Chinese government. What Twitter did not reveal was that they were also using a disinformation campaign against their own users to ensure that only opinions approved by Twitter management showed up on Twitter. This deception was revealed in 2022 when new owners of Twitter released the incriminating evidence of what had been done,

Facebook reported that they had found a large number of accounts that appeared to be taking orders from the Chinese government to discredit and disparage the Hong Kong protestors, or simply drive pro-protestor users off Facebook pages or discussions favorable to the protests. Facebook was also more willing to admit incidents of censoring users and backed off on that while Twitter continued.

This effort to find and cripple the Chinese Information War operation on Twitter and Facebook confirmed earlier estimates that about half a million Chinese were working for this Information War operation. The Chinese effort was not just directed against the Hong Kong protestors but also sought to boost China’s image among the worldwide Chinese speaking social media users. For those who follow this sort of thing, the Chinese Hong Kong disinformation operation is nothing new. Disinformation efforts have been going on for decades and expanded and escalated after 1995 when the Internet became easier to use for the rapidly growing number of PC and later cellphone users.

The Chinese began to use the Internet as part of their Information War operations in 2005 when propaganda officials sought ways to deal with growing anti-government activity on Internet message boards. One idea was to organize the pro-government posters already out there. The propaganda bureaucracy (which is huge in China) did so and got so many volunteers that they soon developed a test to select the most capable candidates. In addition, the government set up training classes to improve the skills of these volunteers. Cash bonuses were offered for the most effective work. At one point, the government had nearly 100,000 volunteers and paid posters operating. This quickly evolved into the 50 Cent Army. By 2010 the Russian government adopted the practice and before long there was the 50 Ruble Army in Russia.

The Chinese eventually realized that quality was better than quantity because the less articulate posters were easily spotted, and ridiculed, as members of the "50 Cent Army," "Internet Apes," or the “Water (because of the zombie accounts used for posting) Army.” This was especially the case outside of China. Inside China people just learned to ignore the government posters. That was a wise choice because currently about 18 percent of all posts on the Chinese Internet come from government-controlled or influenced accounts.

Gradually China grew to depend on quantity as well as quality. They found that the more skilled Internet Apes often appear convincing to many people following Internet based discussions. The 50 Cent Army was often a very worthwhile investment, especially when experienced and skilled posters were used. In this area, quantity does not really match quality. In the United States, China used the same techniques to push political candidates or commercial products. Americans call this "viral marketing" and it is a popular marketing tool worldwide. The CIA has used a similar technique to counter anti-American, or pro-terrorist, activity on the Internet. This activity also made it easier to spot potential terrorists or potential informants.

Russia adopted the Chinese technique of harnessing the enthusiasm of pro-government volunteers. As happened elsewhere, bloggers and posters with a large following were also enticed to be pro-government, for a fee, or perhaps because of a few threats. This practice of buying favorable attention in the media is nothing new and is centuries old. The U.S. is unique in that, for about a century, the American mass media was largely free of this blatant bribery. But in most of the world, a clever journalist quickly attracts the attention of people who will pay for some favorable comments. It's no secret, although many journalists insist they are not bought.

More Americans have become aware of this form of Information War since late 2016 when suddenly there were frequent accusations of Russia interfering in American elections. This was accomplished by Russia using government-directed messages to be posted, on a massive scale, in social media and other online sites. One aspect of this that didn’t attract much media attention was that this technique, and its use by foreign governments in the United States, was nothing new. This sort of thing has been widely used on the Internet for over a decade and for generations before that there was “astroturfing” (creating fake “grassroots” support with a variety pre-Internet techniques) and more lavishly funded Soviet efforts called dezinformatsiya (disinformation) operations.

During the Cold War the communist rulers of the Soviet Union invented or expanded on all sorts of propaganda, deception and indoctrination techniques that are still widely copied (and often condemned) because they work, at least sometimes. In the end, all that dezinformatsiya did not prevent the Soviet empire from collapsing and disintegrating. Some of those techniques have been updated and continue to serve the current rulers of Russia. One of them involves the Internet and is believed particularly useful (or at least thought to be) in Russia.

While technically a democracy, modern Russia has evolved into yet another dictatorship. This is because out of the ashes of the Soviet Union there arose an oligarchy with enough cash and propaganda skills, not to mention control of most mass media, to get elected and make most Russians support what the new government wants. A key tool in this was using freewheeling Internet-based message boards to mold and manipulate public opinion. This sort of thing has been around since the Internet began its explosive growth after 2000, as it went from 500 million users to nearly 5 billion now. Most of the of people on the planet have access to the Internet and it has become a major tool for disinformation operations

It wasn’t long before many Internet users noticed that messages posted by propagandists (or PR specialists) were showing up in social media and messaging areas throughout the Internet. This was especially true in China. This is where it all began; the idea of quietly paying Internet users a small fee to post pro-government (or company) responses on message boards where some company or the government is being criticized or maligned. For some members of the original Chinese "50 Cent Party" it was a full-time job, receiving up to 50 cents (two yuan) each for up to a hundred pro-government messages posted a day, using several dozen different accounts. But most of the posters were volunteers or just did it to earn a little extra money. If you could post in foreign languages, especially colloquial English, you would make more. Very few members of the "50 Cent Army" made lots of money and most were reviled by their online peers as a bunch of trolls (those who leave messages to annoy rather than inform or amuse).

By 2015 Russia had turned Internet trolling into a profession with full-time workers getting paid $700 to $1,000 a month (plus bonuses for especially effective efforts) and working in office settings rather than from home. These professional trolls mainly write in Russian, to encourage pro-government opinions among Russian Internet users. The government also has an international program that pays a lot more because of the need for good foreign language skills. That means the ability to “write like a native” not only in terms of grammar but in terms of the Internet idioms unique to each language or country. The key here is not so come off as a Russian troll but a local.

Even before Russia had turned Internet trolling into a profession, Israel kicked this process up a level in 2013 by establishing a special tuition assistance program for university students who agreed to regularly post messages on the Internet to combat anti-Semitism and anti-Israel propaganda. While Israel is unique in being one of the few countries to admit doing this, many others have been caught at it and continue to deny any official involvement. One example is North Korea, which South Korea believes has had (since at least 2014) several hundred operatives who are basically full-time “Internet Apes”, whose sole task is to battle anti-North Korean sentiments on South Korean internet message areas and push the idea that North Korea is a better place to live than it actually is.

By now many veteran Internet users automatically recognize and ignore the paid messages and go out of their way to teach others what to look for. In the West, many moderators of message boards have tools that allow them to instantly delete the accounts of Internet Apes and all their paid-for posts. In China you can get arrested for doing that, but not for just ignoring the paid propaganda. Israel leaves it up to the “operators” to reveal they are semi-official or keep quiet about that. By using carefully selected university students the Israelis are better able to avoid detection and deliver more effective messages. This could be a key advantage of this program because if you can influence people who are very active on the Internet and have many followers you gain credibility and momentum.




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