Information Warfare: Iranian Domains Deleted

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November 1, 2020: The United States, invoking a law (FARA) making it possible to shut down foreign Internet-based propaganda supporting terrorism, seized 92 domain names used by the Iranian IRGC (Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps) to spread such propaganda. While only four of those domain names were used to distribute English language disinformation, the other 88 were used to distribute fake news and pro-Islamic terror messages in local languages throughout the Middle East, Southeast Asia and Europe. The IRGC sites pretended to represent legitimate news sources and posted articles copied from actual ones but with the information changed to justify and promote Islamic terrorism and criticize local efforts to find and prosecute supporters of Islamic radicalism and the use of violence in the defense of Islam.

The investigation against the network of Iranian sites was started when Google reported some of the suspicious sites to the FBI, which then worked with Google, Facebook and Twitter to track down the common source of all this propaganda and who was behind it. That led to 92 domain names that were found to be owned and operated by the IRGC.

The current Iranian religious dictatorship used similar tactics to overthrow and replace the Iranian monarchy in 1979 and democracy in Iran during the 1980s. Since then the message of hate has been mainly aimed at Israel and the United States. The IRGC has proved to be good at using disinformation and local Shia groups to kill thousands of “enemies of Iran.” This Iranian campaign did not use much social media. Instead the IRGC created fake news sites that could not be removed by social media efforts to limit disinformation.

Russia and China do the same thing and all these Information War efforts are about the resurgence of Cold War era media campaigns that Russia used to wage internationally using pre-Internet media. Social media has become a favorite venue for these fake messages and in the last few years Facebook has discovered and banished thousands of accounts owned and operated by Russian firms that specialize in this sort of thing.

The largest Russian disinformation operation is the IRA (Internet Research Agency). During the Cold War something like the IRA would be a top-secret subsidiary of the KGB (secret police). In post-communist Russia, a lot of KGB operations have gone commercial and many other nations have adopted those techniques. Facebook has found dozens of nations using, or backing the use of Internet-based propaganda or disinformation campaigns. That is something new because in pre-Internet days only major nations could organize and run an effective international disinformation effort.

Facebook and other social media outlets now go public about these problems in part to alert the public to how these scams work and what to look for. Social media uncover these scams via software that looks for certain kinds of CIB (Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior). This automated approach sometimes leads to false positives and a hapless user finds themselves banned for appearing to be part of a Russian disinformation operation.

In 2020 disinformation campaigns were used by China to spread false and disparaging news about the millions of pro-democracy demonstrators in Hong Kong. Twitter and Facebook found and disabled a large number of accounts that appeared to be taking orders from the Chinese government to discredit and disparage the Hong Kong protestors, or simply drive pro-protestor users off Facebook pages or discussions favorable to the protests.

This effort to find and cripple the Chinese Information War operations on Twitter and Facebook confirmed earlier estimates that about half a million Chinese were working for this Information War operation. The Chinese effort was not just directed against the Hong Kong protestors but also sought to boost China’s image among the worldwide Chinese speaking social media users. For those who follow this sort of thing, the Chinese Hong Kong disinformation operation is nothing new. Disinformation efforts have been going on for decades and expanded and escalated after 1995 when the Internet became easier to use for the rapidly growing number of PC and later cellphone users.

The Chinese began to use the Internet as part of their Information War operations in 2005 when propaganda officials sought ways to deal with growing anti-government activity on Internet message boards. One idea was to organize the pro-government posters already out there. The propaganda bureaucracy, which is huge in China, did so and got so many volunteers that they soon developed a test to select the most capable candidates. In addition, the government set up training classes to improve the skills of these volunteers. Cash bonuses were offered for the most effective work. At one point, the government had nearly 100,000 volunteers and paid posters operating. This quickly evolved into the 50 Cent (for the rate for 50-100 posts made in a foreign language) Army. By 2010 the Russian government adopted the practice and before long there was the 50 Ruble Army in Russia.

The Chinese eventually realized that quality was better than quantity because the less articulate posters were easily spotted, and ridiculed, as members of the "50 Cent Army," "Internet Apes," or the “Water (because of the zombie accounts used for posting) Army.” This was especially the case outside of China. Inside China people just learned to ignore the government posters. That was a wise choice because currently about 18 percent of all posts on the Chinese Internet come from government-controlled or influenced accounts.

Gradually China grew to depend on quantity as well as quality. They found that the more skilled Internet Apes often appear convincing to many people following Internet based discussions. The 50 Cent Army was often a very worthwhile investment, especially when experienced and skilled posters were used. In this area, quantity does not really match quality. In the United States, China used the same techniques to push political candidates or commercial products. The Americans call this "viral marketing" and it is a popular marketing tool worldwide. The CIA has used a similar technique to counter anti-American, or pro-terrorist, activity on the Internet. This activity also made it easier to spot potential terrorists or potential informants.

Russia adopted the Chinese technique of harnessing the enthusiasm of pro-government volunteers. As happened elsewhere, bloggers and posters with a large following were also enticed to be pro-government, for a fee, or perhaps because of a few threats. This practice of buying favorable attention in the media is nothing new and is centuries old. The U.S. is unique in that, for about a century, the American mass media was largely free of this blatant bribery. But in most of the world, a clever journalist quickly attracts the attention of people who will pay for some favorable comments. It's no secret, although many journalists insist they are not bought.

More Americans have become aware of this form of Information War since late 2016 when suddenly there were frequent accusations of Russia interfering in American elections. This was accomplished by Russia using government-directed messages to be posted, on a massive scale, in social media and other online sites. One aspect of this that didn’t attract much media attention was that this technique, and its use by foreign governments in the United States, was nothing new. This sort of thing has been widely used on the Internet for over a decade and for generations before that there was “astroturfing” (creating fake “grassroots” support with a variety pre-Internet techniques) and more lavishly funded Soviet efforts called dezinformatsiya (disinformation) operations.

During the Cold War the communist rulers of the Soviet Union invented or expanded on all sorts of propaganda, deception and indoctrination techniques that are still widely copied, and often condemned because they work. At least sometimes. In the end, all that dezinformatsiya did not prevent the Soviet empire from collapsing and disintegrating. Some of those techniques have been updated and continue to serve the current rulers of Russia. One of them involves the Internet and is believed particularly useful (or at least thought to be) in Russia.

While technically a democracy, modern Russia has evolved into yet another dictatorship. This is because out of the ashes of the Soviet Union there arose an oligarchy with enough cash and propaganda skills, not to mention control of most mass media, to get elected and make most Russians support what the new government wants. A key tool in this was using freewheeling Internet-based message boards to mold and manipulate public opinion. This sort of thing has been around since the Internet began its explosive growth after 2000, as it went from 500 million users to nearly 5 billion now. Nearly 60 percent of people on the planet have access to the Internet and it has become a major tool for disinformation operations

It wasn’t long before many Internet users noticed that messages posted by propagandists (or PR specialists) were showing up in social media and messaging areas throughout the Internet. This was especially true in China. There is where it all began; the idea of quietly paying Internet users a small fee to post pro-government (or company) responses on message boards where some company or the government is being criticized or maligned. For some members of the original Chinese "50 Cent Party" it was a full-time job, receiving up to 50 cents (two yuan) each for up to a hundred pro-government messages posted a day, using several dozen different accounts. But most of the posters were volunteers or just did it to earn a little extra money. If you could post in foreign languages, especially colloquial English, you made more. Very few members of the "50 Cent Army" made lots of money and most were reviled by their online peers as a bunch of trolls (those who leave messages to annoy rather than inform or amuse).

By 2015 Russia had turned Internet trolling into a profession with full-time workers getting paid $700 to $1,000 a month (plus bonuses for especially effective efforts) and working in office settings rather than from home. These professional trolls mainly write in Russian, to encourage pro-government opinions among Russian Internet users. The government also has an international program that makes a lot more money because of the need for good foreign language skills. That means the ability to “write like a native” not only in terms of grammar but in terms of the Internet idioms unique to each language or country. The key here is not so come off as a Russian troll but a local.

Even before Russia had turned Internet trolling into a profession Israel kicked this process up a level in 2013 by establishing a special tuition assistance program for university students who agreed to regularly post messages on the Internet to combat anti-Semitism and anti-Israel propaganda. While Israel is unique in being one of the few countries to admit doing this, many others have been caught at it and continue to deny any official involvement. One example is North Korea, which South Korea believes has had (since at least 2014) several hundred operatives who are basically full-time “Internet Apes”, whose sole task is to battle anti-North Korean sentiments on South Korean Internet message areas and push the idea that North Korea is a better place to live than it actually is.

By now many veteran Internet users automatically recognize and ignore the paid messages and go out of their way to teach others what to look for. In the West, many moderators of message boards have tools that allow them to instantly delete the accounts of Internet Apes and all their paid-for posts. In China you can get arrested for doing that but not for just ignoring the paid propaganda. Israel leaves it up to the “operators” to reveal they are semi-official or keep quiet about that. By using carefully selected university students the Israelis are better able to avoid detection and deliver more effective messages. This could be a key advantage of this program because, if you can influence people who are very active on the Internet and have many followers you gain credibility and momentum.

 

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