Ukraine’s drone missions operate using SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses) drones to home in on and destroy air defense radars. This allows subsequent drones or missiles to reach their targets unhindered. Currently, attacks involve up to 3,000 drones for SEAD and attack missions. Ukraine has rapidly scaled long-range drone production, with FP-1/FP-2 units produced at rates of 200 per day, and plans to increase these attacks with more drones, including upgraded models in development.

There are a lot of other things drones can do, like the recent incident when a Ukrainian naval drone ran up on a beach on the Black Sea coast and landed a mobile ground combat drone armed with a machine gun. Ukraine has been using thousands of aerial drones to attack Russian targets in the Crimean Peninsula, which Russia has occupied since 2014. By 2024, Ukrainian drones had forced the remains of the Russian Black Sea Fleet to take refuge in distant Black Sea ports. Recently, Ukrainian drones attacked and sank or damaged over three dozen Russian commercial ships operating in the Black Sea. This is part of an effort to halt Russian commercial and military naval operations in the Black Sea. That the Ukrainians can do this, without having much of a navy, just a few patrol boats, is humiliating.

Drones cannot replace warships operating on the high seas, but the Black Sea is not the high seas. It is unclear if naval and ground combat drones could play a significant role in a large amphibious invasion. No one has tried it yet, but the Ukrainians may be the first to do so if they use amphibious attacks to retake Crimea. The Ukrainian military cannot afford heavy casualties. Over the last year, the Ukrainian military has used lots of drones, including ground combat models, either armed or for transport. Currently, only one Ukrainian soldier is a casualty for every eight Russians.

To do this, Ukraine uses 30 percent more and better drones than Russia. In the first half of 2025, Russia sharply increased its use of attack drones, primarily FPV (First Person View) drones. The Ukrainian drone advantage slowed, stopped, and sometimes reversed the momentum of the Russians' offensive operations

A similar situation applies to the daily percentage of drones operating with FOG (Fiber Optic Guidance). These drones are controlled via a fiber-optic cable that can be many kilometers long. FOG drones cannot be jammed. For Ukraine, 32 percent of drones use FOG guidance, while the Russians use only 24 percent. Ukraine has been faster with new innovations in drone design. The Russians imitate this progress but are always a few months or more behind.

In some parts of the 900-kilometer front line, the Russians can concentrate more drones for offensive operations than the Ukrainians. Fewer Russian offensives are underway because of high casualties, troop shortages, and declining morale. The Ukrainians have taken advantage of this and are reclaiming more territory. At this rate, the Russians might be pushed out of Ukraine by 2027. One factor making this possible is the increasing number of long-range attacks against Russian refineries, pipelines, weapons, and electronics manufacturing. Last month, in a particularly bold move, Ukraine sent nearly a hundred drones against the Plesetsk Cosmodrome, which is 1,500 kilometers from Ukraine. While the Russians admitted they had to delay some operations at Plesetsk, it remains unclear how much, if any, damage the drones caused to the Plesetsk facility.

These Ukrainian attacks deep inside Russia are disrupting Russian efforts to use their air defense systems effectively, or at all. Russia must move the S-300 and S-400 air defense batteries by rail or barge to new locations. The Ukrainian drones are now equipped with guidance systems that can attack one of several targets, depending on which target has the fewest air defense systems protecting it. The air defense crisis also means front-line troops often have little or no air defense.

For Russia, the most damaging Ukrainian innovation in drone warfare is their use of AI/Artificial Intelligence for drone targeting systems. The AI drone contains a targeting system that finds targets. The AI drone operator confirms which targets are real and, once a target is confirmed, the AI targeting system needs no further communication. It resists all forms of jamming.

FPV drones have radically changed modern warfare. These drones are an omnipresent aerial threat to armored vehicles and infantry. Each FPV drone costs less than $1,000. Operators use the drone's camera to see what is below and find targets. Armed FPV operators are several kilometers away to decide when their FPV drones will drop explosives on an armored vehicle, which has thinner armor on top, or on infantry in the open or in trenches. To do so, drone operators often work in pairs, with one flying behind the other and focusing on the big picture while seeking a likely target. When the reconnaissance drone finds a target, the armed drone is directed to it. The two FPV drone operators are usually in the same room or tent and can take control of new drones, which are lined up and brought outside for launch when needed. Reconnaissance drones are often unarmed so they can spend more time in the air searching for a target.

The Ukrainians developed the FPV drone in 2022, when only a few FPV drone attacks were recorded. The Ukrainian Army was the first to appreciate the potential of FPV drones. By the summer of 2023, the Russian Army also began to use FPV drones in greater numbers. Since then, the number of FPV drone attacks has grown exponentially on both sides. Only 12% of those attacks destroy a target, whether a vehicle, a group of infantry, or even a sniper firing through a window from inside a building. In this case, the armed FPV drone would fly through the window and explode in the room the sniper was in. The only defense is having a nearby open door the sniper can run to or dive through as the FPV drone approaches. Sometimes that isn’t possible because the armed FPV drone comes down from above the window and then in. You don’t see those coming until it’s too late.

In 2026, Ukraine plans to build at least eight million drones. They built about five million drones last year. In 2024, they built 1.5 million drones. There have been problems. Chinese component producers are having a hard time keeping up, and last year, to assist the Russians, China halted sending drone components to Ukraine. Suppliers in Europe, the United States, and elsewhere quickly stepped in. Nearly 90 percent of Ukrainian drones are built entirely in Ukraine, while the rest use imported parts or complete assemblies. Some Ukrainian firms have improvised by using plywood and similar materials for their drones. For FPV (first-Person View) drones, cheaper is better if the drone can hit its first and only target. Most Ukrainian drones are FPV models, which are considered ammunition.

Both sides now use FPV drones, but they use them differently in combat. The Ukrainians seek out high-value targets like armored vehicles, electronic warfare equipment, anti-aircraft systems, and storage sites for munitions or other supplies. Russian supply trucks are another prime target.

James F Dunnigan