Information Warfare: Winning The App War In Ukraine

Archives

November 10, 2022: Ukrainian app developers recently created an app (ePPO) to enable civilians to quickly report incoming Russian cruise missiles, especially the new Iranian Shahed 136 Russia obtained which is low (down to 100 meters) slow (180 kilometers an hour) and noisy. These are often sent in small swarms (4 to 12 missiles) and at night. With ePPO all a user has to do is point the phone in the direction of the missile and press a large button. The information quickly arrives at the local air defense headquarters where numerous reports are instantly combined on a computer display so the officer on duty can instantly send the data to nearby air defense units. With that kind of information, more and more of the Shahed 136s and even some larger, faster cruise missiles are detected and shot down. Civilians with a “take cover” app get an alert to do that if they are in the target area. Suppliers of this data are verified by another app, Diia, which contains user identification documents

Earlier the phones with Diia had a similar app to instantly report any enemy activity. For Ukrainians in Russian occupied territory, this often provided important target locations so Ukrainian guided missiles could destroy weapons storage sites as well as headquarters or troops concentrations. Technically, the use of this app in enemy territory makes the user a partisan and subject to attack. This did not discourage many Ukrainians, who noted that the Russians were already attacking civilians without any provocation.

As soon as the invasion began in February, civilians were using chat apps to quickly report where the enemy had been spotted. Ukraine’s cell phone services kept operating during the invasion because of access to the Starlink satellite system. The Russians had no such access and not many military radios. The Russians were moving and fighting blind compared Ukrainian troops and civilians with cell phones.

This persistent cell phone service enabled families to keep track of their men, and women, in the military. Apps for that had already been used in many other countries as well as numerous navigation, first aid and fire-control apps that had been developed over the last decade. Many of these apps were also used by police, firemen and first-responders.

The military has had problems with some of these apps revealing troop locations to an enemy equipped to detect such use. This led to many apps being banned from use in combat zones until the flaws could be fixed. Although Russia also had some military apps, they had fewer of them and less opportunity to get cell phone service in Ukraine. The Russians were also unable to develop new apps to deal with new developments in the war. Ukraine always had a more robust and prolific app development community and that turned out to be a military superiority the Russians did not expect, much less deal with.

 

X

ad

Help Keep Us From Drying Up

We need your help! Our subscription base has slowly been dwindling.

Each month we count on your contribute. You can support us in the following ways:

  1. Make sure you spread the word about us. Two ways to do that are to like us on Facebook and follow us on Twitter.
  2. Subscribe to our daily newsletter. We’ll send the news to your email box, and you don’t have to come to the site unless you want to read columns or see photos.
  3. You can contribute to the health of StrategyPage.
Subscribe   contribute   Close