Murphy's Law: Putin is Tsar Vladimir II

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November 22, 2026: The Ukraine War was another disaster for the Russian army. One result of the war was Russians calling their leader Tsar Vladimir II, anticipating another 1917 revolution. That attitude was: whatever it takes to end this damn war. If we had a Tsar, we could murder the bastard and end it all quickly. Another interesting angle of this Tsar business was that Tsar Vladimir I was a Ukrainian.

Meanwhile, last year, Russian military leaders are calling for another round of reforms, one that will work. All previous efforts had failed in one way or another. A common factor in all the failed reform programs was corruption exacerbated by disastrous civilian leadership.

Several rounds of unsuccessful military reforms have followed the Soviet Union's collapse in 1991. One major cause of that collapse was its unaffordable and largely ineffective armed forces. In post-Soviet Russia, there were far fewer restrictions on criticizing the military. Most Russians had a very negative attitude towards conscription and the reforms underway because of the Ukraine War disaster are typical of several previous efforts to remedy problems that continue to resist any fundamental change.

Military reform has never come easily to Russia and usually occurred under a particularly strong and harsh ruler. In modern times, Russia has undergone four periods of major military reform. The first was in the early 18th century, under Czar Peter the Great. The next was under Field Marshall Milyutin in the late 19th century. In the 1930s, over a dozen daring reformers made the military ready for modern warfare. However, most of these men were executed by a paranoid dictator, Josef Stalin, just before World War II. For over 60 years, there was little real reform until 2008, when Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov sought to recast the Russian military into a force like those in the West. This meant fewer officers and conscripts, more NCOs and volunteers, plus new equipment, weapons, training methods, and tactics. Serdyukov was replaced in late 2012, and many thought his reforms might be halted. That did not happen, but some of his reforms were delayed.

One of Serdyukov’s most unpopular moves was shrinking the officer corps. Although most of the officers being let go were not really needed, this move elicited many protests from active-duty and retired officers. The mass officer firings continued anyway. Shrinking the officer corps hurt morale, as expected. Moreover, most of the good officers had left after the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, and the Russian military saw its budget slashed by 80 percent. Building an NCO corps was difficult because the 1930s reforms had gotten rid of it, as officers, all members of the Communist Party, were considered more politically reliable than NCOs. The big problem was the collapse of Soviet military industries. With orders from the Russian military disappearing in the 1990s, many of these firms disappeared or switched to civilian products. Those that survived did so by taking on export orders. The defense industry lost its best people, who left for better-paying jobs overseas or for new non-defense firms in Russia.

The latest round of reforms comes from Vladimir Putin, who blames the generals and military staff for failing to identify and address the problem. The generals were reluctant to tell Putin that he is the problem because the gangster kleptocracy he uses to rule Russia is thoroughly corrupt, starting with Putin personally, and makes everything for sale all the time. Russia was corrupt before Putin took over, but that has dramatically escalated since then. Putin refuses to believe that Russian forces cannot defeat the Ukrainians. Putin also refuses to believe that it is the Ukrainian willingness to fight the Russian invaders, and not just all the military aid sent by NATO nations, that causes this. Putin also doesn’t want to hear about Russian soldiers avoiding service in Ukraine, refusing to fight once they got there, and often deserting if compelled to fight. Most junior officers agree with their troops but are much less likely to desert or remind their superiors that the Russian situation in Ukraine has become increasingly difficult.

By remaining in Ukraine, Russia continues to suffer high economic costs caused by the economic sanctions imposed by most Western nations. Russian leaders realize even now that, if the cost of continuing the war against Ukraine reaches the point where more Russians experience declining living standards, they might lose. Ukraine was not about defending Mother Russia, as it was during World War 2, when Russians were proud of their successful effort to halt the German invaders and then defeat Germany with some help from Western nations. Ukraine is different, as Russia is the invader. Many Russians are not comfortable with that and don’t understand why their government would invade a neighbor. The invasion failed, and the Russian people are paying for it in terms of Russian lives lost and growing hardship from sanctions and the war’s cost.

Soon, the biggest priority became improving the economy, which meant addressing the harsh economic sanctions imposed by Western nations. That left Russia with only two trading partners: Iran and North Korea. These allies could supply some weapons but little else.

Then there are the internal problems that weaken Russia's ability to fight the Ukrainians. Internal fighting between Russian troops belonging to different ethnic groups sometimes turns deadly. These animosities often disrupt combat operations because the groups don’t trust each other. Similar problems occur between regular troops and irregulars. Both are supposed to cooperate in combat, but that often does not happen. Commanders often struggle to get these different types of soldiers to cooperate in combat. These off-duty differences don’t disappear when the fighting starts. Another problem with maintaining troop morale is providing adequate combat equipment, including helmets, protective vests, and combat glasses to protect eyes from the tiny but injurious debris created during combat. Economic sanctions have prevented Russia from manufacturing all this essential equipment for its soldiers. To deal with that, Russia smuggles in equipment from China via Turkish companies, using a variety of misdirection and deception they have developed over the years.

James Dunnigan

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