July 22, 2026: The Russian Akula-class SSBNs are nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines. Last month, one of these, the Leopard, began sea trials after fifteen years spent in modernization and refueling. This is four or five times longer than it usually takes, and that's because of resource shortages, especially money. Leopard is to be back in service by the end of this year.

The Russian Navy is maintaining its SSBN upgrade and refurbishment program. Currently, Russia has thirteen SSBNs in service. Eight of them are Borei class, with possibly six more to come if the money is available. Russia still has seven Cold War-era Delta-class SSBNs in service, with several more being refurbished to extend their service lives.

Russia has planned a major expansion of its navy since the 1990s. This included replacing all the remaining Cold War-era ships and adding many additional new ships and submarines. That plan was disrupted by financial difficulties, less efficient shipyards than during the Soviet period, the loss of skilled workers, and disagreements over which new ships to build. There was a consensus that submarines, especially ballistic missile-carrying SSBN submarines, should get priority. SSBNs are an important component of the Russian nuclear missile arsenal. The SSBNs are even more important than the land-based missiles in silos. The SSBNs move around at sea and are more difficult to find and attack. SSN nuclear attack submarines were also important. Some were needed to escort and protect the SSBNs. At the same time, SSNs also carried some cruise or anti-ship missiles. The priority given to building new post-Soviet classes of submarines delayed the production of new surface warships until 2010. Now only surface warships of frigate size or smaller are being built.

Russia has been trying since the late 1990s to build replacements for Cold War-era warships. Most of these have reached the end of their useful lives, and many of them, while still listed as in service, rarely, if ever, seem to leave port. Russian admirals have been aware that they won't have much of a navy by the 2020s unless these older ships are replaced. The problem was that the older ships could not be refurbished or upgraded easily or cheaply, because doing so would cost more than buying new ones. These older ships are not just falling apart; because there was no money available right after the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991, there were few repairs and no upgrades during the 1990s.

While most surface ships received few upgrades or refurbishments, submarines had priority for new construction even in the 1990s, but that slowed down in the 2010s. This is a problem because there is insufficient funding to build replacements for the Cold War-era Delta-class SSBNs. Instead, some Deltas underwent refurbishment to extend their useful life.

Priority was given to building eight new Borei-class SSBNs. These were delayed, and the first one did not enter service until 2013. Money was found to take several half-built Boreis and finish them. If that had not happened, the SSBN fleet would be in danger of shrinking to four subs for a while, perhaps a long while.

The Russian economy revived in the late 1990s, and parliament allocated more funding after 2000 to build enough surface ships to maintain a respectable fleet. But that revealed another problem. Most of Russia's warship-building capability, experience, and skills disappeared after 1991. Before 2014, the government thought it had a solution: to strike a deal with France to import modern warship-building techniques by purchasing two Mistral amphibious assault ship/helicopter carriers and the right to build two more in Russian shipyards. During that process, Russian shipbuilders would learn how it's done in the West. Since the late 1990s, most of Russia's construction effort has gone into finishing a few subs and building some surface ships for export. Even these subs had serious construction problems. Mainly it was quality control, and the Navy refused to accept defective ships, especially subs that could not pass sea trials. Apparently, the shipyards were ordered to devote all their efforts to the subs, and eventually some of them limped into service. But the deal to import French shipbuilding techniques disappeared when Russia invaded Ukraine in 2014. France refunded the billion dollars paid for the two Mistrals and later sold them to Egypt, leaving the Russians on their own.

Boreis may be the last SSBNs Russia can afford for a long time. While Russia allocated more of its defense budget to SSBNs than to any other type of ship, the post-Cold War Navy budget continued to shrink. The Cold War ended in 1991, but Russia’s financial problems continued to get worse. Mistakes continue to get made, like invading Ukraine in early 2022. That was a major miscalculation, and the financial costs are being felt throughout the Russian military.

Despite all that, work continues, if more slowly, on numerous projects. Particularly SSBNs. The slowdowns have a cumulative effect. For example, in late 2020, Russia conducted a multiple missile launch from one of its new SSBNs. For the second time since the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, a submerged Borei class SSBN fired multiple Sea-Launched Ballistic missiles or SLBMs in rapid succession. This time the SSBN was off the Pacific Coast in the Sea of Okhotsk, and the four Bulava SLBM warheads landed 5,500 kilometers to the west in the Chizha test range, a large body of water in northwest Russia near Archangel and long used as a landing zone for SLBMs fired from off the Pacific coast. The last such multiple missile test was in 2018 when another Borei in the White Sea (north of Murmansk) fired four Bulava SLBMs eastward for 6,000 kilometers, and the warheads landed off the east coast of the Kamchatka Peninsula in the Kura test range, a body of water used as a landing zone for ICBMs as well as SLBMs.

As impressive as these two tests were, they did not match the last multiple SLBM launch conducted in 1991, just before the Soviet Union was dissolved. That test involved a Delta IV SSBN launching all sixteen of its R29 SLBMs. While the solid fuel Bulava could be launched every 3-4 seconds, the liquid-fueled R29S required 14 seconds between launches. It took nearly four minutes for the Delta IV to launch 650 tons worth of missiles. The largest launch of SLBMs took place in 1998, when a Typhoon-class SSBN launched all 20 of its R-39 SLBMs, not as a test but to publicly destroy them as part of the post-Cold War START disarmament agreement. The twenty R-39s did not travel far, as they were programmed to self-destruct shortly after launch, which they did.

The Boreis were the first post-Cold War Russian SSBNs; the first began construction in 1996 and took 17 years to complete. The problem was that the capabilities of Russian shipyards had declined during the 1990s because skilled engineers and workers were free to find better-paying jobs and did so on a large scale. As a result, the Boreis currently being built take about 8 years to enter service. The last Soviet-era SSBNs, the Delta IV class, took three or four years to complete. The seven Delta IVs entered service between 1984 and 1990, and six of them were refurbished a decade ago so they could remain in service until enough Boreis were ready.

Delays in getting the new Borei SSBNs into service were exacerbated by problems with their new SLBMs that persisted after the first Borei was ready for service. There were so many missile delays that the older Delta-class SSBNs had to remain in service longer than they were designed for. That meant these Deltas could not go to sea as often, a problem partially solved by refurbishing six of them. As a result, Russia has had few SSBNs at sea since 2010. The seven Boreis now in service at sea compensate for the growing inability of the Deltas to stay out for long periods.

The fourth Borei was also the first improved Borei, or Borei A design, and construction took longer and cost more than planned. One feature, adding four more SLBM launch tubes, was deleted. Borei A includes improved electronics and changes to the hull and propulsion system to make the boat quieter and more maneuverable. There are now additional sonar arrays on the sides of the boat in addition to the usual one in the front or bow of the sub. There were significant changes to the propulsion system to improve maneuverability at low speeds. The hull now has a sleeker form without the noticeable bump behind the sail, which is the small superstructure on top of subs. One morale-enhancing new feature was a small four-seat sauna. There are also larger and more comfortable crew quarters. These changes made the Borei-A look more like a Western SSBN and perform like one. These changes made to create Borei-A were so expensive that the Navy could only afford to build ten Boreis.

The Boreis are essential to replace the aging Delta IVs. In many ways, the Delta IVs were a superior design compared to the Boreis. There were 43 Deltas put into service between 1972 and 1990. There were actually four distinct models: Delta I, II, III, and IV. These varied in size from 7,800 to 13,500 tons and in capabilities. Russia had already built a class of subs to replace the Deltas: the enormous 24,000-ton Typhoon/Akula-class SSBNs. These proved too expensive to build and operate. Six of them entered service between 1981 and 1989, and to save money, all were retired or scrapped by 2009. One Typhoon remained in service until early 2023 to test new SLBM designs. That’s because the missile tubes on the Typhoon are so large that they can easily be modified to handle any new SLBM design. The last Typhoon retired in early 2023. The problems with the Typhoons were a foretaste of worse problems with the Borei and other planned large subs and surface ships.

The shipyards could not get it done. Part of the problem was growing corruption, which contributed to the Soviet Union's destruction, as well as a shortage of qualified managers, engineers, and construction workers to design, develop, and build these new ships. Because of all that, Russia had to adapt its plans. In the 1990s, it was decided that subs were more important than surface vessels, and that meant that, once budget and construction management problems manifested themselves after the 1990s, the subs always had priority. This led to the cancellation of several large surface ship construction plans and many modifications for submarine construction and use. More subs were retired as they became too old and expensive to operate. Money was always found to keep construction of new subs, especially SSBNs, going. There was also more patience for dealing with the seemingly endless flaws found in the new subs and their weapons. Priorities took priority.

The first three new Borei-class boats were supposed to be based in the Pacific, but only two were. One reason was the lack of funds to refurbish and reactivate the Chizha Test Range near Archangel. This facility was used to monitor ballistic missiles or SLBMs test-fired from east to west. The test range on the Pacific coast has been upgraded so that ballistic missile and SLBM testing can continue and be accurately monitored to assess the performance of test warheads. To continue testing the Bulava, one of the Boreis had to be assigned to the Northern Fleet.

During the Cold War, most of Russia’s SSBNs were based in the north, at several bases east of the Norwegian border and facing the Arctic Ocean. Russia spent over $350 million to expand and improve its submarine base on the Kamchatka Peninsula on its Pacific coast. This enabled new SSBNs to threaten China, as well as the United States.

The Boreis are the first new Russian boomers, naval slang for SSBNs, to enter service since 1990, when the last Delta IV entered service. Borei is the first new Russian sub design since the end of the Cold War. The other two Boreis, Alexander Nevsky and Vladimir Monomakh, benefited from all those delays with the first Borei and were built much more quickly.

The Boreis are more closely related in design to the Delta IVs and American Cold War SSBNs. The Boreis are 170 meters long and 13 meters in diameter. Surface displacement is 15,000 tons, and 16 Bulava SLBMs are carried. Work on the Yuri Dolgoruky was delayed for several years because the first missile being designed for it did not work out. A successful land-based missile, the Topol-M, was quickly modified for submarine use. That should have worked, but it didn’t and failed in many frustrating ways. This Bulava and its missiles are also known as the R-30 3M30 and SS-NX-30. This SLBM was larger, reducing the Boreis’ original capacity from 20 to 16 missiles. The boat also has four torpedo tubes and twelve torpedoes or torpedo tube-launched missiles. There are also tubes for launching smaller countermeasure devices resembling torpedoes. The Bulava has a max range of 10,000 kilometers with six warheads and 8,000 kilometers with ten warheads.

The Boreis have a crew of 107, with half of them being officers. This is a common Russian practice for high-tech ships, such as nuclear subs. Each of these Borei A boats cost at least two billion dollars, in part because money was spent on improved crew quarters. That was necessary to attract enough skilled and volunteer sailors to run these boats. The high cost of Boreis, by Russian standards, is partly because many factories that supplied parts for Russian subs were in parts of the Soviet Union that are not now within the borders of post 1991 Russia. New factories had to be built. All components of the Boreis and their missiles are to be built in Russia.

Without the Bulava, the only alternative was to redesign the Boreis to use the existing R-29 Sineva SLBM. This is the last liquid-fuel Russian SLBM in service and was used on the older Delta-class SSBNs. This redesign would cost billions of dollars and delay the Boreis' entry into service by several years. To many, switching to the older, but more reliable, Sineva missiles seemed like a reasonable move. Liquid fuel missiles are more complex than solid-fuel missiles, even though they use fuel that can be stored for long periods inside the missile. Unable, for a long time, to develop the technology for solid-fuel rockets, Russia made the most of this and developed some very effective "storable liquid fuel" rockets. It was only near the end of the Cold War that Russia finally mastered the solid-fuel rocket construction techniques. But only one solid-fuel SLBM entered service, the huge 90-ton R-39 for the massive Typhoon SSBNs.

Borei-class submarines have missile tubes designed to hold the Bulava, which is 12.1 meters long and 2 meters in diameter. The Sineva is 14.8 meters long and 1.8 meters in diameter. The additional length of the Sineva would require substantial revisions in the existing Borei design and the two still under construction in 2018. The only existing solid fuel SLBM that works, and is carried in the larger Typhoon, is the R-39, and it is huge, as in 16 meters long and 2.4 meters in diameter. Much too large even for a rebuilt Borei.

These delays in getting Bulava to work reliably led to many embarrassing changes. That’s because, in early 2012, Russia announced that its SSBNs would resume long-range combat patrols within a year. On schedule, the Russian Navy finally accepted its first Borei, Yury Dolgoruky, for service on December 30th, 2012. Thus, it appeared that the newly commissioned Yury Dolgoruky would be the first Russian SSBN in many years to make a long-range cruise, as soon as it had a working SLBM to arm it. Mass production of Bulava SLBMs began in 2013, with the goal of producing at least 124 of them. Yury Dolgoruky finally made its first combat patrol in 2015, although it was understood that only about half of the 16 Bulava SLBMs carried would work if launched. Since then, the Bulava SLBM is considered combat-ready, but only if you accept that about half of them may not work.

The Russian Navy has made a mess of its SSBN force and has done slightly better developing new SLBMs. This is all about what kind of SSBN force Russia will have in the future and what those SSBNs will be capable of. At the moment, the answers seem to be few and far between.

The Delta IV refurb included the SLBM tubes and launch equipment, enabling it to handle the latest MU2 version of the R-29 missile. Most of the improvements in the R-29MU2 concern the third stage, which can now carry 12 warheads, each capable of hitting a different target. Alternatively, the R-29MU2 can carry eight warheads, along with numerous decoys and penetration devices to deceive anti-missile systems. The upgrade extends the life of the Delta IV by 3- 4 years, which means that by the late 2020s only one Delta IV will still be in limited service and, depending on how much money and patience are available, as many as ten Boreis.